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This dissertation investigates partial disintermediation and co-opetition in
platform-based ecosystems and modern supply chains. Disintermediation has been
an intriguing puzzle for managers for the last several decades, but recent develop-
ment in electronic commerce makes the management of this trade-o even more
challenging. The rst type of partial disintermediation I study, often referred to
as \platform envelopment", is widely observed in platform-based businesses. Plat-
form owners often rely on complementary innovations from third-party providers
(i.e., third-party contents), while providing their own products/services to consumers
(i.e., rst-party contents). The second type of partial disintermediation I study is
referred to as \supplier encroachment". Due to the fast development of electronic
commerce, many manufacturers have established their direct-selling channels on the
internet (e.g., online stores), instead of completely relying on third-party retailers to
reach customers. The widespread observation of disintermediation and the resulting
vi
co-opetition behaviors in various industries has motivated me to investigate two im-
portant questions: (1) what's the impact of partial disintermediation on consumer
demand and rm prots? (2) what strategies can be used to manage the co-opetition
relationship? I use both analytical modeling and empirical methods to study the im-
pact of disintermediation on consumer behaviors, rm prots, and social welfare. The
ndings provide managerial insights into how to manage the co-opetition dilemma
due to disintermediation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation investigates partial disintermediation and co-opetition in
platform-based ecosystems and modern supply chains. Disintermediation has been an
intriguing puzzle for managers for the last several decades, but recent development in
electronic commerce makes the management of this trade-o even more challenging.
The rst type of disintermediation I study is often referred to as supplier
encroachment. Due to the fast development of eCommerce, many manufacturers
have established their direct-selling channels on the internet (e.g., online stores),
instead of purely relying on third-party retailers to reach customers. Examples of
supplier encroachment abound: Amazon's Kindle is available through Amazon's own
web-site as well as through major in-store and on-line channels of retailers such as
Best Buy; Apple operates its own on-line and in-store direct channels, yet also sells
through a variety of major retailers and telecommunications service providers; Many
branded apparel manufacturers, e.g., Coach, Nike, and Tommy Hilger, etc., sell
through traditional retailers as well as through their own \factory outle" channels;
In the travel industry, hotels and airlines generate sales though their own channels
and through brokerage services like Travelocity, Expedia, and Orbitz, etc.
The rst essay Li et al. (2014) in the dissertation investigates how a supplier's
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direct channel impacts the material/information ow in the competing retailer chan-
nel. For a symmetric information setting, prior research has shown that supplier
encroachment into a retailer's market can mitigate double marginalization and thus
benet the supplier and the supply chain. Our paper studies an asymmetric informa-
tion setting where the retailer has private demand information of the local market.
Supplier encroachment may alter the material/information ow in an intriguing way.
We nd that the launch of the supplier's direct channel can result in costly signaling
behavior on the part of the retailer, in which he reduces his order quantity. Such
a downward order distortion can amplify double marginalization. As a result, sup-
plier encroachment can hurt both the retailer and the supplier. We further explore
the implications of these ndings for strategic information management. Comple-
menting the conventional understanding, we show that with the ability to encroach,
the supplier may prefer to sell to either a better informed or an uninformed re-
tailer in dierent scenarios. On the other hand, as a result of a supplier developing
encroachment capability, a retailer may either choose not to develop an advanced
informational capability, or become more willing to nd a means of credibly sharing
his information with the supplier. Thus, competition between the supplier and the
retailer may actually increase information transparency in the supply chain.
The second essay Li et al. (2015) in the dissertation investigates how a sup-
plier's direct channel may interfere with her nonlinear pricing strategy. The lit-
erature have investigated the impact of supplier encroachment, assuming uniform
wholesale price contracts and symmetric information between the supplier (she) and
the retailer (he). However, in practices, retailers very often have private information
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about market conditions. In this paper, we investigate how the supplier's encroach-
ment capability aects the retailer's information strategy, information rents, and the
eciency of nonlinear pricing. We nd that the supplier's direct channel may ei-
ther enhance or hinder her optimal pricing strategies, and fundamentally alter the
structure of the optimal contracts. We observe upward distortion in equilibrium -
the supplier intentionally sells an ineciently large quantity through the retailer, in
order to convince the retailer that she will not sell a large quantity through her direct
channel. This upward distortion is in contrast to the well-known eciency at the
top property in screening contracts. Thus, supplier encroachment has two opposing
eects. On one hand, the ability to shift sales to the direct channel allows the sup-
plier to reduce information rents with less sacrice of eciency; but on the other
hand, by introducing the possibility of her own opportunistic behavior (i.e., ex post
encroachment), it can result in upward distortion of the quantities sold through the
reselling channel, which is a new source of ineciency. Depending upon the relative
eciency of the reselling channel and the demand distribution, either of these two
eects may dominate and the supplier's ability to encroach may either benet or
hurt both the supplier and the retailer.
The second type of disintermediation I study, often referred to as platform
envelopment, is widely observed in platform-based businesses. Platform owners of-
ten seek for complementary innovations from third-party providers (third-party con-
tents), while at the same time provide their own applications to consumers (rst-
party contents). The third essay Li and Agarwal (2014) in the dissertation studies
platform integration with rst-party applications. Platform owners often choose
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to provide tighter integration with their own complementary applications (i.e., rst-
party applications) as compared to that with other complementary third-party appli-
cations. We study the impact of such integration on consumer demand for rst-party
applications and competing third-party applications by exploring Facebook's integra-
tion of Instagram in its photo-sharing application ecosystem. We nd that consumers
obtain additional value from Instagram after its integration with Facebook, leading
to a large increase in the use of Instagram for Facebook photo-sharing. While con-
sumer valuations of small third-party applications decrease, consumer valuations of
big third-party applications slightly increase after the integration event. As a result,
big third-party applications face much smaller reduction in demand as compared to
small third-party applications. Interestingly, a large fraction of the new users Insta-
gram attracted are new users who did not use any photo-sharing application, rather
than incumbent users of third-party applications. As a consequence, the overall de-
mand for the photo-sharing application ecosystem actually increases, which suggests
that Facebook's integration strategy benets the complementary market overall. Our
results highlight the value of platform integration for rst-party applications and the
application ecosystem overall, and have implications for strategic management of
rst-party applications in the presence of third-party applications.
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Chapter 2
Supplier Encroachment under Asymmetric
Information
2.1 Introduction
Many upstream manufacturers have invested in direct channels such as online
stores, catalog sales, and factory outlets (Nair and Pleasance 2005).1 With these
established direct channels, manufacturers may sell their products directly as well
as indirectly through the reselling channels (e.g., distributors, wholesalers, retail-
ers). Consequently, competition can arise between the resellers and their suppliers,
a phenomenon often referred to as \supplier encroachment."
While retail competition (competition among resellers) has been extensively
studied and well understood, supplier encroachment has received much less attention
and has distinct features. A study by Arya et al. (2007) shows that supplier encroach-
ment endows the supplier with a mechanism to control the selling price in the retail
market, and consequently motivates her to reduce her wholesale price. The com-
bination of these two eects mitigates double marginalization and can benet both
the supplier and the reseller when the latter has a signicant eciency advantage in
the retail process. While the existing literature has considered various elements that
1This chapter is based on Li et al. (2014). I appreciate my adviser and co-author Stephen Gilbert
and Guoming Lai for their guidance and feedback when I was writing this paper.
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may inuence the eects of supplier encroachment, the information structure is often
assumed to be symmetric in the supply chain. In practice, resellers often have better
knowledge of the market potential than the upstream suppliers, due to their exper-
tise and superior forecasting ability in the selling process as well as rich rst-hand
sales data. Although conventional wisdom holds that resellers necessarily benet
from having access to private market information, our results demonstrate that this
is not always the case when the supplier has developed its own direct channel.
In this paper, we build upon the supplier encroachment framework based
on Cournot competition from Arya et al. (2007) by incorporating an asymmetric
information structure, where the reseller knows the realization of the market size
but the encroaching supplier knows only the prior distribution of the market size.
Credible information communication is not available. In the face of information
disadvantage, the supplier wants to infer the true market size from the reseller's
order quantity to more properly decide the direct selling quantity. Anticipating
the supplier's strategy, the reseller may purposely distort his order quantity for his
own benet. The interaction between the supplier's and the reseller's incentives can
result in an inecient downstream signaling outcome. Regardless of which market
size is observed by the reseller, he would like the supplier to believe it is small.
Consequently, when the reseller observes a small market, he may need to distort his
order quantity downward in order to send a credible signal that the market size is
small. This downward distortion, if it occurs, amplies double marginalization and
may hurt both the supplier and the reseller. As a result, we nd that, in the presence
of asymmetric information, the supplier's development of encroachment capability
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can lead to \lose-win" or \lose-lose" outcomes for the supplier and the reseller in
addition to the \win-win" and \win-lose" outcomes that are reported in Arya et al.
(2007).
We then explore the implications of supplier encroachment for information
management in supply chains. Prior literature has shown that with a reselling chan-
nel alone, the supplier is indierent between a reseller who is better informed or
equally informed. However, we nd that when the supplier has the ability to en-
croach, she strictly prefers to sell to a better informed reseller when her eciency
disadvantage in the selling process is not large; otherwise, she prefers to sell to an
equally informed reseller. On the other hand, prior literature shows that without the
supplier's direct channel, the reseller always prefers to be better informed. Whereas,
after the supplier launches her direct channel, the incumbent reseller can be discour-
aged from obtaining advanced information in a wide range of parameters. While
this prevents downward distortion of the reseller's order quantity and benets the
supplier, it expands the range of parameters for which total supply chain prots are
lower under encroachment. Our analysis also provides an interesting implication on
information sharing. It is well known in the literature that, in standard bi-lateral
monopoly settings in which production costs are linear, the supplier is restricted to
setting a linear wholesale price, and the reseller determines the output quantity, the
reseller benets from having private information about demand. In contrast, we nd
that in the presence of the supplier's direct channel, the reseller may prefer that
the supplier has access to the same information that he has over being privately
informed.
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2.2 Related Literature
The eects of supplier encroachment have been discussed in the literature.
Empirical studies nd that supplier encroachment can possibly lower a reseller's ef-
fort to sell a product (Fein and Anderson 1997) and it can also aect brand image
(Frazier and Lassar 1996). However, several analytical studies have shown that sup-
plier encroachment can mitigate double marginalization and thus benet both the
supplier and the reseller. For example, Chiang et al. (2003) demonstrate that a sup-
plier's threat to sell through a direct channel causes the reseller to lower his selling
price, which can benet both parties. In another study, Tsay and Agrawal (2004) in-
corporate sales eorts that can be exerted by the supplier as well as the reseller, and
show that in such a context, the launch of a supplier direct channel can still benet
both parties. The eect of mitigating double marginalization is also found by Cat-
tani et al. (2006) based on a model with horizontal dierentiation. They reveal that
supplier encroachment can benet both the supplier and the reseller if the supplier
commits to the same selling price and the direct channel is not as convenient for con-
sumers as is the existing reselling channel. Similarly, Arya et al. (2007) demonstrate
based on a quantity competition model that the supplier's direct sale not only adds
another source of revenue for her but also motivates her to oer a lower wholesale
price to the reseller. Consequently, encroachment has the potential to benet the
supplier as well as the reseller, especially when the latter enjoys a signicant cost
advantage in the selling process. Our work complements this stream of research by
allowing for the reseller to have private information about the market size, and this
leads to results that are quite dierent from those found in the literature, including
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the fact that supplier encroachment can sometimes amplify double marginalization
and hurt both the supplier and the reseller when the latter is privately informed
about demand.
Our work is also related to the literature that investigates the incentives of
information sharing in supply chains. Cachon and Lariviere (2001) explore contracts
through which a downstream buyer can credibly share private demand information
with a supplier. Li (2002) and Zhang (2002) investigate information sharing in a
setting where a central supplier sells to multiple competing resellers and they show
that without particular incentives, the resellers will withhold their private demand
information instead of sharing it with the supplier in equilibrium. With a condential
agreement by which the supplier does not leak received information, competing re-
sellers might be willing to share their private demand information with the supplier,
which can drive down the wholesale price. Ha and Tong (2008) and Ha et al. (2011)
study the incentives of information sharing within two competing supply chains, con-
sidering the eects of information accuracy, nonlinear production costs, as well as a
nonlinear pricing schedule. Two recent papers are similar to ours in considering how
a reseller's concern over leaking his private demand information may aect how he
orders from a supplier. Anand and Goyal (2009) and Kong et al. (2013) investigate a
one supplier-two reseller setting where the supplier may leak the market information
learned from the incumbent reseller's order quantity to an entrant reseller. Anand
and Goyal (2009) show under an exogenous wholesale price contract that the supplier
always leaks information to stimulate downstream order quantity. Consequently, the
incumbent reseller may purposely block information dissemination by ordering the
9
same quantity for any market size. Kong et al. (2013) considers a similar setting but
demonstrate that a revenue sharing scheme may prevent the supplier from leaking in-
formation, and consequently can result in pareto gains for all parties. Similar to this
latter paper, we allow for an endogenous wholesale price, but we consider a setting in
which the supplier's own direct channel, rather than a second reseller, is the potential
beneciary of information gained from the informed reseller. In addition, we consider
the eect that a supplier's development of a direct channel can have upon her own
as well as the reseller's preferences among dierent information structures, and nd
that encroachment may encourage the reseller to share his private information with
the supplier. Consequently, our perspective of analyzing how supplier encroachment
aects the ows of materials and information in a supply chain is quite dierent from
either of these papers.
Finally, our work is related to the recent work of Jiang et al. (2011). In
their study, an independent seller sells a product through a platform. The platform
owner can also acquire the product and has monopolistic control over the access
to the market. In particular, the platform owner can incur a xed cost, to sell
the independent seller's product and take away all of the demand from the latter
if strong sales are revealed. They show a pooling outcome where the independent
seller's incentive to hide the private demand information by exerting the same selling
eort may hurt the platform owner but benet himself. In contrast, we assume that
both rms have the access to the market, but the supplier has full control over the
access to the product (i.e., the reseller has no alternative source of supply). For this
setting, we show that no pooling equilibrium can survive the intuitive criterion, and
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that, in the resulting separating equilibria, supplier encroachment can either benet
or hurt the two rms.
2.3 The Model
We consider a supplier (she) that sells a product through a reseller (he), but
she also has her own direct channel and may sell the product directly to consumers.
We normalize both the production cost of the supplier and the selling cost for the
reseller to zero. To allow for the possibility that the supplier may be less ecient in
retail operations than is the reseller, we assume that the supplier incurs a per-unit
selling cost of c for each unit that she sells directly to consumers. Consumer demand
follows a linear, downward sloping demand function, P = a   Q, where Q is the
total number of the product deployed for sale, P is the market clearing price, and a
represents the market size. Note that it is without further loss of generality that we
have normalized the slope of this demand function to be  1.
The above setup is nearly identical to that of Arya et al. (2007). However, to
capture the notion that the reseller is closer to the market and may also have better
expertise in forecasting the demand than the supplier, we assume that the market
size a is, ex ante, random which can be either large (a = aH) with probability  and
small (a = aL) with probability 1   , where aH > aL > 0; the reseller can observe
the true market size privately, before ordering from the supplier, while the supplier
knows only the prior distribution of the market size.2 Let  = aH + (1  ) aL,
2For simplicity, we assume here that the reseller learns the market size perfectly, while the
supplier only has the prior knowledge. The insights we reveal, however, will continue to hold, even
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representing the expected market size, and 2 = (aH   )2 + (1   )(aL   )2 be
the variance of the market size distribution. We restrict our attention to the cases in
which aL >

2
, so that, as we will show later, the reseller's equilibrium order quantity
is strictly positive for both market sizes without supplier encroachment. Such an
assumption will simplify the analysis and can also highlight the contrast between the
cases with and without supplier encroachment. Finally, we assume that the supplier
uses a linear wholesale price only contract. Linear pricing schemes are widely used
in practice and also are commonly assumed in the literature that studies channel
structure (e.g., McGuire and Staelin 1983; Lariviere and Porteus 2001; Cachon 2003;
Arya et al. 2007). Similar results hold even if the supplier can implement nonlinear
pricing through a menu of contracts.
Figure 2.1 details the timeline of the model. First, the supplier oers a whole-
sale contract to the reseller, which contains a unit wholesale price w. The reseller
who has observed the true market size, a = aH or a = aL, orders qR units from the
supplier. The supplier then decides the quantity qS which she sells through her direct
channel. The market clearing price P is realized according to P = ai   (qR + qS)
for i 2 fH;Lg, and the two parties obtain their nal prots.3 The assumption that
the reseller orders before the supplier determines her order quantity is justied by
the fact that the supplier has no way to credibly commit to refrain from revising her
own order quantity after receiving the reseller's order.
if both of them receive noisy signals of the market size, as long as the reseller is more precisely
informed about the demand than the supplier.
3This inverse demand function implicitly assumes that consumers perceive the two channels to
be perfect substitutes. While allowing for partial substitutability would complicate the analysis, it
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The supplier offers a 
wholesale contract
The supplier decides the stocking 
level for her direct channel
The market clearing price is realized, so as 
the profits of the reseller and the supplier
The reseller who observes the market 
size decides the order quantity
Figure 2.1: The timeline of the model.
2.4 Analysis
Before beginning our analysis of how the development of supplier encroach-
ment capability (i.e., the launch of the direct channel) aects the interactions between
a supplier and a reseller, we rst present the benchmark in which the supplier lacks
this capability and sells the product only through the reseller.
2.4.1 Benchmark without Encroachment
When the supplier lacks the infrastructure of a direct channel, she has eec-
tively provided a credible commitment that she will not encroach. Then, given the
wholesale price w and the market size ai; i 2 fH;Lg, the reseller determines his order
quantity as the solution to:
max
qR
[ai   qR   w]qR:
It is easy to obtain the optimal order quantity of the reseller for each market size ai,
i 2 fH;Lg:
qNR (w; ai) =
ai   w
2
:
would not provide additional insights.
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Recall that the supplier does not observe the true market size, but anticipates
the reseller's decision. Thus, the supplier chooses her wholesale price as the solution
to:
max
w
E

qNR (w; a)w

:
In equilibrium, the supplier's optimal wholesale price is wN = 
2
, and the expected
prots of the reseller and the supplier are:
R =
2 + 42
16
and S =
2
8
; (2.1)
where the lower case  indicates that there is no encroachment.
2.4.2 Encroachment Analysis
Let us now enhance the model to allow for supplier encroachment, by which
we mean the supplier has her direct channel in place and can choose to sell directly.
Since the supplier does not observe the market demand directly, she will use the
information revealed from the reseller's order quantity to make her decision on the
direct sale quantity. Because the reseller anticipates the supplier's reaction to his
order, a signaling game may arise in which the reseller may purposely alter his order
quantity. In particular, as is often the case, there are two mutually exclusive types
of equilibria that might arise. In the rst, the reseller orders a distinct quantity
for each market size, and his order perfectly reveals the market size to the supplier.
In the second, he orders the same quantity for both market sizes, and his order
is uninformative. The former case represents a separating outcome while the latter
corresponds to a pooling outcome. Typically, such signaling games can have multiple
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equilibria depending on the players' belief specication. However, this obstacle can be
overcome by using the intuitive criterion, which is a classical equilibrium renement
developed by Cho and Kreps (1987). As we can show (see the appendix) that pooling
equilibrium cannot survive the intuitive criterion in our model, we focus directly on
separating equilibrium. That is, all of the formulation and analysis presented below
are based on the fact that the supplier can perfectly infer the market size from the
reseller's order quantity. Furthermore, we conne our formulation and analysis to
those cases (with respect to c, , aH and aL) where the supplier optimally sells a
positive quantity for each market size (the boundary condition is provided when we
characterize the equilibrium). Displaying the full analysis for the cases where the
supplier optimally chooses not to encroach would complicate the exposition without
adding any interesting insights.
We rst formulate the supplier's belief. We use aj(qR) to indicate the market
size that the supplier believes after receiving an order quantity qR from the reseller.
It is intuitive that the reseller will order more when the true market size is large
than when the market size is small. Thus, we apply the following belief structure
depending on a threshold order quantity q^R(w) for a given wholesale price w (other
belief formulations exist that can lead to the same equilibrium result):
j(qR) =

H if qR > q^R(w),
L o/w.
That is, the supplier believes that the market size is large if the reseller's order
quantity qR > q^R(w) and small otherwise. Then, after observing the reseller's order
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quantity qR, the supplier determines her direct selling quantity by solving:
max
qS
[aj(qR)   qR   qS   c]qS;
which yields the optimal direct selling quantity:
qS(qR) =
aj(qR)   qR   c
2
:
In anticipation of the supplier's belief and reaction, the reseller, who knows the true
market size ai, i 2 fH;Lg, solves:
max
qR
[ai   qR   qS(qR)  w]qR: (2.2)
Let qR(w; ai) denote the optimal solution of (2.2). Notice that for a given order
quantity, the reseller would be better o if the supplier believed the market size were
small than if she believed it were large. Thus, the reseller may purposely order a
lower quantity to induce the supplier to believe the market size is small. The supplier
will adjust q^R(w) taking the reseller's incentive into account. To solve this problem,
we dene the following equilibrium concept.
Denition 1. Given any wholesale price w, a perfect Bayesian separating equilibrium
is reached if aj(qR(w;ai)) = ai for each market size ai, i 2 fH;Lg; that is, there exists
a q^R(w) such that qR(w; aH) > q^R(w) while qR(w; aL)  q^R(w).
To facilitate the characterization of the equilibrium, we dene the following
functions:
Vij(qR) =

ai   qR   aj   qR   c
2
  w

qR; 8i; j 2 fH;Lg:
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Vij(qR) is the reseller's prot if the true market size is ai while, given the reseller's
order quantity qR, the supplier believes that the market size is aj.
Lemma 1. Vij(qR) is concave in qR for any i; j 2 fH;Lg, and there is a unique
maximizer of Vii(qR), that is, qR =
 
ai 2w+c
2
+
, for each i 2 fH;Lg.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the reseller's possible prot functions, Vij(qR). From
Lemma 1, we can clearly see that if the supplier could also observe the market size
then the reseller would order qR =
 
ai 2w+c
2
+
, for each market size ai. When the
supplier does not have complete information, the reseller may have an incentive to
place an order lower than
 
ai 2w+c
2
+
. It is easy to see that the supplier would
never benet from setting a wholesale price, w  aH+c
2
, since this would prevent the
reseller from ordering anything for each market size. Therefore, we implicitly assume
w < aH+c
2
for all the analysis below.
Lemma 2. VHL(qR) > VHH(qR) for any qR > 0 and there exists
qR(w) =
2aH   aL   2w + c 
p
(aH   aL) (3aH   aL   4w + 2c)
2
<
aH   2w + c
2
such that VHL(qR(w)) = VHH
 
aH 2w+c
2

, VHL(qR) < VHH
 
aH 2w+c
2

when qR <
qR(w), and VHL(qR) > VHH
 
aH 2w+c
2

when qR(w) < qR <
aH 2w+c
2
. Furthermore,
let w = 3aL aH+2c
4
. Then, qR(w) S
 
aL 2w+c
2
+
when w S w.
Figure 2.2 provides an illustration of the results of Lemma 2 and the threshold
qR(w). Lemma 2 implies that if the threshold q^R(w) in the supplier's belief is above
qR(w), then if the reseller observes a large market he would order less than
aH 2w+c
2
,
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Figure 2.2: Demonstration of the reseller's possible prot functions and the threshold
qR(w). The parameters are:  = 0:3, aH = 1:2, aL = 1, w = 0:2, and c = 0:2. In
this example, w < w = 0:55.
to induce the supplier to believe that the market size is small. Therefore, in order
for a separating equilibrium to exist, q^R(w) cannot be greater than qR(w). With this
intuition, the following proposition characterizes a unique separating equilibrium
that survives the intuitive criterion.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique perfect Bayesian separating equilibrium that
survives the intuitive criterion, in which the reseller's order quantity satises qR(w; aH) =
aH 2w+c
2
and qR(w; aL) = q^R(w) = min
n 
aL 2w+c
2
+
; qR(w)
o
, and the supplier's di-
rect selling quantity is qS(qR(w; ai)) =
ai qR(w;ai) c
2
, 8i 2 fH;Lg:
In this equilibrium, the reseller orders aH 2w+c
2
when the market size is large,
which coincides with the optimal quantity he would order if the supplier also observes
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the market size. In other words, for the large market size, the reseller's order quantity
will not be distorted as the information of the market size becomes private to the
reseller. However, when the market size is small, distortion of the reseller's order
quantity can arise due to information asymmetry. We can observe from Lemma 2
that only when w  w, would qR(w; aL) coincide with
 
aL 2w+c
2
+
, and when w < w,
qR(w; aL) <
 
aL 2w+c
2
+
. That is, if the wholesale price w < w, then, for the small
market size, the reseller will order less in the presence of asymmetric information
than he would if the market size were observable to the supplier. In order to credibly
signal that the market size is small, the reseller needs to downward distort the order
quantity to such a level that he would have no incentive to mimic when observing the
large market size even if that would allow him to deceive the supplier. Consequently,
in equilibrium, the supplier can always learn the market size from the reseller's order
quantity and determines her direct selling quantity accordingly.
Recall from Arya et al. (2007) that the potential for mutual benet from
encroachment arises because the supplier lowers the wholesale price at the same time
that she stimulates the volume of sales through the reseller with the threat of her
own direct sales. However, in the presence of asymmetric information, the reseller's
propensity to downward distort his order quantity when the wholesale price is low
can dampen the supplier's willingness to reduce her wholesale price. Consequently,
informational asymmetry can reduce or eliminate the potential for mutual benet
from encroachment.
A deeper investigation of the reseller's order quantity for the small market
size can draw the following conclusion.
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Lemma 4. The reseller's equilibrium order quantity for the small market size satis-
es:
dqR(w;aL)dw  = 1 when w  w < aL+c2 and dqR(w;aL)dw  < 1 when w < w.
Lemma 4 asserts that the reseller's equilibrium order quantity under a small
market size, qR(w; aL), will be less responsive to the wholesale price (i.e., the order
quantity increases at a slower rate as the wholesale price decreases) in the region
with a distortion than without. As we will see later (at Proposition 5), the point
where w drops below w corresponds to a discontinuous drop in the price elasticity of
the reseller's order quantity and can drive up the supplier's wholesale price and thus
amplify double marginalization.
The supplier's wholesale pricing decision, in anticipation of the subsequent
subgames, can be expressed as:
max
w
E [qR(w; a)w + (a  qR(w; a)  qS(qR(w; a))  c) qS(qR(w; a))] : (2.3)
Proposition 5 provides the solution to (2.3) and the corresponding subgame equilib-
rium for the cases where the supplier encroaches for both market sizes.
Proposition 5. Given aH and aL, for any  2 (0; 1), there exists a threshold c()
such that in equilibrium,4
(1) the supplier's optimal wholesale price and the reseller's order quantity
follow:
4The threshold, c(), is the selling cost above which the supplier's direct selling quantity under
at least one market size reaches zero in equilibrium.
20
i) if c 2

0; 3
p
(aH aL)
4
i
, then w = 3aH c
6
, qR(w
; aH) = aH 2w
+c
2
and
qR(w
; aL) = 0;
ii) if c 2

3
p
(aH aL)
4
;min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
oi
, then w = 3 c
6
, qR(w
; aH) =
aH 2w+c
2
and qR(w
; aL) = aL 2w
+c
2
;
iii) if c 2

min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
; c()

, then w = minfw;wfg, where
wf >
3 c
6
is the smallest solution of the rst order condition of (2.3),5 qR(w
; aH) =
aH 2w+c
2
and qR(w
; aL) = qR(w);
(2) the supplier's direct selling quantity follows qS(qR(w
; ai)) =
ai qR(w;ai) c
2
,
8i 2 fH;Lg, which is positive for c 2 (0; c()).
Proposition 5 shows that when the supplier's selling cost is relatively small,
i.e., 0 <c  3
p
(aH aL)
4
, she chooses the wholesale price at a level such that the
reseller orders a positive quantity only if the market size is large. With an intermedi-
ate selling cost, 3
p
(aH aL)
4
< c  min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
, the supplier's optimal
wholesale price induces the reseller to order a positive quantity for each market size.
Further, the reseller who observes high demand will have no incentive to attempt to
mimic even the undistorted quantity that he would order with a small market size.
Consequently, when the supplier's selling cost is intermediate, we will see a natural
separating equilibrium in which there is no distortion of the reseller's order quan-
tity when the true market size is small. However, when the supplier's selling cost
is relatively large, min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
< c < c(), the reseller who observes a
5The rst order condition of (2.3) is (3aH   c   6w) + (1   )(aH + 2aL   c  
6w)

1 
q
aH aL
3aH aL+2c 4w

= 0.
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large market size would have an incentive to mimic an undistorted small order quan-
tity to deceive the supplier. As a result, the reseller will have to distort his order
quantity downward when he truly observes a small market size, in order to credibly
reveal the information to the supplier. In anticipation of this quantity distortion,
the supplier's optimal wholesale price will exceed the 3 c
6
that she would otherwise
oer in the absence of quantity distortion. Note that this is a direct outcome of
the discontinuous reduction in the price elasticity of the reseller's order quantity as
discussed below Lemma 4. Finally, note that we have restricted our analysis to the
cases where c < c() for which the supplier will sell a positive quantity through
her direct channel for each market size. For c  c(), the analysis becomes quite
complex because there may be cases in which the supplier sells nothing through her
direct channel for either the small or the large market size. Since further analysis of
these cases is unlikely to yield additional insights, we have restricted our attention
to those cases for which the supplier always encroaches.
With Proposition 5, we can assess the impact of supplier encroachment on the
supplier's as well as the reseller's protability. Let us denote by uppercase R and S
the equilibrium prots of the reseller and the supplier under encroachment when only
the reseller knows the true realization of market size. We rst focus on the cases with
small and intermediate direct selling costs, i.e., c 2

0;min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
oi
.
Proposition 6. The supplier is always better o in expectation by encroachment
(i.e., S > S) when c 2

0;min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
.
Proposition 6 shows that when the supplier's selling cost is relatively small
or intermediate, encroachment always increases the supplier's prot. In particular,
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when the direct selling cost is small, 0 < c < 3
p
(aH aL)
4
, by encroachment, the
supplier can set a wholesale price, w = 3aH c
6
, more appropriately targeting the
large market size than what she would oer without encroachment; on the other
hand, having the ability to sell the product directly with a small cost limits the
potential loss if the reseller does not order when the market size is small. When
the direct selling cost is intermediate, 3
p
(aH aL)
4
< c < min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
,
the situation faced by the supplier in our model is the most similar to what has
been explored in Arya et al. (2007). In particular, the reseller is induced to order a
positive but distinct quantity for each market size without any intentional distortion.
Supplier encroachment not only introduces another stream of revenues to the supplier
but also endows the supplier with a mechanism to control the selling price in the
retail market, which mitigates double marginalization.
For the reseller, although supplier encroachment causes him to lose the monopoly
power in his market, it may also lead to a lower wholesale price. As revealed in Arya
et al. (2007) with symmetric and full demand information, supplier encroachment
can benet or hurt the reseller depending on the supplier's direct selling cost. We
nd a similar result with asymmetric information.
Proposition 7. Given aH and aL, for any  2 (0; 1), there exists a threshold
c^R() such that the reseller is worse o in expectation by supplier encroachment
(i.e., R < R) when c 2 (0; c^R()) and better o (i.e., R > R) when c 2
c^R();min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
oi
.
Proposition 7 shows the existence of a threshold, c^R(), with respect to the
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supplier's direct selling cost. When the supplier's direct selling cost, c, is lower than
this threshold, the reseller is made worse o from losing the monopoly position in
the downstream market as the supplier encroaches. In contrast, when the supplier's
selling cost exceeds this threshold, the reseller enjoys a large eciency advantage in
the selling process, which helps him to gain more prot with a lower wholesale price
oered by an encroaching supplier. The benet from the reduction of the wholesale
price outweighs the loss of demand due to the supplier's direct competition under
encroachment. In particular, it can be shown that when  ! 0, c^R() ! 3
p
2aL
8
and when  ! 1, c^R() ! 3
p
2aH
8
, which coincides with the threshold characterized
in Arya et al. (2007) (with the market size a dened in their study being equal to
either aL or aH). Therefore, supplier encroachment can still lead to a \win-win"
outcome for the supplier and the reseller even under the setting with asymmetric
market information in the channel.
The above analysis focuses on the cases where the supplier has a relatively
small or intermediate selling cost. In such cases, the reseller has no incentive to
purposely distort his order quantity under the supplier's optimal wholesale price.
However, as we observe from Proposition 5, when the supplier's selling cost is rel-
atively large, the supplier will set a wholesale price under which the reseller will
downward distort his order quantity if the market size is small. Such a distortion
can take a toll on both the supplier and the reseller.
Remark 1. There exist aH , aL,  and c 2

min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
; c()

such
that both the supplier and the reseller are worse o in expectation by supplier en-
croachment.
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While it is challenging to derive the sucient and necessary condition under
which having the ability to encroach hurts the supplier herself as well as the reseller,
as a consequence of the fact that the supplier's optimal wholesale price takes a
complex implicit form when c 2

min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
; c()

, Remark 1 asserts
the existence of such scenarios. With information asymmetry, the reseller observing a
large market size has the incentive to order less to pretend to have observed a small
market to induce the supplier to sell less in her direct channel. For a suciently
small wholesale price, this incentive can cause the reseller to lower his order quantity
to credibly signal his information when the market size is truly small. Recall from
Lemma 4 that in the range of w for which distortion occurs, there is a reduction
in the magnitude of the price elasticity of the reseller's order quantity. As a result,
the anticipation of the reseller's potential distortion can cause the supplier to oer
a higher wholesale price, which consequently amplies double marginalization in
the indirect channel. In contrast to the \win-win" outcome revealed in the earlier
discussion, a \lose-lose" outcome can also arise if the supplier possesses the ability
to encroach while she has an intermediate selling cost and the probability of a large
market is low. This result does not occur in the analysis of Arya et al. (2007)
because it is driven by the information asymmetry between the reseller and the
supplier. It sounds an alarm over upstream encroachment when the downstream is
better informed. Supplier encroachment can create downstream ordering distortion
amid information dissemination, which harms channel eciency.
To gain a deeper intuition, we further conduct a numerical analysis to reveal
all possible outcomes. First, we nd that the presence of information asymmetry
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Figure 2.3: Demonstration of the impacts of supplier encroachment on the supplier's
and the reseller's prots with symmetric and asymmetric information settings. In
this example, aH = 1:35, aL = 1, and  = 0:10.
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can have a signicant impact on the benets of encroachment for both the supplier
and the reseller, and in general, this impact is stronger when the supplier's direct
selling cost c becomes larger (see Figure 2.3). However, for some range of c, the
presence of information asymmetry can also make supplier encroachment benet the
reseller more compared to the corresponding case with symmetric information. This
is because an uninformed supplier cannot tailor her optimal wholesale price to the
realized market size. Second and more interestingly, we can observe from Figure
2.4 that in the presence of information asymmetry, supplier encroachment can still
lead to either a \win-win" or a \win-lose" outcome for the supplier and reseller
respectively, but a \lose-win" or a \lose-lose" outcome is also possible. Recall from
Arya et al. (2007) that neither of these latter two outcomes arises as a result of the
development of encroachment capability under symmetric information. Specically,
even though the supplier benets from having encroachment capability for a relatively
wide range of parameters, she can still be worse o with a relatively small  (the
prior probability of the large market size) when her direct selling cost is intermediate
(see the left subplot of Figure 2.4) or the ratio of the two market sizes is neither
very large nor very small (see the right subplot of Figure 2.4). For the reseller,
he will benet from the supplier's ability to encroach, only if he enjoys a relatively
large advantage in the selling process while the ratio of the two market sizes is
small. Note that the equilibrium result in our study converges to that in Arya et al.
(2007) as aH
aL
approaches one so that there is no information asymmetry and the
signaling game does not occur. Although our results also converge perfectly to theirs
as  approaches one, we will not have similar convergence as  becomes arbitrarily
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small, since the signaling game will always arise and there will be a discontinuity
between the equilibrium result in our study and that in Arya et al. (2007). Such a
discontinuity is common among signaling games and is not unique to our model.
2.5 Implications for Information Management
Throughout the previous analysis, we have assumed that the reseller is en-
dowed with a better knowledge of the market scenario than that of the supplier.
In this subsection, we explore how the supplier's development of encroachment ca-
pability alters the extent to which the supplier and the reseller benet from the
possession of information. We explore this issue from three dierent perspectives.
First, we take the perspective of a supplier that may be able to choose among several
resellers with which to do business, and we address the issue of whether the supplier
should prefer to interact with a more or less informationally capable reseller (i.e.,
who can be better informed than the supplier or just equally informed). Second, we
take the perspective of a supplier who is in a bilateral monopoly relationship with
a single reseller, in which the reseller's decision to develop infrastructure to enhance
his informational capability is an endogenous decision. Here, we address the question
of how such an endogenized informational strategy aects the equilibrium prots of
the supplier and the reseller. Finally, we consider the possibility that the reseller can
share demand information with the supplier, and address the question of whether
encroachment impedes or facilitates information sharing.
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Figure 2.4: Demonstration of the impacts of supplier encroachment on the supplier's
and the reseller's protability. In this example, aL = 1:0. In the left plot, aH = 1:35;
in the right plot, c = 0:6.
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2.5.1 Preliminaries
In order to address the questions above, we must rst perform some prelim-
inary analysis to characterize the prots of the supplier and the reseller with and
without encroachment capability under two additional information structures: one
in which neither rm knows the realized market size, and another in which both
rms know the realized market size. As before, we use lower case R and S (upper
case R and S) to denote the prots of the reseller and the supplier without (with)
supplier encroachment capability.
In the absence of encroachment it is straightforward to show that when neither
the supplier nor the reseller knows the realization of the market size, their equilibrium
expected prots can be characterized as:
NIR =
2
16
and NIS =
2
8
; (2.4)
where NI indicates no information. Similarly, if both the reseller and the supplier
can observe the realization of the market size, presumably through some credible
information sharing mechanism, then their expected prots can be expressed as:
SIR =
2 + 2
16
and SIS =
2 + 2
8
; (2.5)
where SI indicates shared information. Recall from section 2.4.1 that when the
reseller has private information, the prots of the reseller and the supplier are
R =
2+42
16
and S =
2
8
, respectively. Therefore, in the absence of supplier en-
croachment, we have that R  SIR  NIR while SIS  S = NIS , where the
inequalities are strict if and only if  > 0. That is, the reseller prefers to be pri-
vately informed to having shared information, and prefers shared information to no
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information. Although the supplier prefers having shared information to either no
information or having a privately informed reseller, she is indierent between the
latter two. This nding has also been established in the literature (Li and Zhang
2002).
We now provide the prots of the rms for the case where the supplier has
encroachment capability (the detailed derivation is provided in the appendix). In
particular, if neither rm has information about the realization of demand, then the
reseller's and the supplier's expected prots follow:
NIR =
2c2
9
and NIS =
32   6c+ 7c2
12
.
In contrast, if they both have information about the true market size, then their
expected prots are:
SIR =
2c2
9
and SIS = 
3a2H   6aHc+ 7c2
12
+ (1  ) 3a
2
L   6aLc+ 7c2
12
.
Note that, for both of the above cases of encroachment under symmetric information,
the expected prot of the reseller is independent of the market size, and depends
only upon the supplier's relative ineciency, c.6 The reason for this is that, with
symmetric information, the supplier's equilibrium wholesale price induces the reseller
to respond by ordering a quantity equal to 2c
3
, and the supplier subsequently sets her
own quantity to ensure that the reseller's expected per-unit prot margin is c
3
. As
a result, the supplier's development of encroachment capability alters the reseller's
6This is also the case in Arya et al. (2007), though they do not discuss it.
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preferences so that instead of preferring shared information to no information, he is
indierent between the two.
However, when the reseller has private information, an encroaching supplier
can no longer ensure that the reseller's order quantity and prot margin are invariant
with respect to the market size, and it is not obvious whether the reseller's having
private information aects the expected prots of the supplier or the reseller. Re-
call that S and R are the expected prots for the supplier and reseller under
encroachment when the reseller has private information that we analyzed in Section
2.4. In what follows, we compare these to the prot functions above and discuss the
managerial implications.
2.5.2 Supplier Preference for an Informationally More or Less Capable
Reseller
In settings in which a supplier can choose from among multiple potential
resellers, it is of interest to understand the conditions under which she should prefer
a reseller who is more or less capable of learning the market demand. Specically,
we consider the case where the supplier must choose between one reseller who is
informationally more capable and knows the market size perfectly, and another who
is less capable who has the same knowledge of the market size as the supplier. While
such a choice is stylized, it reects the reality that resellers are not homogenous in
their abilities to collect and interpret data for the purpose of forecasting demand.
Recall that, in the absence of encroachment, the supplier is indierent regarding the
reseller's informational capability. However, when the supplier has encroachment
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capability, we have the following result:
Proposition 8. When c < min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
, the supplier prefers a better
informed reseller.
Once the supplier develops the ability to encroach upon the reseller's market,
the reseller's knowledge of the true market size matters to the supplier. As long as her
own direct selling operations are not too inecient relative to those of the reseller, she
prefers to interact with a reseller who has better knowledge of the market. Note that
the condition (i.e., c < min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
) specied in Proposition 8 serves
as a sucient condition. From our numerical analysis (see Figure 2.5), however, we
can make the following observation:
Observation 1. When the supplier's direct selling cost exceeds a threshold level of
ineciency, she may prefer to interact with a reseller whose information is identical
to her own in order to avoid the adverse eects of downward distortion that would
arise with a better informed reseller.
The above result is related to that of Taylor and Xiao (2010), who show that,
for a supplier selling to a newsvendor, the supplier may or may not prefer to have
a better informed reseller. However, our result is driven by entirely dierent forces
that exist only in the presence of supplier encroachment.
2.5.3 Endogenous Encroachment and Information Strategies
We now consider how a supplier's decision to develop encroachment capability
aects the decision of an existing reseller to develop/maintain the infrastructure that
33
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Figure 2.5: Demonstration of the impact of downstream information advantage on
the supplier's protability in the presence of supplier encroachment. In this example,
aH = 1:35 and aL = 1.
provides him with better knowledge of the market demand. Specically, we consider
the following sequence of events: First, the supplier determines whether to develop
encroachment capability by developing the infrastructure for a direct channel, and
this decision is publicly observed. Second, the reseller decides whether to develop
advanced informational capability. Third, the supplier observes the reseller's infor-
mational capability and sets the wholesale price. Fourth, the reseller responds with
an order quantity. Finally, if the supplier has a direct channel, she determines her
own volume of direct sales. Note that an alternative sequence of events would be to
assume that the reseller decides whether to acquire specic market information after
the wholesale price is announced. However, the sequence that we have proposed is
more reasonable in environments where the reseller's information advantage is gener-
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ated from his informational capability and expertise in predicting the demand, so that
even if the supplier and the reseller receive the same data about the market demand,
an informationally more capable reseller might be better able to interpret it and thus
have a more accurate prediction of the true market size. To gain such informational
capability would require a relatively long-term development of infrastructure, e.g.,
software, data structures, human resource capability; whereas, the wholesale price
and ordering decisions can be made instantaneously. For simplicity, we normalize to
zero the cost incurred by the reseller to develop informational capability (introducing
a xed cost would not change our results qualitatively). To understand how the re-
seller will choose his information strategy when the supplier develops encroachment
capability, we need to compare his expected prots with private information, R,
from section 2.4.2 with his expected prots without information, NIR .
Proposition 9. If c 2

3
p
(aH aL)
4
;min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
, then the reseller
will develop advanced informational capability relative to the supplier, which benets
both himself and the supplier (i.e., R > 
NI
R and S > 
NI
S ). Otherwise, if c 2
0; 3
p
(aH aL)
4
i
or c 2

min
n
3(1+3+4
p
)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
; c()

, then R < 
NI
R and
the reseller will choose not to develop advanced informational capability.
Proposition 21 conrms that even if the supplier has encroachment capability,
the reseller can still benet from having better knowledge of the demand, but only
when his eciency advantage in the selling process is intermediate so that he can
avoid substantial distortion of his order quantity. In such a scenario, the dominant
eect of private information is that it allows the reseller to tailor his order quantity
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to the realized market size. Furthermore, the supplier also strictly benets from the
reseller's endogenous decision to be better informed. Recall from the results of Li
and Zhang (2002) that this will never occur in the absence of encroachment.
However, Proposition 21 also arms that under supplier encroachment, the
reseller is worse o by having better knowledge when either his advantage in the
selling process is small or large. In particular, when c 2

0; 3
p
(aH aL)
4
i
, the sup-
plier will set a high wholesale price for a privately informed reseller that induces
him to order a positive quantity only if the market size is large. Because the
supplier is only slightly less ecient than the reseller, she is willing to monopo-
lize the market when demand is small in return for setting a wholesale price that
is more precisely targeted at the large market size. This more precisely targeted
(higher) wholesale price hurts the reseller. At the other extreme, when the reseller's
selling cost advantage is large, i.e., c 2

min
n
3(1+3+4
p
)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
; c()

, ac-
cess to private demand information causes him to substantially distort his order-
ing quantity under low demand, which can result in his earning lower prot in
expectation than if he did not have access to the information. Note that to com-
pare the reseller's prots with and without advanced informational capability when
c 2

min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
;min
n
3(1+3+4
p
)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
is technically chal-
lenging, but we observe from our numerical analysis (see Figure 2.6) that, within
this region, there exists a threshold on the cost, c, above (below) which the reseller
is worse o (better o) with advanced informational capability.
In order to understand the impact of a reseller's endogenous information strat-
egy upon the supplier's decision about whether to develop encroachment capability,
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Figure 2.6: Demonstration of the impact of endogenous downstream information
strategy on the reseller's protability in the presence of supplier encroachment. In
this example, aH = 1:35 and aL = 1.
we resort to a numerical investigation. For the example depicted in Figure 2.6, where
aH = 1:35 and aL = 1, the reseller develops advanced informational capability for
only a relatively small range of parameters. However, this is not enough to deter the
supplier from encroaching. Regardless of the value of , the supplier benets from
encroachment over the entire range of c for which she would exercise her ability to
encroach if she could.
To further explore how the development of encroachment capability aects
the prots of the supplier and the reseller, we have plotted the ratio of prots with
encroachment capability to prots without encroachment capability for the supplier,
the reseller, and the supply chain in Figure 2.7. (A prot ratio larger than unity
implies a benet from encroachment capability.) Notice that in all three sub-gures,
37
curves are not smooth. In particular, the plots of the prot ratios shift upward
when there is positive variance and c is in the range for which the reseller develops
informational capability. This occurs for c 2 (0:18; 0:3) for 2 = 0:03 and for c 2
(0:28; 0:48) for 2 = 0:07.
There are several things that are worthy of notice in these plots. First, observe
that for the supplier, the prot ratio is greater than one over the entire range of c,
i.e., she benets from having encroachment capability even when it discourages the
reseller from developing advanced informational capability. Second, notice that for
the reseller, outside of the range of c for which he is better informed, greater demand
variance reduces his prot ratio, i.e., he does not benet as much from demand
variance under encroachment as he does without it. As a consequence, we can see
that as demand variance increases, there is a reduction in the range of c for which
the reseller benets from encroachment, i.e., where his prot ratio exceeds one. Also
note that, in the range of c for which the reseller is better informed under 2 = 0:03
(and 2 = 0:07) his prot ratio exceeds that for 2 = 0. This is because when the
reseller endogenously develops advanced informational capability, there is little or no
ordering distortion, and demand variance reduces the extent to which he is harmed
by encroachment, though not by enough to allow him to benet.
Finally, we can observe that the range of c for which the entire supply chain
is harmed by the supplier's development of encroachment capability is increasing in
demand variance. This can be conrmed by the fact that, as 2 increases, a larger
portion of the supply chain prot ratio curve lies below 1.0. This is a result of
the fact that, encroachment discourages the development of advanced informational
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capability at the reseller, while in the absence of encroachment, the total supply
chain prot increases when the reseller develops advanced informational capability.
2.5.4 Credible Information Sharing
Thus far, we have assumed that there does not exist a credible mechanism
for information sharing. Let us now relax this assumption and consider how the
supplier's development of encroachment capability might aect the incentives for
both rms to pursue a means for credibly sharing information.
It is well established in the literature that, in the absence of supplier encroach-
ment, R  SIR , while SIS  S, i.e., the reseller prefers being privately informed
over having shared information with the supplier, while the supplier would prefer
shared information over the reseller's having private information. (See, for exam-
ple, Li and Zhang 2002.) However, once the supplier has encroachment capability,
both the supplier's and the reseller's preferences between information structures can
change as described in the following proposition.
Proposition 10. i) When the supplier has encroachment capability, information
sharing always benets the supplier (i.e., SIS  S). ii) However, the reseller
prefers to share his information (i.e., SIR > R) when c 2

0; 3
p
(aH aL)
4
i
or c 2
min
n
3(1+3+4
p
)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
; c()

, and she prefers not to share his information
(i.e., R > 
SI
R ) when c 2

3
p
(aH aL)
4
;min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
.
Knowing the exact market scenario always benets the supplier because she
can set a targeted wholesale price for each market size and avoid reseller order dis-
tortion. However, for the reseller, having shared information with the supplier is
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Figure 2.7: The impact of demand uncertainty on the eciency of the supply chain.
In this example,  = 0:5; aH = aL = 1:175 for the scenario with 
2 = 0; aH = 1:35
and aL = 1 for the scenario with 
2 = 0:03; and aH = 1:45 and aL = 0:9 for the
scenario with 2 = 0:07.
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a double-edged sword. On one hand, shared information allows the supplier to
optimize the wholesale price for each market size. Of course, this hurts the re-
seller as a consequence of the fact that his prot function is concave in the whole-
sale price. On the other hand, when an encroaching supplier obtains access to
the same market information as the reseller, it alters her strategy in setting the
wholesale price so the reseller is induced to sell a positive quantity even when
the market size is small and the supplier's cost disadvantage is small (i.e., c 2
0; 3
p
(aH aL)
4

); furthermore, information sharing will also cure the reseller's in-
centive to distort his order quantity when the supplier's direct selling cost is large
(e.g., c 2

min
n
3(1+3+4
p
)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
; c()

), which will improve the eciency.
As a result, in contrast to the case without supplier encroachment, Proposition 10
asserts that under supplier encroachment, both the supplier and the reseller may
benet from the development of some means by which the reseller can credibly share
its demand information. In other words, once the supplier has encroachment capabil-
ity, a shift from an information structure in which the reseller is privately informed
to one in which both rms have shared information is Pareto improving. This is not
the case without encroachment, and suggests that the development of mechanisms
for credibly sharing information might be more likely to occur in supply chains in
which the supplier has its own direct channel.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate supplier encroachment in the presence of infor-
mation asymmetry where the reseller has private information about the market size.
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We show that in such a setting, if the supplier uses a linear wholesale price, supplier
encroachment can cause the reseller to practice costly signaling and distort his or-
der quantity downwards. In addition, the supplier may increase her wholesale price
and thus amplify double marginalization. Consequently, there are parameters for
which supplier encroachment leads to \win-win", \win-lose", \lose-win" and \lose-
lose" outcomes for the supplier and the reseller. These ndings complement existing
results that show how supplier encroachment mitigates double marginalization when
both rms have the same information.
We also demonstrate that supplier encroachment can have signicant implica-
tions for information management in supply chains. We nd that when the supplier
has the ability to encroach, she will strictly prefer to sell to a better informed reseller
when her eciency disadvantage in the selling process is not large; otherwise, she
will prefer to sell to an equally informed reseller. This result complements prior lit-
erature that has shown that with a reselling channel alone, the supplier is indierent
toward the reseller's state of information. On the other hand, we nd that when the
supplier has encroachment capability, the reseller may prefer to remain uninformed
about demand, which contrasts with existing results that have been obtained without
encroachment. We further show that even though encroachment always benets the
supplier after the reseller's information strategy is endogenized, it can hurt the to-
tal supply chain performance as the reseller is discouraged from obtaining advanced
information. Finally, our study reveals that both the supplier and the reseller may
benet from the development of a mechanism that will allow the reseller to credibly
reveal his private demand information, which does not happen in the absence of
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encroachment.
Of course, our model also has some limitations. First, to avoid unnecessary
complications, we have assumed that the reseller releases to the market all of the
units that he orders, even if it might be ex-post sub-optimal to do so. If we were
to allow the reseller a free-disposal option, this will tend to undermine the reseller's
ability to commit to a sales quantity, but only when the wholesale price is relatively
high. Consequently, a free disposal option plays a role only when both the ratio aH
aL
is large and the probability of a large market, , is suciently small. When it does
play a role, it causes the reseller to order less for the large market size, and forces
him to further distort his order quantity for the small market size. However, our
main insights are robust to the free disposal option. For further discussion of this,
we refer readers to the appendix.
A second limitation is the fact that we do not consider the possibility that
once the supplier develops a direct channel, she may have access to a new source
of information. In the appendix, we extend our model to allow for the supplier to
receive a noisy signal about demand if she develops encroachment capability. This
enables the supplier to tailor her wholesale price according to the signal that she
receives. However, so long as the signal is imperfect, the signaling game between
the supplier and reseller always arises, and all of our main results continue to hold
qualitatively. Of course, it is also possible that both the supplier and the reseller may
have imperfect signals about demand. Because it would introduce the possibility of
signaling behavior for both the supplier and the reseller, this may alter the dynamics,
which is a worthy subject for future research.
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Finally, our model assumes that the supplier is limited to a linear wholesale
price. Because linear wholesale prices are common in practice and are standard in
the literature, it is useful to focus on them initially. However, it is also of interest
to understand the implications of encroachment when a supplier can use a more
sophisticated pricing mechanism. Under a non-linear pricing policy, the issues shift
from signalling to screening. The analysis and insights are fundamentally dierent,
as revealed in Li et al. (2015).
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Chapter 3
Supplier Encroachment under Nonlinear Pricing
3.1 Introduction
In practice, rms may sell their products through both intermediaries (re-
selling channels) and their own direct channels.1 For instance, electronic product
makers may sell their products through third-party retail stores as well as their own
stores or websites (e.g., Apple, Sony, Microsoft); apparel and fashion accessory mak-
ers may sell their products through independent retailers as well as their own factory
outlets (e.g., Coach, Nike, Adidas); airlines and hotels sell tickets and rooms through
both travel agencies and their websites (e.g., American Airlines, Hilton). This is not
just limited to the large branded companies. More small and local rms also start
to use direct sales besides the traditional distribution channels for various products
(Reisinger 2012, Blank 2013).
There are a number of reasons why a rm might introduce its own direct
channel in addition to relying on resellers (a practice that is often referred to as
\supplier encroachment" in the literature), including: obtaining more direct feed-
backs from consumers, increasing market size, and obtaining an additional source of
1This chapter is based on Li et al. (2015). I appreciate my adviser and co-author Stephen Gilbert
and Guoming Lai for their guidance and feedback when I was writing this paper.
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leverage with respect to resellers. Our focus is on the last one. In particular, a subtle
benet is revealed in the literature that supplier encroachment can mitigate double
marginalization in the reselling channel and result in a \win-win" outcome even if
the products sold through the two channels are perfect substitutes. In reaching such
a conclusion, most studies assume that a wholesale price only contract (i.e., a linear
contract) is adopted in the reselling channel and information is complete. However,
this benet will disappear if the supplier can use a nonlinear price scheme to coor-
dinate the channel. Nonlinear pricing is not uncommon in practice. For instance,
many rms oer quantity discounts to their customers. Nonlinear pricing has also
been extensively studied in the economics, marketing and operations literatures (e.g.,
Spence 1977, Jeuland and Shugan 1983, Ha 2001).
In this study, we show that, although a supplier that can use nonlinear pric-
ing gains nothing from the ability to encroach under symmetric demand information,
this is not necessarily the case when the reseller has private demand information. Re-
sellers often have access to better demand information than do their suppliers. Not
only do they have access to data on a wider range of products, they often pos-
sess greater capability in interpreting whatever data is available as a result of their
business focus on market mediation. Moreover, these informational advantages may
persist even when suppliers operate their own direct channels. While the supplier en-
croachment literature has explored various factors, the interplay of nonlinear pricing
and asymmetric information has not been investigated.
In our model, the supplier's ability to encroach endows her with the option to
sell through her own direct channel as well as through a reseller (or both). To focus
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on how this ability aects her leverage with respect to the reseller, we assume that
the products sold through the direct and indirect channels are perfect substitutes. To
represent the fact that production must occur before the market clears, we assume
that the two rms compete in quantities rather than prices, i.e., Cournot competition.
In addition to having an informational advantage, we also assume that the reseller
has an eciency advantage that allows him to sell the product at a lower cost per
unit than can the supplier. The sequence of events is as follows: The supplier acts
as a Stackelberg leader by announcing a take-it-or-leave-it menu of quantity-price
pairs (henceforth referred to as contracts) to the reseller. The reseller responds by
choosing one of the price and quantity pairs from the menu. If the supplier has the
infrastructure that allows her to have the option to encroach, then she determines
her direct selling quantity. Finally, the market clears.
We rst show that in the absence of information asymmetry, it is never ben-
ecial for the supplier to possess the ability to encroach upon the reseller when she
has the ability to use a nonlinear price scheme to contract with the reseller. With
nonlinear pricing, the supplier can already capture the entire supply chain surplus for
the rst-best quantity while enjoying the eciency of the reselling channel. Conse-
quently, the only eect of her developing the ability to encroach is that it introduces
the potential for her own opportunism, which interferes with her implementing the
rst-best solution. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, the supplier's
ability to encroach is a double-edged sword for the supplier. Although the supplier's
ability to encroach upon the reselling channel can reduce the eciency loss that is
required to reduce the information rents surrendered to the reseller, it also creates
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the possibility of her own opportunistic behavior, which will distort the reseller's
order quantity. In contrast to the classical mechanism design problems where distor-
tion occurs only in the less favorable states, in our context, the supplier's potential
opportunism can result in distortion for even the most favorable state. Moreover,
because the distortion of quantities has implications for both the magnitude of infor-
mation rents as well as for the supply chain eciency, the supplier and the reseller
may either benet from, or be hurt by, the supplier's ability to encroach, depending
on the reseller's cost advantage in the selling process and the prior distribution of
the market size. Specically, we nd that the supplier is always better o with the
ability to encroach when the reseller's cost advantage in the selling process is small.
When the reseller's cost advantage is intermediate, encroachment capability can be
either benecial or detrimental for the supplier, depending on the prior distribution
of the market size. For the reseller, the supplier's ability to encroach always makes
him worse o when his cost advantage is small and makes him better o when his
cost advantage is intermediate. (When the reseller's cost advantage is suciently
large, the supplier would never exercise her ability to encroach.) We reveal regions
where the supplier's ability to encroach can lead to either \win-lose" or \lose-lose"
outcomes for the two parties. These ndings are robust to either a discretely or
continuously distributed market size.
Hence, our study complements the existing literature on supplier encroach-
ment. We demonstrate that in the presence of information asymmetry, supplier
encroachment capability can be helpful even if the supplier can implement a non-
linear price scheme. Moreover, the eects of the supplier's encroachment capability
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on the two parties' prots are not monotone, and depend critically on the reseller's
selling advantage and the information structure.
3.2 Related Literature
Manufacturers selling to multiple channels has been widely observed in prac-
tice (Nair and Pleasance 2005). The ndings in the academic literature on sup-
plier encroachment are however divided. There are studies that show supplier en-
croachment reduces the incentive of the resellers to promote the manufacturers' prod-
ucts and dilutes brand image (Fein and Anderson 1997, Frazier and Lassar 1996).
Whereas, there is also a stream of research that shows supplier encroachment can
improve the system eciency by alleviating double marginalization. Specically,
Chiang et al. (2003) demonstrate that a supplier's threat to launch and sell through
her direct channel can lower the reseller's selling price, while Cattani et al. (2006)
and Arya et al. (2007) demonstrate, based on price and quantity competition models,
that supplier encroachment can motivate the supplier to lower her wholesale price
in the reselling channel. As shown by Tsay and Agrawal (2004), the result that
the launch of a direct channel can mitigate double marginalization holds even in a
context where the supplier and the reseller can exert sales eorts to promote the
demand.
The above literature generally assumes that the supplier can use only a linear
price scheme to contract with the reseller. As noted by Arya et al. (2007), if the
supplier can alternatively use a nonlinear price scheme, then double marginalization
would be completely resolved under the optimal supply contract, and encroachment
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could not provide strict gains for the manufacturer. While their observation is, of
course, correct when both rms have symmetric market size information, we demon-
strate that it may not hold when the reseller is endowed with private market size
information. Specically, under nonlinear pricing, encroachment generates a force
that pushes the reseller's order quantities upward, and in general we no longer ob-
serve the usual \eciency at the top" that one normally expects for nonlinear pricing
problems.
Related to our work, there exist a few studies that explore the incentive of
information sharing with dierent supply chain structures under asymmetric infor-
mation. For instance, Li (2002) and Zhang (2002) investigate information sharing
in a setting where a central supplier sells to multiple competing resellers that have
better demand information, while Ha and Tong (2008) and Ha et al. (2011) focus
on a setting with two competing supply chains and explore the incentive of each re-
seller to share information with his supplier. Dierent from the above studies where
the resellers have the same information advantage, Anand and Goyal (2009) and
Kong et al. (2013) investigate a one supplier-two competing reseller setting where
the incumbent reseller has better information than the other parties. Anand and
Goyal (2009) show that the supplier's incentive to leak the information learned from
the incumbent reseller to an entrant reseller may block information sharing in the
supply chain, while Kong et al. (2013) analyze a revenue sharing scheme to resolve
information leakage. Finally, Guo and Iyer (2010) and Guo et al. (2011) investigate
the eect of strategic ex post information sharing in a vertical supply chain where a
party, either the supplier or the reseller, is able to acquire advanced information.
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To our best knowledge, Li et al. (2014) is the only study to examine the
impact of information asymmetry in a setting in which the supplier has encroachment
capability. In that study, the supplier is assumed to use linear pricing, and it is shown
that, as a consequence of the signaling game that the reseller initiates in response
to a linear wholesale price, the supplier's ability to encroach can either mitigate or
amplify double marginalization in the presence of information asymmetry with a
wholesale price only contract. Of course, when the supplier can implement nonlinear
pricing, double marginalization is no longer a concern, and that is why our focus is
on investigating how encroachment capability aects the information rents and the
eciency of the pricing menu oered by the supplier. Under nonlinear pricing, the
supplier's development of encroachment capability can have two opposing eects:
By allowing the supplier to sell through the direct channel, it allows the supplier to
reduce information rents with less sacrice of sales volume. However, because the
supplier's ability to encroach creates the potential for her own opportunism, it can
also result in upward distortion of the quantities sold through the reselling channel
for the best realization of market size. This upward distortion is in contrast to the
usual eciency at the top that we expect in screening contracts, and it is also distinct
from the downward distortion that we observe under linear wholesale pricing.
3.3 The Model
We consider a supplier (she) that can sell her product either through a reseller
(he), her direct channel, or both. To focus attention on the coordinating role of
supplier encroachment, we assume that the products sold through the two channels
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are perfect substitutes, and thus adding a direct channel would not aect the total
market size. This eliminates the possibility that a direct channel would allow the
product to reach a broader set of consumers, which tends to favor the use of the
direct channel. Specically, we assume that the total consumer demand follows a
linear, downward sloping function, P = a Q, where a represents the market size, Q
is the total number of units of the product deployed for sale in the channels, and P is
the market clearing price. To incorporate the notion of information asymmetry, we
further assume that the market size a is, ex ante, random, which can be either large
(a = aH) with probability H =  or small (a = aL) with probability L = 1   ,
where aH > aL > 0. Denote by  = [H ; L] the vector of these two probabilities for
high and low demands. This simple, two-point distribution of demand facilitates the
demonstration of our main results. However, to conrm that our qualitative results
do not depend upon the two-point distribution, we extend our analysis to a setting
with a continuously distributed a in the appendix.
As in Arya et al. (2007), we assume that, because the supplier is less ecient
in retail operations than the reseller, her per unit selling cost is c higher than that
for the reseller. Such a premium can arise as a result of the supplier needing to pay
higher transportation cost to ship items directly to consumers while the reseller can
take advantage of bulk shipping to transport the items in bulk to a traditional retail
location. To simplify the presentation of our results, we normalize the selling cost
for the reseller to zero, and the selling cost of the supplier to c.
Finally, the supplier is the Stackelberg game leader who can provide a \take-it-
or-leave-it" oer with a menu of contracts to the reseller. Without loss of generality,
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we assume the reseller's reservation prot is zero.
Figure 3.1 details the sequence of events in our model. First, the supplier
designs a menu of contracts, f(w(ai); qR(ai))gi2fH;Lg, where w(ai) is the per unit
wholesale price and qR(ai) is the corresponding quantity in a contract. That is, if
the reseller chooses one specic contract i, then he obtains qR(ai) units and pays the
supplier w(ai) per unit. Second, the reseller observes a = aH or a = aL and chooses
one contract from the oer and the contract is executed immediately. Third, based
on the contract chosen by the reseller, the supplier then stocks quantity, qS(ai), of
the product that she will sell through her direct channel. Lastly, the market clearing
price P is realized according to P = ai   (qR(ai) + qS(ai)) for i 2 fH;Lg, and the
two parties obtain their nal prots.
Note that the assumption that the two rms determine their stocking quan-
tities sequentially, i.e., the reseller makes his ordering decision before the supplier
determines her own stocking quantity, reects the reality that the supplier typically
has no means of making a credible commitment to not adjust her own stocking quan-
tity in response to the order placed by the reseller. If the supplier does have such
capability, then she can specify her own stocking quantity for each quantity-price
pair in the menu of contracts that she oers to the reseller. Because this gives the
supplier an additional degree of freedom in design of the menu of contracts without
introducing the possibility of opportunism, it is intuitive that this would benet the
supplier and hurt the reseller.
53
The supplier offers a menu 
of nonlinear contracts
The supplier decides the stocking 
level for her direct channel
The market clearing price is realized, so as 
the profits of the reseller and the supplier
The reseller who observes the market 
size chooses one contract
Figure 3.1: The timeline of the model.
3.4 Base Case with Perfect Information
In this section, we analyze a base case with perfect information. Specically,
the supplier and the reseller both know perfectly the realization of the market size,
ai, i = H;L. This analysis provides a useful benchmark with which to compare the
results we will reveal later for asymmetric information.
We rst derive the solution for the case where the supplier does not have the
option to encroach upon the reselling channel. As the information is complete, the
supplier will oer only one contract, (w(ai); qR(ai)), corresponding to the realization
of the market size, ai. If the reseller takes this contract, his sales revenue will be
(ai   qR(ai))qR(ai), which is maximized at qR(ai) = ai2 . It is straightforward now
that the optimal contract (w(ai); qR(ai)) is equal to (
ai
2
; ai
2
) for either realization of
the market size. Under such a contract, the reseller obtains zero prot, while the
supplier captures the entire surplus,
a2i
4
. Notice that this contract achieves the largest
possible surplus of the system.
Now, we derive the solution for the case where the supplier has the ability to
encroach upon the reseller. We apply backward induction. After the reseller takes
the contract, (w(ai); qR(ai)), the supplier determines her direct selling quantity by
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solving
max
qS
(ai   qR(ai)  qS   c)qS;
which yields the optimal direct selling quantity
qS(ai) =

ai   qR(ai)  c
2
+
: (3.1)
Notice that this quantity is a function of both the demand parameter, ai, and the
quantity sold by the reseller, qR(ai). Of course, the reseller anticipates this direct
selling quantity when he determines how to respond to the quantity-price pair oered
by the supplier. Hence, when the supplier designs the contract, she must consider
how her own subsequent incentive to encroach will aect the reseller's participation
condition. Specically, the supplier solves:
max
(w(ai);qR(ai))
w(ai)qR(ai) + (ai   qR(ai)  qS(ai)  c) qS(ai) (3.2)
s:t: (ai   qR(ai)  qS(ai)  w(ai)) qR(ai)  0:
Let us denote by qPIR (ai) and w
PI(ai) the optimal solution to the supplier's
optimization problem that is dened in (3.2), and let qPIS (ai) be the supplier's equi-
librium direct selling quantity.
Proposition 11. With perfect information of the market size ai, i = H;L, and the
option of encroachment, the supplier's optimal contract oer and her direct selling
quantity are in Table 3.1.
It is intuitive that when the supplier's selling cost is suciently large (c > ai
2
),
the supplier will not use her direct channel, i.e., encroachment is not a practical
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Scenarios wPI(ai) q
PI
R (ai) q
PI
S (ai)
c 2 (0; ai
3
] ai c
2
2c ai 3c
2
c 2 (ai
3
; ai
2
] c ai   c 0
c 2 (ai
2
;1) ai
2
ai
2
0
Table 3.1: Optimal contract oer and direct selling quantity under perfect informa-
tion and supplier encroachment
option for the supplier. It is straightforward that the optimal contract under such a
scenario follows: (wPI(ai); q
PI
R (ai)) = (
ai
2
; ai
2
), which achieves the maximum surplus
of the system. When the supplier's selling cost is intermediate or small, the supplier's
incentive to encroach plays a role. Recall that, when information is complete, the
supplier always obtains the entire supply chain surplus under the optimal contract.
However, in the presence of the ability to encroach, the supplier may fall victim to
her own potential opportunism. That is, in anticipation of the supplier's ex post
encroachment, the reseller may be unwilling to take the ecient contract, (ai
2
; ai
2
),
to procure ai
2
and pay
a2i
4
, since doing so would lead to a negative prot for himself.
To mitigate this eect, the supplier must either reduce the per unit wholesale price
or increase the quantity that is targeted at a reseller who observes a given market
size. Note that these two actions have dierent eects. Reducing the per unit
wholesale price would compensate the reseller for the lower retail price that he will
receive as a consequence of the supplier's direct sales, whereas increasing the quantity
would reduce the supplier's ex post incentive to sell through her direct channel. We
can observe from Proposition 11 that the total output (qPIR (ai) + q
PI
S (ai)) is always
greater than the rst-best (ecient) quantity, ai
2
, for all c 2 (0; ai
2
]. That is, the
maximum supply chain surplus is not achieved in the presence of the supplier's
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ability to encroach. Proposition 12 formalizes this nding.
Proposition 12. With perfect information of the market size ai, i = H;L, the sup-
plier (and also the supply chain) is never better o with the option of encroachment.
In particular, the supplier is strictly worse o when 0 < c < ai
2
. The reseller is
indierent as he always obtains zero prot with or without supplier encroachment
capability.
Because of the fact that, with complete information, the supplier can use
nonlinear pricing to simultaneously achieve the rst-best solution and to extract the
full surplus from the reseller, encroachment does not add anything benecial for the
supplier or for the supply chain. In fact, because the ability to encroach creates the
unavoidable possibility of supplier opportunism, it can only be detrimental. This
result contrasts those revealed in the literature based on a linear price scheme where
supplier encroachment can alleviate double marginalization and thus benet the
supplier and the supply chain.
3.5 Analysis with Asymmetric Information
In this section, we analyze our model with a binary distribution of the market
size; i.e., a = aH (aL) with probability H (L), ex ante (where H = 1 L = ). In
the absence of supplier encroachment capability, it is reasonable to assume that the
reseller has access to better demand information than does the supplier. To represent
this, we assume that the reseller observes the true realization of market size, while
the supplier knows only the prior distribution at the time that she proposes the
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pricing policy. When the supplier develops the ability to encroach, this will change
the strategic interactions that she has with the reseller. In addition, it may also
give her access to her own demand information. To disentangle these two eects,
for most of our analysis, we assume that encroachment capability does not alter the
information that is available to the supplier before she announces her price policy.
However, in the appendix, we conrm that our results are robust with respect to the
possibility that, because encroachment capability puts the supplier in direct contact
with end consumers, it also provides her with an independent signal about demand.
Let us begin by deriving the solution for the case where the supplier does not
have the ability to encroach.
3.5.1 Without the Option of Encroachment
With asymmetric information, the supplier can implement nonlinear pricing
through a menu of contracts, f(w(ai); qR(ai))gi2fH;Lg, one targeting the large market
size and the other targeting the small market size. Without encroachment, the
supplier's problem can be formulated as:
NS () = maxf(w(ai);qR(ai))gi2fH;Lg
X
i2fH;Lg
iw(ai)qR(ai) (3.3)
s:t: (ai   qR(ai)  w(ai)) qR(ai)  0; 8i 2 fH;Lg;
(ai   qR(ai)  w(ai)) qR(ai)  (ai   qR(aj)  w(aj)) qR(aj); 8i; j 2 fH;Lg:
The supplier designs the contracts to maximize her expected prot by satisfying
the reseller's individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints.
From the revelation principle, in the optimal solution, the reseller will self-select the
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menu-option that corresponds to the true demand parameter, and we can represent
the reseller's expected prot as:
NR () =
X
i2fH;Lg
i
 
ai   qNR (ai)  wN(ai)

qNR (ai) (3.4)
where qNR (ai) and w
N(ai) for i 2 fL;Hg denote the optimal solution to (3.3). We
derive the following proposition from solving (3.3).
Proposition 13. Without the option of encroachment, the optimal menu of contracts
under asymmetric information is in Table 3.2.
Small Market Size Large Market Size
Scenarios wN(aL) q
N
R (aL) w
N(aH) q
N
R (aH)
 2 (0; aL
aH
) aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 )
aL
2
  (aH aL)
2(1 )
aH
2
  2(aH aL)qNR (aL)
aH
aH
2
 2 [ aL
aH
; 1) 0 0 aH
2
aH
2
Table 3.2: Optimal menu of contracts under asymmetric information without supplier
encroachment
Corollary 14. The above menu of contracts induces the rst-best (ecient) quantity
aH
2
to be sold when the realized market size is large, and it induces a less than the
ecient quantity to be sold when the realized market size is small.
The two properties in the above corollary are quite standard in mechanism
design settings (see, e.g., Moorthy 1984) and are often referred to as \eciency at
the top" and \downward distortion", respectively. This can be observed from the
fact that qNR (aH) =
aH
2
and qNR (aL) <
aL
2
for any .
Notice that in our problem, when  < aL
aH
(or identically aL > aH), the
possible prot that the supplier can achieve from the small market size is signicant
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and thus it is benecial for the supplier to oer positive quantities for both of the
two market sizes. However, in order to induce the reseller observing the large market
size to choose the optimal order quantity aH
2
, the supplier has to downward distort
the order quantity targeting the small market size by (aH aL)
2(1 ) from the ecient level
aL
2
. The supplier can capture the entire supply chain surplus when the market size
is small, but she has to surrender some information rents to the reseller when the
market size is large. Specically, the information rents (or the expected prot the
reseller obtains) are NR = (aH   aL)qNR (aL).
When   aL
aH
(or identically aL  aH), the information rents become su-
ciently large so that the supplier prefers to avoid them by foregoing all sales when the
market size is small. Consequently, the supplier's pricing policy induces a positive
order quantity from only the reseller who observes the large market size. Note that,
in this case, the information rents for the reseller are zero. Although the supplier
extracts the full supply chain surplus conditional on the market size being large,
neither rm earns anything when the market size is small.
3.5.2 With the Option of Encroachment
In many principal-agent settings with asymmetric information (such as the
one analyzed in the above), it is possible to rely on the revelation principle in which
there exists an optimal menu of contracts such that the principal learns the agent's
true type from his choice of contract. However, in our setting with encroachment,
because the supplier's ex-post output decision may depend upon the information
that she obtains from the reseller's choice of contract, it is possible that the optimal
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contract will not induce each retailer to reveal his type. Consequently, we must
consider two types of contract menus that the supplier can oer: a pooling menu,
in which the reseller is oered a single quantity-price pair and accepts it regardless
of the observed market size; and a separating menu, in which the reseller chooses a
distinct quantity-price pair for each observed market size.
To formalize this, let EPS () be the maximum prot that the supplier can
earn under encroachment conditional upon her using a pooling menu that causes the
reseller to select a single quantity-price pair regardless of the observed market size,
and let ESS () be the maximum prot that the supplier can earn under encroach-
ment conditional upon her using a separating menu that causes the reseller to select
a distinct quantity-price pair for each observed market size.
If the supplier oers a pooling menu, then she will not learn the market size
from the reseller's response. Consequently, the supplier's output quantity will be:
qS(qR) =

aH + (1  )aL   qR   c
2
+
(3.5)
and the conditionally optimal pooling contract can be identied as the solution to:
EPS () = max
w;qR
wqR + (qS(qR))
2 (3.6)
s:t: (ai   qR   qS(qR)  w) qR  0; 8i 2 fH;Lg:
Alternatively, if the supplier oers a separating menu, then she will learn the
true market size from the reseller's response, and her own optimal output quantity
will be tailored to each market size, i.e.:
qS(ai) =

ai   qR(ai)  c
2
+
(3.7)
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and the conditionally optimal separating menu f(w(ai); qR(ai))gi2fH;Lg can be iden-
tied as the solution to:
ESS () = max
X
i2fH;Lg
i[w(ai)qR(ai) + (ai   qR(ai)  qS(ai)  c) qS(ai)] (3.8)
s:t: (ai   qR(ai)  qS(ai)  w(ai)) qR(ai)  0; 8i 2 fH;Lg;
(ai   qR(ai)  qS(ai)  w(ai)) qR(ai) 
(ai   qR(aj)  qS(aj)  w(aj)) qR(aj); 8i; j 2 fH;Lg:
Note that, in both the pooling and separating menu design problems, the reseller's
IR and IC constraints incorporate the supplier's direct selling quantities. However,
because the reseller's type is revealed only in the separating menu, it is only there
that the supplier can tailor his quantity to the realized market size. We derive the
following proposition from solving (3.6) and (3.8).
Proposition 15. With the option of encroachment, the optimal separating menu
of contracts dominates the optimal pooling menu for the supplier, i.e., ES () =
ESS (). The optimal separating menu of contracts is in Table 3.3, with w
E(aL) =
IfqER(aL)>0g
 
aL   qER(aL)  qES (aL)

and wE(aH) = aH qER(aH) qES (aH)  (aH aL)q
E
R(aL)
qER(aH)
.
The supplier's direct selling quantity is qES (ai) =

ai qER(ai) c
2
+
, i 2 fH;Lg.
Under the above optimal separating menu of contracts, the reseller's expected
prot is:
ER() =
X
i2fH;Lg
i
 
ai   qER(ai)  qES (ai)  wE(ai)

qER(ai): (3.9)
Corollary 16. When the supplier has encroachment capability, the optimal nonlinear
menu of contracts may no longer induce the reseller who observes the large market
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(a) Small Market Size
Scenarios qER(aL)
c 2 (0; aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ]

2c  2(aH aL)
1 
+
 2 (0; aL
aH
) c 2 (aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ;
aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ] aL   c
c 2 (aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ;+1) aL2   (aH aL)2(1 )
 2 [ aL
aH
; 1) c 2 (0;1) 0
(b) Large Market Size
Scenarios qER(aH)
c 2 (0; aH
3
] 2c
c 2 (aH
3
; aH
2
] aH   c
c 2 (aH
2
;+1) aH
2
Table 3.3: Optimal menu of contracts under asymmetric information and supplier
encroachment
size to order the ecient quantity, aH
2
, i.e., the optimal menu may lack the eciency
at the top property.
The above Corollary highlights the fact that the reseller's willingness to pay
for any given quantity is adversely aected by the supplier's own incentive to behave
opportunistically after the reseller accepts the contract. Consequently, for the large
market size, the supplier may no longer oer the ecient quantity aH
2
.
This result is driven by the fact that the supplier cannot pre-commit to her
own output quantity, and her ex-post optimal quantity response is a function of the
quantity that she sells to the reseller. In particular, it can be veried that qER(aH) is
the value of qR(aH) that maximizes the total supply chain prot conditional upon the
supplier selling

aH qR(aH) c
2
+
through her direct channel. Thus, although qER(aH)
is conditionally ecient, it is not absolutely ecient, i.e., it diers from the rst-best
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solution. It can be conrmed that once we incorporate the functional form of the
supplier's ex-post optimal direct selling quantity response into the reseller's utility
function, which forms the basis for the IR and IC constraints, we continue to have
the single crossing property in which a reseller's preference for a larger quantity
is increasing in the size of market that he observes. In addition, the supplier's
objective function is separable and concave in the quantities oered. Because of
this structure, the solution to the mechanism design problem dened in (3.8) does
have the eciency at the top and downward distortion properies relative to this
conditional optimization problem, but it may not have either of these properties
relative to the rst-best solution.
From Proposition 15, we can notice that when the supplier's selling cost is
low (c  aH
4
), she sets qER(aH) to less than the ecient quantity, and partially com-
pensates by relying on her own direct channel.2 But when her selling cost increases
to the range, c 2 (aH
4
; aH
2
), she sets qER(aH) above the ecient quantity in order to
credibly commit to limiting her own subsequent sales through her direct channel.
For the small market size, the supplier's choice of qER(aL) still involves the trade-o
between information rents (ER = (aH aL)qER(aL)) and wholesale revenue from the
small market, but her ability to encroach gives her the ability to generate sales rev-
enue from the small market without increasing information rents, especially when her
selling cost is low. When   aL
aH
, similar to the case without the ability of encroach-
ment, the supplier does not induce the reseller to sell anything to the small market.
2Our solution requires that c > 0. Notice that in the limiting case of c = 0, the quantity for the
reseller converges to qER(aL) = q
E
R(aH) = 0, which would preclude the supplier from obtaining the
market information from the reseller's order.
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However, for  < aL
aH
, dierent from the case without the option of encroachment,
the supplier will induce the reseller to order a positive quantity for the small market
only if the reseller's cost advantage is suciently large, i.e., when c > (aH aL)
(1 ) . In
such a scenario, the value that the supplier can obtain by selling through the re-
selling channel under the small market size outweighs the information rents that will
be introduced. Otherwise, the supplier will prefer to forego any sales through the
reselling channel and rely entirely upon her direct channel, when the market size is
small. By doing so, the supplier saves the information rents that would otherwise be
surrendered to the reseller under the contract targeting the large market size while
still capturing some amount of sales through her direct channel. That is, in contrast
to the complete information setting, supplier encroachment can be helpful from the
perspective of reducing the information rents paid to the reseller under asymmetric
information.
Hence, supplier encroachment can have two distinct eects on the supplier's
prot under a nonlinear price scheme with asymmetric information. On the one
hand, it can help reduce the information rents surrendered to the reseller; on the
other hand, it can worsen the ordering distortion in the reselling channel. Below,
we characterize when having the option to encroach benets or hurts the supplier
(i.e., comparing the supplier's prot under the decisions given by Propositions 13
and 15). We divide the comparison into two cases with   aL
aH
and  < aL
aH
since
the structures of the contracts dier signicantly.
Proposition 17. When   aL
aH
, if aL
aH
 1
2
, then there exists one threshold c0S such
that encroachment capability makes the supplier strictly better o when 0 < c < c0S,
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weakly worse o when c0S  c < aH2 , and has no eect when c  aH2 . If aLaH > 12 ,
then there exist two thresholds c0S and c
00
S such that encroachment capability makes
the supplier strictly better o when 0 < c < c0S and c
00
S < c < aL, weakly worse o
when c0S  c  c00S, and has no eect when c  aL.
When   aL
aH
, the supplier sells through the reseller only if the market size
is large, regardless whether she has the option to encroach. It is apparent that,
conditional upon the market size being small, the supplier can gain extra prot by
having the option to sell directly. This gain however decreases as the supplier's direct
selling cost (c) increases. On the other hand, conditional upon the market size being
large, the supplier's ability to encroach can reduce her prot due to the ordering
distortion in the reselling channel. Notice that this distortion loss is minimal when
the supplier's direct selling cost is either small or large, while it can be signicant
when the supplier's selling cost is intermediate. As a result, it is intuitive that the
supplier is better o by having the option to encroach when c is suciently small, and
that there exists some intermediate range of c for which she is worse o. However,
as c approaches aH
2
, she may be either better o or worse o. Specically, when
aL
aH
> 1
2
, there exists a range, c00S < c < aL, for which the supplier is also better
o by having the ability to sell directly. In this range, the extra prot the supplier
obtains by selling directly for the small market size outweighs the cost of upward
distortion for the large market size. In contrast, when aL
aH
 1
2
, the supplier's direct
selling quantity for the small market size would be zero when c is close to aH
2
and
thus such a better-o region will not appear. Finally, for any c  maxfaH
2
; aLg, the
supplier will never sell directly as it is too costly. Consequently, she does not need to
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upward distort the reselling quantity for the large market size. Hence, the supplier
is indierent toward encroachment when c  maxfaH
2
; aLg.
Proposition 17 in Figure 3.2. In this experiment,  = 0:80 > aL
aH
. Recall from
Propositions 13 and 15 that this implies that, regardless of whether the supplier has
encroachment capability, she sells nothing to the reseller when demand is low and
she extracts the full surplus from the reseller, i.e., NR = 
E
R = 0. In plot (a), we have
aL
aH
< 1
2
, while in plot (b), we have aL
aH
> 1
2
. There is one threshold c in plot (a) that
divides the regions where the supplier is better o and worse o by encroachment;
and in plot (b), in addition to the pattern in plot (a), the supplier can also be better
o when c is close to aH
2
.
The comparison becomes relatively more involved when  < aL
aH
under which
the supplier sells through the reseller for both market sizes. We derive the following
proposition.
Proposition 18. When  < aL
aH
, the eect of encroachment capability upon the
supplier can be characterized according to three thresholds: c0S  c00S  c000S , such that
encroachment capability makes the supplier strictly better o when 0 < c < c0S or
c00S < c < c
000
S , weakly worse o when c
0
S  c  c00S or c000S  c < maxfaL2 + (aH aL)2(1 ) ; aH2 g,
and has no eect when c  maxfaL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ;
aH
2
g.
First, notice that supplier encroachment makes the supplier better o when
c is small (0 < c < c0S), worse o when c is relatively large (close to but smaller than
maxfaL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ;
aH
2
g), and indierent when c exceeds maxfaL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ;
aH
2
g. In
particular, when c is small, the direct channel is nearly as ecient as the reselling
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Figure 3.2: The eects of supplier encroachment and asymmetry information on
the supply chain parties' prots when   aL
aH
. The parameters are:  = 0:8,
(aL; aH) = (1; 2:2) in the left plot, and (aL; aH) = (1; 1:4) in the right plot.
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channel. In such a scenario, having the option to sell directly allows the supplier
to reduce the quantity that she sells through the reseller for the small market size.
Because the information rents are linearly increasing in qR(aL), this reduces the
information rents available to the reseller while losing little in the selling process,
which benets the supplier. However, as the direct channel becomes less ecient, the
direct channel can lead to upward distortion of the quantities for both the large and
small market sizes. This means that the direct channel not only introduces inecient
upward distortion for the large market size, it also increases the information rents. In
particular, there exists a region close to maxfaL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ;
aH
2
g, where the supplier
is worse o by having the option to encroach. In this region, the direct channel
is relatively inecient and is used only sparingly. The costs associated with the
increment of information rents and the upward distortion exceed the benet from
direct sales. Obviously, as c continues to increase, the supplier becomes less and
less ecient relative to the reseller, and the potential impact of the direct channel
eventually vanishes. Indeed, when c is greater than maxfaL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ;
aH
2
g, the
supplier does not use the direct channel and is indierent toward the option to
encroach.
Second, it is interesting to notice that in the middle range of c, supplier
encroachment can be rst detrimental for the supplier (c0S  c  c00S) and then
become benecial (c00S < c < c
000
S ), as c increases. Such a result can arise because both
the benet from reducing the information rents and gaining direct sales and the cost
of upward distortion are not monotone in c. In fact, for the large market size, as
c increases from zero, the cost of upward distortion caused by encroachment rst
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increases from zero to some large value and then gradually decreases to zero. On the
other hand, for the small market size, as c increases from zero, supplier encroachment
rst reduces the information rents and, at the same time, gains the supplier some
extra prot from the direct sales. However, as c increases, these benets decrease,
and when c reaches a critical level, upward distortion in the reselling quantity may
appear, and this increases the information rents. The above eects make it possible
that in the middle range of c, supplier encroachment can rst reduce the supplier's
prot and then increase her prot relative to what it would be without encroachment.
Note that two or three of these thresholds may coincide with each other depending
on the prior distribution of the market sizes.
We demonstrate the results of Proposition 18 numerically in Figure 3.3. We
can observe from the left plot that when  = 0:58, the three thresholds are indis-
tinguishable; as c increases, encroachment capability rst makes the supplier better
o, then worse o, and eventually has no eect. In contrast, in the right plot where
 = 0:65, there are three distinct thresholds below maxfaL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ;
aH
2
g; as c
increases, encroachment capability rst makes the supplier better o, then worse o,
then better o (again), then worse o (again), and eventually has no eect.
While the above discussion is from the supplier's perspective, the eects of
supplier encroachment on the reseller's prot can be easily understood through the
impact that is upon information rents and quantity distortion. The comparison
between the gain and the loss for the reseller is, in fact, much simpler.
Proposition 19. When   aL
aH
, the reseller always obtains zero prot with or
without supplier encroachment. When  < aL
aH
, there exists one threshold c0R such
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Figure 3.3: The eects of supplier encroachment and asymmetry information on
the supply chain parties' prots when  < aL
aH
. The parameters are: aL = 1 and
aH = 1:4.
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that the reseller is weakly worse o when c  c0R, strictly better o when c0R < c <
aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , and indierent when c  aL2 + (aH aL)2(1 ) , with supplier encroachment
compared to without.
When   aL
aH
, the supplier does not sell through the reseller for the small
market size, with or without supplier encroachment, which yields zero information
rent to the reseller. Hence the reseller's prot does not depend upon whether the
supplier has the option to encroach. When  < aL
aH
, the supplier sells through the
reseller when the market size is small, which yields positive information rents to
the reseller. Note that the information rents increase linearly in the order quantity
qR(aL) targeting the small market size. We can thus nd a threshold c
0
R such that
this ordering quantity with supplier encroachment is smaller than that without when
c  c0R, while it is the reverse when c0R < c < aL2 + (aH aL)2(1 ) due to upward distortion.
For any c  aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , the supplier does not use the direct channel and thus
the reseller is indierent whether the supplier has or has not the option to encroach.
The results of Proposition 19 are depicted in Figures 3.2-3.3.
To have a full comparison of the parties' prots with and without supplier
encroachment, we generate Figure 3.4 that shows the regions where the supplier and
the reseller are better o, worse o, or indierent by supplier encroachment with
respect to c and .
It is of interest to compare these results to those of Arya et al. (2007), who
study supplier encroachment under linear wholesale pricing and symmetric demand
information. Recall that they nd that the supplier is weakly better o with en-
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croachment capability, and that there exists an intermediate range of cost advantage
for the reseller for which he too is better o. However, they acknowledge that the
benets of encroachment disappear when the supplier can implement nonlinear pric-
ing. In contrast, we have demonstrated that, when the information is asymmetric,
the ability to encroach can either enhance or hinder a supplier's nonlinear pricing
policy, depending upon the distribution of the demand parameter and her cost dis-
advantage.
Finally, it is natural to question how supplier encroachment aects the total
supply chain surplus in our context. While it is challenging to assess the eects
analytically, we can clearly observe from Figures 3.2-3.3 that the total supply chain
surplus can be either increased or reduced by supplier encroachment for dierent
parameters. The underlying intuition is similar to what we have explained for the
results from the perspectives of the supplier and the reseller.
3.6 Extensions
We now discuss two extensions to our original model. In the rst, to test
the robustness of our model, we allow for the possibility that the reseller can freely
dispose of units that he orders, so that he does not necessarily sell everything if
it is ex-post suboptimal to do so. In the second extension, we consider how the
supplier's encroachment capability will aect the reseller's willingness to acquire
private demand information.
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3.6.1 Free Disposal by the Reseller
It is easy to notice that without supplier encroachment, the reseller will not
withhold any units if he orders optimally. In the following, we discuss the case in the
presence of encroachment where the supplier oers a separating menu of contracts.
The timeline of the game will be: First, the supplier oers a menu of contracts
f(w(ai); qR(ai))gi2fH;Lg to the reseller who then selects one to order. Second, based
on the reseller's contract choice, the supplier prepares a direct selling quantity qS(ai).
Finally, the reseller and the supplier simultaneously determine the quantities to sell
and dispose of any units they withhold.
A straightforward analysis of a simultaneous move Cournot competition can
reveal that without any constraint, the optimal selling quantities of the reseller and
the supplier should be ai+c
3
and ai 2c
3
, respectively, for each market size. Certainly,
in our context, the reseller cannot sell more than what he orders, i.e., his selling
quantity will be minfai+c
3
; qR(ai)g. Therefore, comparing with the results in section
3.5.2, we can notice that the free disposal option will have an impact on the reseller's
selling quantity when c is intermediate. Denote by E = maxfaL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ;
aL
2
g, we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 20. With the reseller's option of free disposal, the optimal separating
menu of contracts under asymmetric information and supplier encroachment is in
Table 3.4, with wE(aL) = IfqER(aL)>0g
 
aL   qER(aL)  qES (aL)

and wE(aH) = aH  
qER(aH)   qES (aH)   (aH aL)q
E
R(aL)
qER(aH)
. The supplier's direct selling quantity is qES (ai) =
ai qER(ai) c
2
+
, i 2 fH;Lg.
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(a) Small Market Size
Scenarios qER(aL)
c 2 (0;minfaL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ;
aL
5
+ 6(aH aL)
5(1 ) g]

2c  2(aH aL)
1 
+
 2 (0; aL
aH
) c 2 (minfaL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ;
aL
5
+ 6(aH aL)
5(1 ) g; E] aL+c3
c 2 (E; aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ] aL   c
c 2 (aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ;+1) aL2   (aH aL)2(1 )
 2 [ aL
aH
; 1) c 2 (0;1) 0
(b) Large Market Size
Scenarios qER(aH)
c 2 (0; aH
5
] 2c
c 2 (aH
5
; aH
2
] aH+c
3
c 2 (aH
2
;+1) aH
2
Table 3.4: Optimal separating menu of contracts under asymmetric information and
supplier encroachment
Comparing with Proposition 15, we can verify that the supplier will be worse
o when the reseller has the option of free disposal than without. The supplier
now faces more constraints when optimizing the menu of contracts. Intuitively,
free disposal limits the reseller's commitment power on his selling quantity, which
enhances the supplier's ex-post encroaching incentive. From Figure A.1, we can
observe that when aH
5
< c < aH
2
, the supplier's prot with free disposal is signicantly
lower than that without. Note that the reseller is also (weakly) worse o by the option
of free disposal as his order quantity for the small market size becomes smaller.
It is worth noting that, because the reseller incurs no cost for obtaining the
product other than the wholesale price, upward distortion will not arise in our current
model if the reseller has the option of free disposal and cannot commit to selling
everything that he orders. However, if the reseller incurs positive handling costs,
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then upward distortion can still be present. For example, suppose the reseller has
a traditional, bricks and mortar, operation so that he incurs a positive per unit
logistics handling cost cR as soon as he orders and takes delivery, and the supplier
sells through a direct online channel. Because the supplier's online channel requires
her to ship units that she sells to individual consumers, her logistics costs are not
only higher, i.e., cS > cR, they are also incurred at the point of sale rather than at the
time that the units are produced. As long as we assume that the reseller can commit
to selling everything that he orders, i.e., no free disposal, the reseller's (supplier's)
cost can be normalized to zero (c = cS   cR), and this is exactly what we have done
in the base model. However, when we allow for the reseller to have the free disposal
option, his positive logistics cost will play an interesting role. Notice that with this
logistics cost, the ecient quantity for the reseller to order and sell under complete
information will become ai cR
2
. However, in the case with asymmetric information,
at the second stage when the supplier and the reseller simultaneously choose their
amounts to sell, this logistics cost is already sunk and will not play a role in the
reseller's decision. As a result, if the reseller is not constrained by his order quantity,
then he will sell aH+cS
3
= aH+cR+c
3
when the market size is large. Clearly, supplier
encroachment can still induce the reseller to sell more than his ecient quantity if
aH cR
2
< aH+cR+c
3
, or equivalently, aH < 5cR + 2c.
3.6.2 Downstream Information Acquisition
In the above analysis, we have assumed that the reseller knows the true market
size. Here, we investigate how downstream information acquisition aects the two
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parties' prots in the presence of supplier encroachment. To do so, we assume that
without acquiring any information, the reseller has the same information set as does
the supplier (i.e., both of them use the prior distribution of the market size, Pr(a =
aH) = H and Pr(a = aL) = L with H = 1   L = , to make their contracting
and stocking decisions). Further, we assume that information acquisition is costless.
When neither rm observes the market size before the reseller orders, the
supplier will oer one contract to the reseller that depends only on the expected
market size. Specically, let (w(); qR()) denote the contract where  = aH +
(1  ) aL is the expected market size. Because the reseller's order quantity conveys
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no information about demand, after the reseller accepts the contract, the supplier's
direct selling quantity will be:
qS() =

  qR()  c
2
+
:
Consequently, the supplier's nonlinear pricing problem can be stated as:
max
(w();qR())
w()qR() + (  qR()  qS()  c) qS()
s:t: (  qR()  qS()  w()) qR()  0:
The solution follows the same format as that in Proposition 11 with ai replaced by
.
Comparing the two parties' prots with and without downstream information
acquisition, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 21. (i) For the reseller, when   aL
aH
, he is indierent toward acquiring
information (since he always obtains zero expected prot); when  < aL
aH
, there exists
a threshold cIR such that he is better o by acquiring information when c > c
I
R and
indierent when c  cIR.
(ii) For the supplier, there exist cIS, c
I
S and such that she is strictly better o by
downstream information acquisition when c < cIS, or c > c
I
S and  > .
For the reseller, without information acquisition, he will always obtain zero
expected prot under the supplier's optimal nonlinear contract. In contrast, as
revealed in Proposition 19, under some parameters, the reseller is able to obtain a
positive expected prot when he has private information of the market size. Hence,
the reseller is always (weakly) better o by acquiring the market information.
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For the supplier, however, the reseller acquiring the market information can
be a double-edged sword. On one hand, the supplier can screen out the market
information and thus make more accurate contracting and direct selling decisions;
on the other hand, the supplier will have to surrender some information rents to the
reseller. Proposition 21(ii) provides two sucient conditions for when downstream
information acquisition benets the supplier. In particular, when c is suciently
small (c < cIS), the direct channel will be very ecient, which limits the information
rents paid to the reseller. In such a scenario, downstream information acquisition
always benets the supplier. When c is suciently large (c > cIS) which prevents en-
croachment, downstream information acquisition benets the supplier if the market
size is very likely to be large ( > ). In such a scenario, the gain from accurately
contracting outweighs the information rents paid to the reseller. When these condi-
tions do not hold, downstream information acquisition may make the supplier strictly
worse o. We demonstrate the possible outcomes in Figure 3.6.
3.7 Conclusion and Discussion
The main contribution of our paper is to identify the complex trade-os that
are involved when a supplier develops encroachment capability in contexts where re-
sellers have private demand information and nonlinear pricing can be implemented.
Although encroachment capability provides the supplier with a more rened mech-
anism for managing information rents, it also introduces the possibility of her own
opportunism, which can lead to inecient distortions in the quantities sold through
the reselling channel. As a consequence of these complex interactions, it is possible
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Figure 3.6: Illustration of the regions where downstream information acquisition ben-
ets or hurts the supplier and the reseller in the presence of supplier encroachment.
The parameters are: aL = 1 and aH = 2:5.
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for either/neither the supplier or/nor the reseller to benet from encroachment.
In particular, we nd that with some parameters, supplier encroachment can
reduce the amount of eciency that the supplier must sacrice in order to reduce
information rents received by the reseller. On the other hand, we also nd that,
because supplier encroachment capability allows the supplier to make an ex-post
output decision, it may cause inecient distortions in the quantities sold through
the reselling channel. Specically, the supplier's own potential to behave opportunis-
tically in determining her own direct selling quantity can cause inecient distortions
in the quantities sold through the reselling channel.
From a practical perspective, our results clearly refute existing results that
suggest that supplier encroachment would have no impact when a supplier can use
nonlinear pricing. Indeed, we have shown that, if the supplier's direct selling channel
is suciently ecient, then she can always benet from developing encroachment
capability, even if she is using nonlinear pricing. (For specic parameters, she may
also benet when her direct channel is at intermediate levels of eciency.) Yet our
results also highlight the dark-side of encroachment; there exists a moderate range
of direct channel eciency for which the supplier's ability to encroach renders both
the supplier and the supply chain worse o.
In presenting our analysis, we have tried to simplify our model as much as
possible to highlight the trade-os that encroachment creates for the supplier between
her enhanced ability to control information rents and the introduction of potential
opportunism. However, in sections A.3 and 3.6.2, we consider two extensions of
our base model. In the rst, we conrm that our main results continue to hold, if
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the reseller can freely dispose of units that he acquires from the supplier when it is
not optimal for him to release them all to the market. In the latter extension, we
analyze how the supplier's encroachment capability aects the reseller's willingness
to acquire information about the market size. Interestingly, although the reseller
always at least weakly prefers to acquire information, the supplier may either benet
from or be hurt by downstream information acquisition.
Of course, when the supplier develops a direct channel to provide her with en-
croachment capability, her direct interactions with the market may provide her with
a source of information that is independent from the reseller. In the appendix, we
model this as a noisy signal of the true market size, and we show that the indepen-
dent source of information has both a direct eect and an indirect eect. The direct
eect is that the supplier can tailor her pricing menu according to the signal that
she receives, and this helps to reduce information rents. In the extreme case where
the signal is perfectly accurate, the information rents are eliminated. The indirect
eect arises from the fact that, because the signal aects the price-quantity pairs
that are oered to the reseller, it indirectly inuences the supplier's direct selling
quantity. Thus, the accuracy of the demand signal indirectly aects the supplier's
direct selling quantity in spite of the fact that she is fully informed of the market
size (via the reseller's order) at the time that she determines the quantity to sell
directly. As a consequence of these two eects, the supplier may or may not benet
from the independent demand signal. More interesting is the observation that, for
certain parameters (relatively high values of both c and ), the reseller benets from
the supplier's development of encroachment capability only if it results in the sup-
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plier obtaining an independent source of demand information. Finally, the appendix
also includes a demonstration that our qualitative results continue to hold when the
market size follows a continuous (uniform) distribution.
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Chapter 4
Platform Integration with First-Party
Applications
4.1 Introduction
Platform-based technologies such as computer operating systems (e.g., Win-
dows, Mac OS, and Linux), mobile operating systems (e.g., iOS and Android) and
video game consoles (e.g., Xbox, Play Station, and Wii) have become an essential
part of the information economy (Evans et al. 2006). As noted by Boudreau (2007),
such platforms are dened as the set of core components whose functionalities can
be extended by complementary applications. Platform owners often seek comple-
mentary innovations from third-party providers to meet the needs of heterogeneous
users. This approach of complementary innovation has given rise to the model of a
platform ecosystem which makes a platform more valuable (Gawer and Cusumano
2002, Tiwana et al. 2010). More recently, social networking services such as Facebook
have also adopted this platform approach of complementary innovations. Facebook
launched its platform in May 2007, providing a set of programming interfaces and
tools for third-party software developers to create applications that interact with
Facebook's core features (e.g., user prole and friendship network). As of February
2012, the Facebook platform supported more than 9 million applications in a vari-
ety of categories such as games, photo-sharing, music-sharing, news, entertainment,
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sports, travel, and lifestyle,1 which in total attract more than 235 million users.2
While continuing to expand their ecosystem through third-party applications,
platform owners may also provide their own applications to consumers (i.e., rst-
party applications), either by in-house development or by acquisition from third-
party developers. These rst-party applications tend to compete with third-party
applications. A critical aspect of this vertical integration strategy is the platform
owner's decision to make a tighter integration of rst-party applications relative to
the integration of other third-party applications. For example, Facebook acquired
Instagram for $1 billion in April 2012. Instagram3 and other Facebook photo-sharing
applications oer social networking features for Facebook users to discover, like,
comment on, or vote for photos from their friend network or even the entire Facebook
network (the total number of active users of these applications was over 113 million in
December 2012). After the acquisition, a partial integration was made by Facebook
in June 2012 to facilitate photo-sharing between Instagram and Facebook. This
integration provided Instagram users an easy-to-use interface to access Facebook data
(e.g., user proles and friendship network) and share photos on Facebook through
Instagram automatically. However, users of third-party applications needed several
extra steps to complete the same tasks.4 Similarly, in May 2012, Facebook acquired
1http://www.insidefacebook.com/2012/04/27/facebook-platform-supports-more-than-42-
million-pages-and-9-million-apps/.
2http://techcrunch.com/2012/08/14/facebook-says-it-now-has-235m-monthly-gamers-app-
center-hits-150m-e monthly-users/.
3Instagram can be used independently of Facebook. Instagram users can use the application to
interact with other social networking services, such as Twitter, Tumblr and Flickr. Our focus in
this paper is Instagram's features that enable users to share photos on Facebook.
4http://androidcommunity.com/instagram-update-adds-deeper-facebook-integration-and-
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a gift-giving application called Karma, which competes with other Facebook gift-
giving applications (e.g., Wrapp).5 Facebook also made tighter integration with
Karma after the acquisition.6
Integration of rst-party applications is an important platform design deci-
sion. As consumers value inter-product integration (Nambisan 2002), platform own-
ers may benet from providing tighter integration with their rst-party applications.
However, third-party developers may resist such moves and hesitate to contribute
to the ecosystem as they fear the platform owner's ability to squeeze them ex post
(Gawer and Henderson 2007). For example, Facebook's vertical integration strategy
has raised concerns about the viability of the platform for third-party developers, as
voiced in the following quote from the CEO of Wrapp: \The $100 billion question
now is whether Facebook will remain an open platform that partners and supports
companies like Wrapp..." The partial congruence of interests between the platform
owner and third-party developers are evidenced in Facebook's response to its plat-
form strategy:\Our company is specically looking for acquisitions that complement
our core products. However, we've never been more invested in supporting and ex-
panding the ecosystem of applications and developers that build with Facebook."7
Managing the tension between rst-party applications and third-party appli-
cations has been a critical part of major platforms' strategies (Gawer and Henderson
search-options-20120626/.
5http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-23/what-facebook-will-get-out-of-gift-giving-
app-karma.
6http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2012/05/18/on-ipo-day-facebook-nds-time-to-buy-
social-gifting-site-karma/.
7http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304441404577480611248317178.
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2007, Huang et al. 2013). Platform owners have to carefully evaluate the impact
of the integration of a rst-party application on its application ecosystem. Analysis
of the resulting consumer preferences and the substitution or complementary eects
between rst-party applications and third-party applications can help platform own-
ers determine the overall impact of their strategy. While we focus on the Facebook
platform, this study has implications for a number of other platforms that routinely
provide rst-party applications and have to devise their vertical integration strat-
egy. For example, Apple has also introduced its own applications (e.g., Apple Maps,
Facetime, and iMovie) for its iOS platform, while Google has launched a variety of
rst-party applications for its Android platform (e.g., Google Chat, Google Finance,
and Google Maps).
The consequences of platform integration are multifold and not obvious. In
the case of Facebook's integration of Instagram, one possibility is that the inte-
gration has little impact as it does not introduce new product features. Without
the integration, users could still complete the same tasks using Instagram or any
third-party application. However, past literature suggests that ease of use is posi-
tively associated with product adoption (Davis 1989, Cooper 2000, Dhebar 1995).
Therefore, users may derive additional utility from the tighter integration of Insta-
gram with Facebook as it enhances Instagram's ease of use as compared to that
for other third-party applications. Integration by the platform owner may also sig-
nal high quality/credibility of the application. As a result, consumers may perceive
the rst-party application more viable than third-party applications. Due to these
benets, consumers may nd the rst-party application more appealing relative to
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third-party applications, resulting in higher demand for the rst-party application
and lower demand for third-party applications. However, the platform owner's inte-
gration strategy can also stimulate consumer demand for applications as users may
perceive the platform owner's strategy as its commitment to grow the applications
ecosystem. As a consequence, third-party applications may also benet from this
market expansion eect. Finally, the impact of the platform owner's integration
strategy can vary across dierent third-party applications. Thus, the overall impact
of platform integration on market demand in the ecosystem is not known.
Despite its importance, empirical research on consumer demand for rst-party
applications and third-party applications has been limited.8 Furthermore, the im-
pact of platform integration remains unclear. Gawer and Henderson (2007) use a
qualitative approach to explore why Intel entered its complementary markets and
how Intel balances its own strong incentives to enter against the risk of discouraging
complementors' innovations. However, they do not empirically evaluate the eect of
platform entry on consumer demand in complementary markets. Huang et al. (2013)
focus on the role of intellectual property rights on third-party developers' incentives
to join the SAP platform, but they do not study the impact of rst-party application
on consumer demand for third-party applications. Lee (2013) investigates the role of
exclusive titles on platform competition in the U.S. videogame industry. However,
he evaluates the impact of exclusive titles on the demand for competing videogame
8Platform owners conventionally do not release demand data about their tightly integrated
rst-party applications. For example, Facebook stops releasing application usage data once an
application gets acquired by Facebook. The Instagram case we study is an exception - Facebook
continued to provide publicly available data on consumers' use of Instagram for Facebook photo-
sharing until December 2012.
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platforms rather than competing titles. No empirical evidence on the impact of a
platform's integration with its rst-party applications has been documented. Fur-
thermore, related theoretical papers have focused on how price competition inu-
ences market demand, leaving out consumer preferences for empirical studies. Thus,
the eect of non-pricing strategy like platform integration in inuencing consumer
preferences and market demand is not known.
We ll the gap in the literature by studying the impact of Facebook's inte-
gration of Instagram on Facebook's photo-sharing applications market. The unique
dataset from this integration event allows us to evaluate the changes in consumer
preferences and market demand after Instagram became a tightly integrated rst-
party application. We aim to address the following questions:
(1) What is the impact of the platform owner's integration strategy on con-
sumer demand for the rst-party application and third-party applications?
(2) How does the integration strategy impact the overall demand in the com-
plementary market?
We build a structural model of consumer choices and estimate demand for the
rst-party application, third-party applications and the overall photo-sharing appli-
cation market before and after the integration event. Our model extends existing
static structural demand estimation models (see, e.g., Berry et al. 1995) by incor-
porating network eects and switching costs arising from the social characteristics
of photo-sharing applications. We estimate the model using a unique dataset that
consists of daily usage of dierent applications on the Facebook platform.
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The main ndings are as follows. First, we nd that consumers obtain ad-
ditional utility from Instagram after its tighter integration with Facebook, leading
to a dramatic increase in the demand for Instagram. This is possibly due to the
real benets from the integration as well as the perceived long-term viability of
the rst-party application. Second, while integration lowers consumer valuations
of third-party applications with a small user base, it actually has a positive eect
on consumer valuations of big third-party applications. This result suggests that
the size of an application's user base inuences consumer preferences for dierent
types of third-party applications following the integration of the rst-party applica-
tion. As a consequence, the integration event has large negative impact on demand
for competing third-party applications with a small user base, whereas it has much
smaller negative impact on competing third-party applications with a large user
base. Finally, we nd that a large fraction of new users gained by Instagram are
new users who did not use any photo-sharing application, rather than incumbent
users of third-party applications. As a result, the overall demand in the market
actually increases, which suggests that Facebook's integration strategy benets the
complementary market overall.
Our research makes several contributions. Our study contributes to the litera-
ture on platform strategies in complementary markets. Previous research has mostly
relied on theoretical models to study strategic interactions between the platform
owner and third-party developers (supply-side behavior), given various assumptions
on consumer behavior (Farrell and Katz 2000, Hagiu and Spulber 2013). Addition-
ally, they do not focus on platform's decision to have variable integration across
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applications and its implication for the consumer demand. Our paper is the rst
study that empirically evaluates consumer preferences for rst-party applications
vis-a-vis third-party applications (demand-side behavior) and its implication for the
platform owner's integration strategy. Our research also contributes to the literature
on network eects. Previous research has focused on the role of network eects on the
adoption and diusion of products (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996, Kauman et al.
2000, Fuentelsaz et al. 2012). Our research adds to this stream by evaluating the role
of network eects on consumer preference for rst-party applications and third-party
applications and its implications in the context of platform ecosystems. Specically,
we show that third-party applications with a larger user base may actually benet
from a platform owner's integration of a rst-party application.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst one to empirically demon-
strate the value of integration of an application by a platform owner. Previous
research has assumed that cross-product integration is valuable and demonstrated
how initial technology architecture/design enables future cross-product integration
(Nambisan 2002, Baldwin and Clark 2000). In these studies, platform owners do not
own rst-party applications that compete with third-party applications. Our paper
demonstrates the eect of platform integration on consumer valuations and demand
for applications in the context of a platform ecosystem with rst-party applications
and competing third-party applications.
From the platform owner's perspective, our ndings shed light on the ecacy
of the platform's integration strategy. On one hand, such a strategy may be bene-
cial particularly in a market where network eects and switching costs are present.
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In such a scenario, the platform owner may gain new users due to the appeal of the
tightly integrated rst-party application while not hurting third-party applications
too much. On the other hand, our research informs small third-party applications,
platform owners, and policy makers about the potential dark side of platform inte-
gration. As small third-party applications are more vulnerable to the negative shock
from vertical integration, such strategies may cause small third-party developers to
exit the market, which reduces the variety of products/services available in the com-
plementary market. Platform owners and policy makers should evaluate the trade-o
between the demand increase in the short-turn and the potential losses in product
variety in the long-turn.
4.2 Related Literature
Our research is related to the literature on platform-based ecosystems with a
focus on complementary markets and the literature on product adoption subject to
network eects and switching costs. We discuss these two streams of research below.
Platform Ecosystems and Complementary Markets
Existing studies have mostly relied on analytical modeling to study the strate-
gic interactions between the platform owner and third-party developers (i.e., supply-
side behaviors). Eisenmann et al. (2011) study platform entry strategies when new
entrants face entry barriers driven by strong network eects and high switching costs.
Farrell and Katz (2000) evaluate how a platform owner's entry into its complemen-
tary market allows it to extract higher rents. Hagiu and Spulber (2013) investigate
the strategic use of rst-party applications and show that the level of investment
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in these applications is driven by the relationship between rst-party applications
and third-party applications and the market conditions. All these theoretical papers
above focus on supply-side behavior and rm strategies, give various assumptions
on consumer behavior. Our paper is the rst study that empirically evaluates con-
sumer preferences for rst-party applications vis-a-vis third-party applications (i.e.,
demand-side behavior). Furthermore, theoretical papers have focused on how price
competition inuences market demand. Our study of the Facebook platform high-
lights the role of a non-pricing strategy like platform integration in inuencing market
demand.
Empirical research on platform-based ecosystems, with a focus on comple-
mentary markets, is limited. Chipty (2001) examines the consequences of vertical
integration between programming and distribution in the cable television industry.
She assesses the role of ownership structure in program oerings and nds that in-
tegrated operators tend to exclude rival program services from their distribution
networks. In our study, the platform owner did not exclude rival applications and
instead adopted an approach of tighter integration with its own application. Gawer
and Henderson (2007) use a deductive, qualitative approach to explore why Intel
entered its complementary markets and how Intel balanced its own strong incentives
to enter against the risk of discouraging complementors' innovations. Our paper
provides concrete empirical evidence on the eects of a platform owner's vertical
integration strategy in shaping consumer demand in the complementary market.
Using rm-level nancial data, Huang et al. (2013) highlights the role of intel-
lectual property rights in third-party developers' incentives to join SAP's enterprise
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software platform. Third-party developers that hold patents and copyrights, which
protect developers from being squeezed by the platform owner, are more likely to
join the platform. The focus of their paper is on third-party developers' entry be-
havior, whereas our paper controls for entry behavior and focuses on understanding
consumer choices of rst-party and third-party applications before and after platform
integration. Lee (2013) investigates the role of exclusive titles on platform competi-
tion in the U.S. videogame industry. However, he evaluates the impact of exclusive
titles on consumer demand for competing videogame consoles rather than compet-
ing third-party applications. Furthermore, in our study of Facebook photo-sharing
applications, consumers may prefer the tightly integrated rst-party application for
its ease of use, a characteristics that is absent in the videogame setting.
Product Adoption in the Presence of Network Eects
Several studies have focused on the role of network eects on product adop-
tion. Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) estimate the impact of installed base and
compatibility on the price of packaged software. Their empirical analysis shows that
the size of a product's installed base is positively associated with the price of the
product. Using electronic banking as a context, Kauman et al. (2000) provide em-
pirical evidence on network externality as a determinant of product adoption and
diusion. They nd that banks in markets that can generate a larger eective net-
work size and a higher level of externalities tend to adopt electronic banking early.
Xue et al. (2011) study consumer adoption of online banking services. They nd that
customers who reside in areas with a larger number of online banking adopters are
faster to adopt online banking as well. Zhu et al. (2006) develop a conceptual model
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that captures network eects, expected benets, and adoption costs as drivers in
the adoption of internet-based interorganizational systems. They highlight that the
extent to which a rm's trading partners is willing to support the same systems as a
key driver of the focal rm's adoption decisions. Gallaugher and Wang (2002) show
a positive eect of network size on the price of Web server software. They attribute
network eects to three sources: exchange value, staying power, and extrinsic bene-
ts. Fuentelsaz et al. (2012) analyze the role of switching costs and network eects
in determining the level of competition in the European mobile communications in-
dustry. Consistent with theoretical predictions, their empirical results suggest that
higher switching costs and stronger network eects lead to lower level of rivalry in
the market.
Thus previous works have primarily focused on the role of network eects on
product adoption and price competition. Our paper extends this stream of literature
by evaluating the role of network eects in inuencing consumer responses to a
platform owner's integration of a rst-party application.
4.3 Photo-Sharing Application Ecosystem on Facebook
In this paper we focus on photo-sharing applications that enable Facebook
users to discover, edit and share photos on Facebook. Photo-sharing applications
provide tools to create personalized photo collages, import pictures from an exist-
ing Facebook album, retouch, add lters or text, and share photos with friends.
These applications also oer social networking features for Facebook users to dis-
cover, like, comment on, or vote for photos from their friendship network or even the
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entire Facebook network. These social features create a local social network within a
focal photo-sharing application. Instagram has been one of the most popular photo-
sharing applications on the Facebook platform.
On April 12, 2012, Facebook acquired Instagram for approximately $1 billion.
After the acquisition, Facebook continued to run Instagram as an independent appli-
cation, instead of fully integrating it into Facebook.com.9 There were no signicant
changes to Instagram and Facebook.com after the acquisition deal, except that, on
June 26, 2012, a partial integration was made to facilitate photo-sharing between
Instagram and Facebook. After the tighter integration, if an Instagram user likes
or comments a photo on Instagram, the photo along with the \like" or comment
may automatically appear as the user's news feed on Facebook; if a Facebook user
likes or comments the photo, the \like" or comment may appear in the original post
on Instagram as well. The update also oers Instagram users enhanced capacity to
nd and connect to their Facebook friends and explore Facebook's network using
this application. Users of third-party applications have to take several extra steps to
complete these tasks.
We obtained a unique dataset from a business analytics company that tracks
usage of applications on Facebook. While Facebook routinely stopped releasing
application usage data after an application was acquired by Facebook, the Instagram
case was an exception. Facebook continued to report data on consumers' use of
Instagram for Facebook photo-sharing until December 2012. Our dataset consists
9https://newsroom.fb.com/News/321/Facebook-to-Acquire-Instagram.
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of the number of daily active users for the top 20 photo-sharing applications on
the Facebook platform from April 27, 2012 to December 15, 2012.10 All the top
20 applications are free applications and cumulatively account for over 88% of the
market share among all Facebook photo-sharing applications. Except Instagram, all
other applications were owned by third-party developers. Besides the time-variant
demand data, we also observe time-invariant product attributes such as release dates
and distribution channels (Facebook canvas, iOS/Android applications). The dataset
also consists of an app's average user star ratings on Facebook's application center.
The star ratings remained constant during the panel period, suggesting there were
no visible quality improvements to the photo-sharing applications during the panel
period.
We divide the dataset into two subsamples, one for estimation and the other
for model validation. The subsample for estimation covers the rst 124 days (two
months before and two months after the integration event), whereas the subsample
for validation covers the remainder of 109 days.
Table 4.1 summarizes some descriptive statistics of the subsample used for
estimation. We compute market shares by dividing the number of application users
by the total number of Facebook users (see, e.g., Berry et al. 1995, Nevo 2001). The
statistics show that a large fraction of Facebook users did not use any photo-sharing
application regularly.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the demand changes for dierent applications before and
10After December 2012, Facebook stopped providing accurate application usage data (it only
reports the range of application users, e.g., 10,000 { 50,000).
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Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Market Size (Daily Users of Facebook) 5.52 × 10
8
 1.07 × 10
7
 5.35 × 10
8
 5.72 × 10
8
 
Natural Log of Market Size 20.12 16.19 20.10 20.16 
Daily Users of Instagram 5.04 × 10
6
 2.91 × 10
6
 1.90 × 10
6
 1.05 × 10
7
 
Natural Log of Daily Users of Instagram 15.43 14.88 14.46 16.17 
Daily Users of Third-Party Apps 2.58 × 10
5
 3.34 × 10
5
 4.00 × 10
2
 1.60 × 10
6
 
Natural Log of Daily Users of Third-Party 
Apps 
12.46 12.72 5.99 14.29 
Market Share of Instagram 0.90% 0.51% 0.35% 1.83% 
Market Share of Third-Party Apps 0.047% 0.060% 7.07 × 10
-5 
% 0.29% 
 
Table 4.1: Daily users of Instagram and other photo-sharing applications on the
Facebook platform. The total number of applications in the sample is 20 and the
length of the panel period is 124 days (two months before and two months after the
integration event). Thus, the total number of observations in this balanced panel is
2,480.
after the integration event. Since its tighter integration with Facebook, Instagram
has experienced signicant growth in its user base. Moreover, the combined demand
of the top third-party applications remains relatively stable, but the growth rate
becomes noticeably lower after the integration event, suggesting certain degree of
substitution between Instagram and third-party applications. The negative impact is
particularly signicant for third-party applications with a small network size. Finally,
the total demand for Instagram and third-party applications is growing. By the end
of August, 2012, the total demand in the photo-sharing category almost tripled.
These results imply that a large fraction of users joining Instagram are new users,
rather than incumbent users of third-party applications. In the remainder of the
paper, we look into these results and their implications by building and estimating
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a random-coecient discrete choice model that captures consumer choices.
4.4 The Model
Our objective is to estimate demand for dierent photo-sharing applications
on the Facebook platform. We build a structural model of consumer choices based
on the literature of structural demand estimation using aggregate data (Berry et al.
1995). This structural approach allows us to derive market share of each application
as a function of product characteristics while accounting for unobserved consumer
heterogeneity and demand shocks. Similar models have been used to study consumer
choices in electronic markets and mobile applications markets (see, e.g., Ghose et al.
2012, Ghose and Han 2014, Danaher et al. 2014).
4.4.1 Model Setup
We observe period t, t = 1; : : : ; T , withMt consumers. Each consumer chooses
at most one application j, j = 1; : : : ; J , in each period. In our setup of Facebook
photo-sharing applications, J = 20. All these photo-sharing applications are free
and thus price is not relevant to consumer choices. We categorize the J applications
into two groups: g =frst-party applications, third-party applicationsg. Denote
j = 0 the option of outside good, the option of not using any of these J applications.
Consumer i's utility of using application j in period t is specied as
Uijgt = yj(t 1)i +
X
g
gIjgt + j +  t + "jt + ijt; (4.1)
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Figure 4.1: Market demand of Instagram, third-party applications, and the overall
market before and after Facebook's tighter integration with Instagram. A tighter in-
tegration between Facebook and Instagram was made on June 26, 2012 (dashed line).
We call the top 9 third-party applications (according to user base) big third-party
applications and the remainder 10 applications small third-party applications. Insta-
gram's user base (in millions) increased dramatically after the integration. However,
the growth rate of big third-party applications became smaller and the user base of
small third-party applications decreased. The total number of users for the photo-
sharing category increased after integration.
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where yj(t 1) is the lagged application user base that determines the direct network ef-
fect (see, e.g., Fuentelsaz et al. 2012). Network externalities are known to play a role
in consumers' adoption of technology products (Katz and Shapiro 1986). Products
and services with a larger user base may provide higher exchange value to users. Such
installed base eect may also come from behavioral factors such as social preferences,
observational learning, and word-of-mouth, which inuence product diusion (Bass
1969, Mahajan et al. 1990). Note that consumers may also derive utility from the
overall user base of Facebook (i.e., indirect network eect). This common network
eect, however, is not identied, as it enters the utility function for each application
and will be cancelled out.
Consumer valuation of the rst-party application may increase after its tighter
integration with the platform due to better ease of use (Davis 1989, Cooper 2000,
Dhebar 1995). For example, reciprocal sharing between Instagram and Facebook
allow Instagram users to manage photos across Instagram and Facebook in a seamless
fashion. This may have negative impact on third-party applications. These eects
are capture by Ijgt which represents a vector of interaction terms Integration 
AppGroup (Integration Instagram, IntegrationThirdPartyApp), whose value
is one if application j belongs to group g and t  tI (tI is the integration time), and
zero otherwise. These two interaction terms capture the impact of integration on
consumer valuation of Instagram and third-party applications.
Our model controls for various unobserved shocks. In Equation (4.1), "jt is the
app-specic shock that enters a consumer's utility in period t but are not observed
by our econometrician, and ijt is the idiosyncratic shock which is assumed to be
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drawn from the Type 1 extreme value distribution independently across consumers,
applications, and time periods (Berry et al. 1995). The model also includes appli-
cation dummies j and time dummies  t to control for time-invariant xed eects
and potential time trends that shift consumers' utility. Application dummies also
account for observed and unobserved product characteristics that do not vary during
the panel period. As noted by Nevo (2001), the rich specications of xed eects
and time eects capture various components of unobservables such as unobserved
promotional activities, unquantiable product characteristics (e.g., brand equity),
or systematic shocks to demand which are common across all photo-sharing appli-
cations. Such rich specications provide a semi-parametric control that assuages
potential misspecication concerns.
Following Berry et al. (1995), we model the distribution of consumers' taste
parameters as multivariate normal, i.e.,
i =  + vvi; vi  N(0; IK); (4.2)
where K is the dimension of product characteristics yjt,  is a vector of the means of
taste parameters, vi is a vector of unobserved individual tastes, and v is a scaling
diagonal matrix that represents the standard deviations of the taste distributions.
In our setup, product attributes except application user bases do not change during
the panel period and are already captured by the application dummy. Thus, we set
K = 1.
We assume random coecient for the key variable, i.e., the network eect
yj(t 1), to account for the possibility that consumers may be heterogeneous in their
103
valuation of the size of an application's user base. Identication of random coe-
cients for dummy regressors is dicult as these variables have very limited cross-
sectional or temporal variations, which hinder the identication of v. As a result,
we do not assume random coecients for dummy regressors and interaction terms
to avoid the explosion of parameters.11 Finally, we normalize the mean utility from
the outside option to zero, i.e., Ui0t = i0t.
Combining Equations (4.1) and (4.2), we have
Uijgt = jt + yj(t 1)vvi + ijt; (4.3)
where
jt = yj(t 1)) +
X
g
gIjgt + j +  t + "jt (4.4)
represents the mean utility and yj(t 1)vvi+ijt corresponds to consumer i's individual-
specic utility from using application j in time t.
A consumer's decision in current period may depend on her previous adoption
and usage. For example, when facing high switching costs, consumers may continue
to use the same product they have been using, even when more favorable alternatives
are available. In the base model described above, we do not consider such dynamic
behavior. In Section 4.6.3, we extend our base model to explicitly consider the role
of switching costs in consumer choices.
Our model implicitly assumes that consumers are myopic and non-strategic.
An individual consumer is \smal" relative to the size of the entire network such that
11Other studies using similar methodologies, such as Song (2015) and Gowrisankaran and Rysman
(2012), assume only one random coecient on the key explanatory variable.
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she anticipates her individual adoption decision will not signicantly inuence the
adoption behavior of other consumers. This is a common assumption in other papers
using similar approaches (see, e.g., Ghose et al. 2012, Ghose and Han 2014, Danaher
et al. 2014). In our context of Facebook photo-sharing applications, consumers have
limited incentives to behave forward-looking because all applications are free and
it is not impossible to switch to other applications. Therefore, we believe that our
assumption of myopic and non-strategic consumers is appropriate.
Our structural model has several advantages over the traditional Dierence-
in-Dierences (DD) technique used to measure the treatment eect. Platform inte-
gration impacts consumer choices over multiple periods, with both rst-order eect
(directly shifting consumer utility in current period) and second-order eect (in-
directly shifting utility in future periods through lagged user base). Our model
explicitly captures both these eects that are dicult to bed modeled using a DD
approach. Further, the structural model allows us to run counterfactual simulations
to estimate the market outcome in alternative scenarios, i.e., with and without in-
tegration. These counterfactual experiments are valuable in evaluating whether or
not it is benecial to conduct platform integration, instead of simply knowing the
changes in market demand before and after integration.
4.4.2 Identication and Estimation
Our focus in this paper is consumer choices before and after platform integra-
tion. To reduce the interference from supply-side behaviors such as entry and exit
following the integration, we restrict our analysis to a relative short horizon, two
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months before and two months after integration, such that application developers
possibly have not yet responded to the integration event. This restriction allows us
to estimate the demand equation in (4.1) without modeling the strategic interactions
between the platform owner and third-party developers.
The panel structure of the dataset allows us to use the xed-eects approach to
control for potential unobserved/omitted time-invariant product characteristics and
promotion eorts. The xed-eects approach provides a semi-parametric control
that assuages many misspecication concerns (Wooldridge 2010). However, xed-
eects estimators are inconsistent when the model includes predetermined explana-
tory variables such as lagged user base (Nickell 1981, Anderson and Hsiao 1982).
The intuition for the inconsistency is that future adoptions are a function of current
adoptions, implying that current unobservables are correlated with the size of appli-
cation user base in all future periods. This violates the strict exogeneity condition
required for the consistency of xed-eects estimators. However, this inconsistency
becomes insignicant when the number of time periods T is relatively large (Hahn
and Kuersteiner 2002), as it is the case in our model. Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002)
nd that the magnitude of biases is close to 2
T
, which is about 0.01, a negligible num-
ber in our setting (parameter estimate of network eect is about 0.7 in our model.).
As a robustness check, we also validate our results with various instruments for the
lagged user base in Section 4.7.
It is possible that Facebook may coordinate the timing of integration based
on some market trends for photo sharing. For example, an increased interest in
photo sharing among consumers may inuence the consumer response to integration.
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We account for such time trends using the time dummies. It is also possible that
Facebook may coordinate the timing of Integration with higher level of external
promotions for the Instagram application. We conducted a comprehensive review
of Instagram's internet activities during the same panel period. We went through
historical news feeds and articles on major search engines (Google, Yahoo!, and Bing),
mobile applications marketplaces (iTunes and Google Play), tech media websites
(CNET and TechCrunch), and Instagram's company page on Facebook. We do
not nd any evidence that Instagram was executing unusual advertising or other
promotional campaigns that may explain the demand patterns observed in Figure
4.1. However, it is possible that there are external unobserved market dynamics
which inuence consumer valuation and are correlated with the integration terms.
As a robustness check, we validate our results with a suitable instrument for the
integration variable in Section 4.7.
Details of the estimation algorithm are provided in the appendix. Here we
present the intuition of the estimation procedure. The model is of individual be-
havior, yet only aggregate data is observed. Our goal is to estimate the mean and
variance of the vector of model parameters while accounting for consumer hetero-
geneity. We apply iterative methods similar to the contraction mapping algorithm
used by Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo 2001. With an initial value of 0v, we can pre-
dict individual utility and aggregate individual choices to obtain predicted market
shares. We solve for the mean utility , such that the model-predicted market shares
are equal to the observed market shares. We then form a minimal distance objective
function based on the sum of squared errors (if instrument variables are used, we
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replace the minimal distance by a GMM objective function based on a set of moment
conditions.) We then update the parameter value and use it as the starting point for
the next iteration. This procedure is repeated until the algorithm nds the optimal
value of v that minimizes the objective function. We tried dierent starting points
and they routinely lead to the same estimates.
4.5 Empirical Analysis and Results
In this section, we explain the empirical results and provide evidence on the
t of the model. At the end of this section, we conduct counterfactual simulations
and estimate market demand for a hypothetical scenario in which Facebook did
not seek tighter integration with Instagram. By contrasting demand estimates from
this counterfactual \without integration" scenario with those from the real \with
integration" scenario, we are able to estimate the impact of platform integration on
dierent types of applications.
4.5.1 Parameter Estimates
Estimation results are in Table 4.2. Estimates in the rst column are from
the model without consumer heterogeneity (xing v to zero). The second column
provides the results from the enhanced model with consumer heterogeneity on net-
work eect. The last two columns present estimates from the same models, but with
control of unobserved time trends. The sum of squared errors in Table 4.2 reveal
that model t increases as controls of consumer heterogeneity and time eects are
included in the model (smaller squared errors mean better model t).
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Variable 
Coefficients (Standard Errors) 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
LaggedAppUserBase (log) 
0.7430*** 
(0.0096) 
0.7108*** 
(0.0096) 
0.7471*** 
(0.0095) 
0.7251*** 
(0.0095) 
Integration×Instagram 
0.3032*** 
(0.0407) 
0.2976*** 
(0.0407) 
0.3404*** 
(0.0407) 
0.3323*** 
(0.0407) 
Integration×ThirdPartyApp 
-0.0424*** 
(0.0090) 
-0.0367*** 
(0.0090) 
  
Time Dummy No No Yes Yes 
Consumer Heterogeneity 
      on AppUserBase (log)  
0.0560*** 
(0.0006)  
0.0439*** 
(0.0006) 
Sum of squared errors 143.9190 143.8043 135.2909 135.2509 
 
Table 4.2: Parameter estimates of the base models. Model (3)-(4) include time dum-
mies and the interaction term Integration  ThirdPartyApp is omitted to avoid
the dummy variable trap. Dummy variable trap occurs as there is perfect colinear-
ity among the time dummies and the two interaction terms for all post-integration
periods. Standard errors in parentheses and p <0.10, p <0.05, p <0.01.
The coecient of lagged application user base is positive and signicant. This
suggests that consumers derive a higher utility from using an application with a larger
user base. The strong network eect may be attributed to the unique features of
Facebook applications: social and sharing. Facebook users use these applications to
share their photos with other users and comment/vote on photos posted by others.
Many Facebook applications embed a local social network within the Facebook social
network, a phenomenon we refer to as \social network within social network". Also
note that the small but signicant parameter of consumer heterogeneity indicates
that users dier in their valuations of the network size. Some users value a large
network size more than others. Ignoring this heterogeneity leads to overestimation
of network eect.
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The coecient of Integration  Instagram is positive and signicant, indi-
cating that consumers derive additional value from Instagram after its tighter in-
tegration with Facebook. The additional value may come from better ease of use
due to tighter integration. It may also come from consumers' perceived long-term
viability of the rst-party application after its tighter integration with the platform
(Katz and Shapiro 1992, Gallaugher and Wang 2002). Tighter integration by the
platform owner may also signal high quality/credibility of the application. Due to
these benets, users are more likely to choose the rst-party application after the
integration.
The integration event reduces consumer valuation of third-party applications,
as evident from the negative coecient of Integration  ThirdPartyApp. If con-
sumer valuation of integration is purely from the better ease of use of the rst-party
application being integrated, then the integration event should not have any eect
on consumer valuations of third-party applications. However, the negative eect sug-
gests that other factors such as stability or long-term viability of an application may
also play a role in consumer valuation of the application. Consumers may perceive
the integration event as lower future support of third-party applications from the
platform owner, and as result, weaker perceived staying power of third-party appli-
cations.12 To our best knowledge, these results provide the rst empirical evidence
on how consumer valuations of rst-party applications and third-party applications
12The perception of weaker staying power could be driven by past consumer experiences in other
contexts such as the desktop OS ecosystems where Microsoft's rst-party applications eventually
dominated in many complementary markets and drove away other competing third-party applica-
tions.
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change following platform integration.
Evaluating the overall impact of platform integration in the presence of net-
work eect is nontrivial. The parameter estimate of integration in Table 4.2 captures
the one-period eect (rst-order eect). The one-period eect impacts consumer
choices in current period t, but the resulting application user base will give rise to
network eect in the next period through the lagged application user base yjt, which
enters consumer's utility function in period t + 1 (second-order eect). As a result,
the overall eect of platform integration will be larger than the one-period eect.
In other words, the second-order eect amplies the one-period eect of platform
integration by a multiplier that is strictly larger than one. In discrete choice models,
it is impossible to derive a closed-form expression for the accumulated eect of plat-
form integration. However, as demonstrated in Section 4.5.3, this accumulated eect
can be easily computed by simulations using our structural model and parameter
estimates.
4.5.2 Model Fit and Validation
Before doing further analysis, we rst evaluate the performance of our pro-
posed model. The proposed model and parameter estimates enable us to predict each
individual app's demand and market share. It allows us to evaluate in-sample t and
perform out-of-sample validation. To see the prediction power of our model, we sim-
ulate consumer choices and aggregate market shares. The mean absolute errors for
the in-sample and out-of sample are 5:12 10 5 and 1:04 10 4, respectively.
For expositional simplicity, we add up market shares from all third-party
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(a) First-party application (Instagram) (b) Third-party applications combined
(c) All applications combined
Figure 4.2: Model predicted market share vs. true market share. Sample for estima-
tion (April 27, 2012 - August 28, 2012); Hold-out sample for validation (August 29,
2012 - December 15, 2012)
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applications and present the combined predicted market shares for in-sample and
hold-out sample. As we can see from Figure 4.2, the model predicted market shares
are very close to the true market shares. The good out-of-sample prediction power
conrms the validity of our model. It provides support for doing counterfactual
simulations based on the model and parameter estimates.
4.5.3 The Impact of Integration on Market Demand
We rst simulate consumer choices and compute market shares for each ap-
plication under two alternative market scenarios: with integration (the true market
scenario where integration occurred in late June 2012) and without integration (a
counterfactual scenario where no integration was made). We then contrast the mar-
ket shares under the counterfactual market scenario (s0jt) to those under the true
market scenario (s00jt). Figure 4.3 shows the simulated market shares under the true
market scenario (solid curve) and the counterfactual market scenario (dashed curve).
The impact of platform integration can be identied by comparing the solid curve
with the dashed curve. Figure 4.3(a) indicates that the rst-party application ex-
periences dramatic growth in market share due to its tighter integration with the
platform. In addition, as shown in Figure 4.3(b), the integration event negatively
impacts consumer demand for third-party applications. Compared to the \with-
out integration" benchmark, the market shares for all third-party applications are
lower in post-integration periods, indicating certain degree of substitution between
the rst-party application and third-party applications. However, as evidenced in
Figure 4.3(c), the net impact of platform integration for the entire market is pos-
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(a) First-party application (Instagram) (b) Third-party applications combined
(c) All applications combined
Figure 4.3: Impacts of integration on market shares of the rst-party application,
third-party applications, and the overall market
itive. The result suggests that the majority of users gained by Instagram are new
users who did not use any application, rather than the incumbent users of third-
party applications. Therefore, the overall market demand increases after platform
integration.
We compute the percentage change in market share due to platform integra-
tion. In period tI + t (i.e., t days after integration), this measure is calculated
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Different Types of Apps 
Percentage Changes in Market Share (∆ (! +∆! )) 
∆! 30 ∆! 60 ∆! 120 
Instagram 177.74% 179.73% 174.61% 
Third-Party Apps Combined -6.70% -8.16% -9.89% 
All Apps Combined 59.11% 58.88% 55.95% 
 
Table 4.3: Changes in market share due to platform integration
as
sj(tI+t) =
s00j(tI+t)   s0j(tI+t)
s0j(tI+t)
 100%: (4.5)
Table 4.3 summarizes the changes in market shares for the rst-party applica-
tion, third-party applications, and the overall market. Compared to the \without in-
tegration" benchmark, tighter integration with Facebook increases the market share
of the rst-party application by about 177.74% within 30 days after the integration.
In addition, the integration decreases the market share of third-party applications
by 6.70%. However, the combined market share of all the 20 applications increases
by 59.11%.
Our results suggest that tighter integration of Instagram has an overall posi-
tive eect on the ecosystem for photo sharing applications.
4.6 Additional Analysis
The impact of the platform owner's integration decision may vary across third-
party applications. In this section, we investigate the eect of integration on big and
small third-party applications. In addition, we extend the base model to capture the
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role of switching costs in consumer choices.
4.6.1 Variable Impact on Big and Small Third-Party Applications
In our main analysis we nd that integration of the rst-party application
lowers consumer utility from using third-party applications (Table 4.2). The negative
eect suggests that long-term viability of an application may play a role in consumer
valuation. Consumers may lower their perception of the staying power of third-
party applications after the platform exercised its integration strategy. However,
for technology products that exhibit network eect, consumers associate a large user
base with strong staying power (Katz and Shapiro 1992, Gallaugher and Wang 2002).
As a result, the eect of integration may be dierent for third-party applications with
dierent network sizes.
To capture this potential variable eect, we rank all the 19 third-party ap-
plications according to their user base in the rst period (two months before the
integration event). We create a dummy variable SmallThirdPartyApp where Small-
ThirdPartyApp equals to one if an app's user base ranks below 10th, and zero oth-
erwise. Similarly, we create a dummy variable BigThirdPartyApp for the top 9
third-party applications. After the segmentation, there are now three groups of ap-
plications, i.e., g =frst-party applications, small third-party applications, big third-
party applicationsg. We replace the interaction term IntegrationThirdPartyApp
in Equation (4.1) by two interaction terms IntegrationSmallThirdPartyApp and
IntegrationBigThirdPartyApp and re-estimate our model.
Results in Table 4.4 show that the platform's tighter integration with the
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rst-party application creates dierent impact on big third-party applications and
small third-party applications. Interestingly, consumer valuation of big third-party
applications actually increases after platform integration, although the added value
is not as large as that for the rst-party application being integrated. A possible
explanation is that consumers may not be concerned about the staying power of big
third-party applications after the integration event. At the same time, integration
of the rst-party application may also signal high viability and credibility of the
Facebook photo-sharing ecosystem. As a consequence, consumer valuation of big-
third-party applications actually increases. In contrast to the increase in valuation
of big third-party applications, consumer valuation of small third-party applications
is reduced by a large amount. Small developers very often have limited budget
and may lack the commitment to grow their user base in presence of unfavorable
market conditions. As a result, small third-party applications are more vulnerable
to platform integration. In this case, users of small applications are more likely to
migrate to bigger applications when the perceived long-term viability of these small
applications is weakened by the platform owner's integration behavior.
Note that the overall impact of integration on demand for each application
depends on consumer utility of using the focal application relative other applications.
Platform integration leads to a much larger increase in consumer utility of Instagram
as compared to big third-party applications (Table 4.4). As a consequence, the
overall market share for the big third-party applications grows at a slower rate after
integration as compared to the scenario without integration (Figure 4.4).
Our results suggest that Facebook's tighter integration with Instagram hurts
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Variable 
Coefficients (Standard Errors) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LaggedAppUserBase (log) 
0.7118*** 
(0.0102) 
0.6358*** 
(0.0102) 
0.7153*** 
(0.0101) 
0.6182*** 
(0.0101) 
0.7155*** 
(0.0101) 
0.6278*** 
(0.0101) 
Integration×Instagram 
0.3419*** 
(0.0404) 
0.3489*** 
(0.0403) 
0.3090*** 
(0.0403) 
0.2826*** 
(0.0402) 
0.4639*** 
(0.0427) 
0.4531*** 
(0.0426) 
Integration×SmallThirdPartyApp 
-0.1293*** 
(0.0136) 
-0.1166*** 
(0.0135) 
-0.1576*** 
(0.0184) 
-0.1735*** 
(0.0183) 
  
Integration×BigThirdPartyApp 
0.0307** 
(0.0124) 
0.0618*** 
(0.0123) 
  
0.1571*** 
(0.0184) 
0.1737*** 
(0.0183) 
Time Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consumer Heterogeneity 
      on AppUserBase (log)  
0.0847*** 
(0.0004)  
0.1042*** 
(0.0004) 
 
0.0936*** 
(0.0004) 
Sum of squared errors 140.2847 139.7101 131.7789 131.3666 131.7984 131.3949 
 
Table 4.4: Variable impact of integration on big and small third-party applica-
tions. Model (3)-(4) include time dummies and the interaction term Integration
BigThirdPartyApp is omitted to avoid the dummy variable trap. Dummy variable
trap occurs because there is perfect colinearity among the time dummies and the
three interaction terms for all post-integration periods. Similarly, Model (5)-(6) in-
clude time dummies and the interaction term Integration SmallThirdPartyApp
is omitted.
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(a) First-party application (Instagram)
(b) Third-party applications combined
(c) All applications combined
Figure 4.4: Impact of platform integration on market shares of the rst-party appli-
cation, big third-party applications, small third-party applications, and the overall
market
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small third-party applications more. This variable impact has important implica-
tions for the platform owner. In the short-run, the platform owner may benet from
demand increase following the integration of the rst-party application. However, in
the long run, the platform may suer from the loss in product variety in the com-
plementary market. The negative shock from platform owner's integration strategy
may cause existing small third-party developers to exit the market. Further, po-
tential new entrants may not see a fair chance to appropriate their innovations and
choose not to participate in the platform ecosystem. This may hurt the platform in
the long run.
4.6.2 Other Counterfactual Experiments
We conduct additional counterfactual experiments to highlight the impact of
platform integration on the rst-party application, third-party applications, and the
entire marketplace.
Integration of Instagram vs. Integration of All Applications: We simulate a
counterfactual scenario where all photo-sharing applications were integrated in late
June 2012, assuming all integrated applications enjoy the increase in consumer utility
as Instagram did after integration. This would represent the potential outcome of
Facebook's plan to build a tightly integrated network with any application through
its Open Graph interface. In Figure 4.5, the dotted curves correspond to the counter-
factual scenario where all applications were integrated. Compared to the true market
scenario where only Instagram was integrated, both big and small third-party ap-
plications are better o, but small third-party applications benet more from this
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(a) First-party application (Instagram) (b) Big third-party applications combined
(c) Small third-party applications combined (d) All applications combined
Figure 4.5: Integration of Instagram vs. integration of all applications
aggressive integration strategy. Additionally, a loss in demand for Instagram is com-
pensated by an increase in demand for all third-party applications. As a result, the
overall demand for the photo-sharing ecosystem is much higher. However, note that
the platform owner has to evaluate the rent increase due to higher demand for third-
party applications against the revenue loss due to lower demand for Instagram and
the additional integration cost for integrating third-party applications.
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Integration of Instagram vs. Integration of the Second Biggest Application:
Pixable was the second biggest photo-sharing application on the Facebook platform
when Facebook made tighter integration with Instagram (Pixable's user base was
about one-third of Instagram's). In this counterfactual experiment, we simulate an
alternative scenario in which Facebook integrated Pixable instead of Instagram. The
gain in demand for Pixable under the alternative is much lower as compared to the
gain in demand for Instagram under the true scenario (Figure 4.6). Compared to
integration of Instagram, integration of Pixable has smaller negative impact on other
applications, but the total gain in market demand is also smaller. These results show
that the impact of integration is proportional to the user base of the application being
integrated. Clearly, the overall demand is lower as compared to the true scenario
where Facebook integrated Instagram. If the cost of integration is comparable, our
result would suggest that Facebook is better o by integrating Instagram rather than
a third-party application.
4.6.3 Switching Costs
In our dataset we observe the daily usage of each photo-sharing application.
As a consumer uses these applications repeatedly, her choice in the current period
may depend on her previous choices, i.e., consumers may reveal state-dependent pref-
erences. Such dynamic consumer behavior may be driven by switching cost which
reduces a consumer's utility for other alternatives, or by variety-seeking behavior
which reduces a consumer's utility from using the same application. For Facebook
photo-sharing applications, state-dependent preferences may be attributed to the
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(a) First-party application (Instagram) (b) Big third-party applications combined
(c) Small third-party applications combined (d) All applications combined
Figure 4.6: Integration of Instagram vs. integration of the 2nd biggest application
123
social features (e.g., social network) in these applications. Switching to a new appli-
cation means leaving the current network and joining a dierent community, which
can be infeasible to some consumers with high switching costs but attractive to others
with strong variety-seeking preferences.
The consumer utility function in Equation (4.1) can be modied to capture
the eect of previous choices. Given that consumer i chose application di(t 1) in
period t  1, her utility from choosing application j in period t is
Uijgt(di(t 1)) = yj(t 1)i+
X
g
gIjgt+j+ t+"jt+ijt ci1

di(t 1) =2 f0; jg
	
; (4.6)
where ci is consumer i' cost (or benet if negative) from using another application
and 1

di(t 1) =2 f0; jg
	
is an indicator function dened as
1

di(t 1) =2 f0; jg
	
=
(
1; if di(t 1) 6= 0 and di(t  1) 6= j
0; otherwise:
Specically, we assume that a consumer i incurs a cost for switching to a
dierent application. However, switching to/from the outside option does not incur
such cost.
We assume ci is drawn from a normal distribution ci  N(c; 2c), with mean
c and variance 2c . We x 
2
c = 1 as it is dicult to identity both the mean and
variance. Therefore, ci = c+ 'i, where 'i follows the standard normal distribution.
Again, we normalize the mean utility from the outside option to zero, i.e., Ui0t = i0t.
Identication of switching cost is methodologically challenging when only
aggregate-level demand data are available. In the dataset, we do not observe an
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individual consumer's historical choices. Our identication strategy relies on the ob-
served demand patterns. We observe the volume of incumbent application users as
well as the number of new users joining the ecosystem. Incumbent application users
face switching costs whereas new users do not. Given an initial set of parameter
values, our iterative estimation procedure computes both existing and new users'
probability of choosing an application based on product characteristics, users' pre-
vious choices, and switching costs. We equate the model-predicted market shares
and the actual market shares in each period to solve for the mean utility and esti-
mate the next set of parameter values. The algorithm iterates until the parameter
estimates converges. The appendix provides the details of the estimation procedure.
Estimates of the mean switching costs are shown in Table 4.5. Comparing the sum
of squared errors with those in Table 4.2, we can see that the model t improves
after accounting for the switching costs.
Our results show that consumers on average incur high switching costs (Table
4.5). Figure 4.7 shows that demand predictions, after accounting for switching costs,
are qualitatively similar to those from the base model. Switching costs may explain
the observed demand patterns after the integration event. If there was no switching
cost, the fast growth of Instagram's user base (and thus the increase in consumer
utility from choosing Instagram) will attract many third-party applications users to
Instagram. But we do not observe such big migration following the integration due
to high switching costs which override the benets of switching to Instagram. As
outside option users and new users do not incur switching costs, they are far more
likely to use Instagram after the tighter integration. Therefore, a large fraction of
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Variable 
Coefficients (Standard Errors)   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LaggedAppUserBase (log) 
0.6886*** 
(0.0102) 
0.6087*** 
(0.0102) 
0.6934*** 
(0.0102) 
0.6496*** 
(0.0100) 
0.6934*** 
(0.100) 
0.6348*** 
(0.0100) 
Integration×Instagram 
0.0937*** 
(0.0403) 
0.2500*** 
(0.0403) 
0.0730* 
(0.0402) 
0.1515*** 
(0.0402) 
0.2321* 
(0.0402) 
0.3454*** 
(0.0425) 
Integration×SmallThirdPartyApp 
-0.1376*** 
(0.0135) 
-0.1199*** 
(0.0135) 
-0.1623*** 
(0.0183) 
-0.1685*** 
(0.0183) 
  
Integration×BigThirdPartyApp 
0.0273** 
(0.0123) 
0.0604*** 
(0.0123) 
  
0.1621*** 
(0.0183) 
0.1715*** 
(0.0183) 
Time Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consumer Heterogeneity 
      on AppUserBase (log) 
 
0.1012*** 
(0.0106) 
 
0.0793*** 
(0.0130) 
 
0.0871*** 
(0.0077) 
Switching Costs (Mean) 
5.8706*** 
(0.0531) 
3.3902*** 
(0.0360) 
4.3118*** 
(0.0361) 
3.8431*** 
(0.0069) 
4.1115*** 
(0.0461) 
3.5174*** 
(0.0268) 
Sum of squared errors 139.5207 139.2849 131.0643 131.0100 131.0737 131.0220 
 
Table 4.5: Parameter estimates of the models with switching costs. Model (3)-(4)
include time dummies and the interaction term Integration  BigThirdPartyApp
is omitted to avoid the dummy variable trap. Similarly, Model (5)-(6) include time
dummies and the interaction term Integration SmallThirdPartyApp is omitted.
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(a) First-party application (Instagram) (b) Big third-party applications combined
(c) Small third-party applications combined (d) All applications combined
Figure 4.7: Impact of integration in the presence of switching costs
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users Instagram gained are new users who did not use any application in previous
period, rather than incumbent users of third-party applications.
4.7 Endogeneity Issues
We conduct several robustness checks to account for potential endogeneity
issues. We discuss how to address these endogeneity concerns using appropriate
instruments.
4.7.1 Endogeneity of Lagged User Base
As explained earlier, our model estimates might be biased due to the use of
predetermined lagged user base which may be correlated with unobservables. In
order to correct for this bias, we follow the approach of Arellano and Bover (1995)
and use lagged dierences of application user base as instruments for the mean util-
ity function in Equation (4.4) and lagged application user base as instruments for
the rst-dierence of this equation. The former equation is often referred to as
\level equation", while the latter \rst-dierenced" equation. Blundell and Bond
(1998) show that these instruments are correlated with explanatory variables and
orthogonal to unobserved errors. These instruments have been successfully applied
by researchers in a wide variety of elds within marketing and economics (see, e.g.,
Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, Durlauf et al. 2005, Clark et al. 2009, Yoganarasimhan
2012). To check the validity of these instruments in our context, we rst perform
weak identication tests on the instruments. The F statistic is greater than the rec-
ommended threshold of 10, suggesting the instruments are correlated with the sus-
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pected endogeneous variable (i.e., our instruments are not weak). We then perform
the overidentication test (Hansen's J test) and cannot reject the null hypothesis
of valid overidentifying restrictions. We apply these instruments using the general-
ized method of moments (GMM) method. Our estimation approach is explained in
Appendix C.2.
GMM estimates of the models are in Table 4.6. Compared to the base model
where instruments are not included, the two set of instruments both give qualita-
tively similar results. In models using lagged user bases as instruments, estimates of
network eect are slightly larger and estimates of impact of integration are slightly
smaller. In models using lagged dierences of user bases as instruments, estimates
of network eect are smaller and estimates of impact of integration are larger. Our
estimates without using any instruments are located between the estimates using
these two sets of instruments.
4.7.2 Endogeneity of Integration Timing
Facebook and Instagram might have chosen the integration timing such that
the integration is more likely to lead to positive outcome. In other words, the integra-
tion event might be correlated with the unobserved shocks that enter a consumer's
utility function but are unobservable to us. To control for this potential endogeneity,
we use Facebook's stock price as an instrument for the integration timing.
Corporate investments are sensitive to stock prices (Baker et al. 2003, Chen
et al. 2007). Additionally, rms are expected to increase their innovation activities
and exploratory search after going public (Wu 2012). Facebook held its initial public
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(a) Using lagged dierenced user bases as instruments for the level equation
Variable 
Coefficients (Standard Errors) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LaggedAppUserBase (log) 
0.6267*** 
(0.0800) 
0.5575*** 
(0.0532) 
0.5603*** 
(0.0942) 
0.5437*** 
(0.0105) 
0.5613*** 
(0.0940) 
0.5537*** 
(0.0105) 
Integration×Instagram 
0.4473*** 
(0.1065) 
0.4659*** 
(0.0411) 
0.4658*** 
(0.1041) 
0.4659*** 
(0.0421) 
0.7213*** 
(0.1627) 
0.7236*** 
(0.0445) 
Integration×SmallThirdPartyApp 
-0.1666*** 
(0.0374) 
-0.1691*** 
(0.0126) 
-0.2617*** 
(0.0659) 
-0.2673*** 
(0.0192) 
  
Integration×BigThirdPartyApp 
0.0506** 
(0.0224) 
0.0678*** 
(0.0126) 
  
0.2602*** 
(0.0656) 
0.2626*** 
(0.0192) 
Time Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consumer Heterogeneity 
      on AppUserBase (log)  
0.0655*** 
(0.0005)  
0.0332*** 
(0.0010) 
 
0.0236*** 
 (0.0015) 
Sum of squared errors 0.4460 0.4452 0.6284 0.6284 0.4393 0.4392 
 
(b) Using lagged user bases as instruments for the rst-dierenced equation
Variable 
Coefficients (Standard Errors) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LaggedAppUserBase (log) 
0.7354*** 
(0.0123) 
0.7353*** 
(0.0102) 
0.7439*** 
(0.0124) 
0.7439*** 
(0.0101) 
0.7441*** 
(0.0124) 
0.7441*** 
(0.0101) 
Integration×Instagram 
0.3126*** 
(0.0415) 
0.3126*** 
(0.0404) 
0.2802*** 
(0.0421) 
0.2802*** 
(0.0404) 
0.4160*** 
(0.0454) 
0.4160*** 
(0.0427) 
Integration×SmallThirdPartyApp 
-0.1189*** 
(0.0139) 
-0.1189*** 
(0.0136) 
-0.1384*** 
(0.0195) 
-0.1384*** 
(0.0184) 
  
Integration×BigThirdPartyApp 
0.0252** 
(0.0125) 
0.0252** 
(0.0124) 
  
0.1379*** 
(0.0195) 
0.1379*** 
(0.0184) 
Time Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consumer Heterogeneity 
      on AppUserBase (log)  
7.77E-05 
(0.0037)  
8.76E-05 
(0.0061) 
 
6.40E-05 
(0.0057) 
Sum of squared errors 0.5312 0.5312 0.7739 0.7739 0.7739 0.7739 
 
Table 4.6: GMM Estimates with instrument variables. In both tables, Model (3)-(4)
include time dummies and the interaction term Integration  BigThirdPartyApp
is omitted to avoid the dummy variable trap. Similarly, Model (5)-(6) include time
dummies and the interaction term Integration SmallThirdPartyApp is omitted.
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oering (IPO) in May 2012, but following that the share price dropped and the stock
was considered disappointing. The company was under pressure from investors to
generate more revenue (e.g., by monetizing Instagram) to improve its stock perfor-
mance. Therefore, Facebook's subsequent investments were likely to be driven by its
unsatisfactory stock price. Tighter integration of Instagram was one such innovation
investment where Facebook explored seamless data exchange between Instagram and
Facebook. Thus, the decision on the timing of integration was likely to be inuenced
by Facebook's stock price. The suspected correlation between the integration tim-
ing and Facebook's stock market performance is evident from the high correlation
between the integration dummy and Facebook's stock price (correlation coecient
is -0.68).
Meanwhile, we expect that Facebook's stock price is not likely to inuence
consumers' relative preferences for various photo-sharing applications. The stock
price may inuence a user's decision to join Facebook. However, conditional on the
fact that a consumer already joined Facebook, the stock price is not very likely to be
directly correlated with the consumer's utility of using Instagram vis-a-vis any other
photo-sharing application on the Facebook platform. Further, the Facebook platform
was supporting over 9 million applications in dierent categories and only a small
fraction (less than 1%) of Facebook users were using Instagram for photo-sharing
on Facebook during our panel period (Table 4.1). As a result, although the stock
price may be correlated with platform-specic unobservables, it is less likely to be
correlated with unobservables specic to an individual application (e.g., promotions
by Instagram).
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We test the validity of using Facebook's stock price alone as an instrument
for the integration timing. The F statistic is far greater than the recommended
threshold of 10, suggesting the instruments are correlated with the integration tim-
ing. Note that we use stock performance data from SecondMarket for the month
of April 2012 as Facebook's IPO took place in May 2012. We also test the validity
of using Facebook's stock price together with lagged dierences of application user
base as instruments for both of the suspected endogenous variables (i.e., integration
timing and lagged application user base). The F statistic is much larger than the rec-
ommended threshold of 10, suggesting the instruments are not weak. The Hansen's
J test cannot reject the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. These
tests provide statistical evidence that the instruments are valid.
Estimates with this instrument, as reported in Table 4.7, remain qualitatively
unchanged compared to estimates of the models without using any instruments.
These additional analyses provide evidence that our results and main ndings are
robust.
4.8 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we build a structural model of consumer choices and estimate
application demand using aggregate data on application usage before and after plat-
form integration. We nd that consumers obtain additional value from Instagram
after its tighter integration with Facebook, leading to dramatic growth in demand
for Instagram. However, a large fraction of new users Instagram gained are new users
who did not use any photo-sharing application, rather than incumbent users of third-
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Variable 
Coefficients (Standard Errors) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LaggedAppUserBase (log) 
0.7075*** 
(0.0108) 
0.7075*** 
(0.0102) 
0.7138*** 
(0.0108) 
0.7138*** 
(0.0101) 
0.7040*** 
(0.0115) 
0.7074*** 
(0.0101) 
Integration×Instagram 
0.3958*** 
(0.0613) 
0.3958*** 
(0.0404) 
0.3324*** 
(0.0616) 
0.3324*** 
(0.0403) 
0.5864*** 
(0.0688) 
0.5864*** 
(0.0427) 
Integration×SmallThirdPartyApp 
-0.1312*** 
(0.0137) 
-0.1312*** 
(0.0136) 
-0.1566*** 
(0.0190) 
-0.1566*** 
(0.0184) 
  
Integration×BigThirdPartyApp 
0.0317** 
(0.0125) 
0.0317** 
(0.0124) 
  
0.1749*** 
(0.0205) 
0.1749*** 
(0.0184) 
Time Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consumer Heterogeneity 
      on AppUserBase (log)  
1.39E-04 
(0.0071) 
 
4.99E-05 
(0.0081) 
 
4.96E-05 
(0.0319) 
Sum of squared errors 1.5633 1.5633 1.5904 1.5904 1.3415 1.3415 
 
Table 4.7: Parameter estimates with alternative instrument for integration tim-
ing. Model (3)-(4) include time dummies and the interaction term Integration 
BigThirdPartyApp is omitted to avoid the dummy variable trap. Similarly,
Model (5)-(6) include time dummies and the interaction term Integration 
SmallThirdPartyApp is omitted.
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party applications. As a result, the overall demand for Instagram and third-party
applications actually increases, which suggest that Facebook's integration strategy
benets the complementary market. We nd that the integration has dierent im-
pact on big third-party applications and small third-party applications. Consumer
valuations of small third-party applications are reduced by a larger amount, whereas
valuations of big third-party applications are resistant to the integration shock. Such
variable eects may be attributed to users' lower perceived staying power of small
third-party applications after platform integration.
Our study makes several contributions. Managing the tension between rst-
party content and third-party content has been a critical part of major platforms'
strategies. Previous research has mostly relied on theoretical models to study strate-
gic interactions between the platform owner and third-party developers (i.e., supply-
side behaviors). Our paper is the rst study that empirically evaluates consumer pref-
erences for rst-party applications vis-a-vis third-party applications (i.e., demand-
side behaviors). This paper is also the rst to empirically demonstrate the impact of
integration of an application by a platform on the application ecosystem. Our model
and ndings provide important implications for managing platform-based businesses.
Analysis of the substitution and complementary eects between rst-party applica-
tions and third-party applications may help platform owners determine the overall
impacts of their platform strategies. Our structural demand analysis can also help
platform owners evaluate whether it is benecial to tightly integrate certain third-
party applications with the platforms. Third-party developers may also benet from
better understanding of consumer preferences for rst-party applications and third-
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party applications. Our models and results may help developers decide whether it is
protable to participate in a platform in the presence of rst-party applications.
Our ndings shed light on the eectiveness of the platform's strategy to pro-
vide tighter integration with the rst-party application. On one hand, our results
suggest that such a strategy may be benecial particularly in a market where net-
work eects and switching costs are present. In such a market scenario, the platform
owner may gain new users due to the appeal of the tightly integrated rst-party
application while not hurting third-party applications too much. On the other hand,
our research informs platform owners and policy makers about the potential dark
side of platform integration. As small third-party applications are more vulnerable
to the negative shock from vertical integration, such integration strategy may cause
small third-party developers to exit the market, which may reduce the variety of
products/services available in the complementary market. For platform owners and
policy makers, our research informs the trade-o between the gains in accumulated
demand in the short-run and losses in product variety in the long-run due to platform
integration. As small third-party applications are more vulnerable to platform inte-
gration, platform owners may come up with certain subsidy schemes to incentivize
small developers to stay in their ecosystems.
For third-party developers, our research has implications for their product
design. Social applications like Facebook applications exhibit network eects and
switching costs. Third-party developers may incorporate social features into their
products/services to create large user base that mitigates the negative impact of
platform integration. Building a large user base not only creates high exchange value
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for users, but also helps maintain users' perceived staying power of the products.
For small third-party applications facing the threat of rst-party applications, the
priority of their business strategies may be given to continuously growing the user
base, instead of rushing to monetize the existing customers.
Our study is not without limitations. The focus of this paper is short-run
demand-side consumer behaviors, i.e., how consumers respond to platform integra-
tion and the resulting demand patterns for dierent types of applications in the
complementary market. We do not model third-party developers' strategic decisions
such as entry and exit, which require completely dierent models and assumptions.
Future research may use a longer panel dataset to investigate these strategic responses
and see how they impact the long-term viability of the ecosystem. Future research
can also look into the role of product characteristics and product dierentiation in
inuencing demand for rst-party and third-party applications. Understanding the
role of product dierentiation may provide third-party developers important insights
into optimal product design. It may also help platform owners decide what product
attributes should be included in their rst-party applications. Finally, out study is
restricted to one platform ecosystem. Future studies may evaluate the robustness of
the results in other platform-based ecosystems.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs of Main Results
Proof of Lemma 1. Vij(qR) follows a piecewise quadratic function. The concavity
property is relatively straightforward. Taking the rst order condition of Vii(qR)
yields the unconstrained maximizer, qR =
ai 2w+c
2
; when w  ai+c
2
, the unique
maximizer would be qR = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2 and Proposition 3. Based on Lemma 1, without the mim-
icking incentive, the reseller's optimal order quantity follows qR(w; ai) =
ai 2w+c
2
(assuming it is positive). It is obvious that if VHL(
aL 2w+c
2
)  VHH
 
aH 2w+c
2

, then
the reseller that observes a large market size has no incentive to mimic the ordering
decision under a small market size (note that the reseller would never mimic the or-
dering decision under a large market size, when the true market size is small). This
condition can be written as
(4aH   3aL + c  2w)(aL + c  2w)
8
 (aH + c  2w)
2
8
;
or identically,
w  w = 3aL   aH + 2c
4
:
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In contrast, if w < w, then the reseller that observes a large market size may
attempt to mimic the ordering decision under a small market size. As a result, for a
separating equilibrium to hold, the reseller, when observing a small market size, has
to downward distort his order quantity to a level such that he would have no incentive
to mimic when seeing a large market size; i.e., VHL(qR(w; aL))  VHH
 
aH 2w+c
2

.
Expanding this condition
[aH   qR(w; aL)  aL   qR(w; aL)  c
2
  w]qR(w; aL)  (aH + c  2w)
2
8
;
from which we obtain the threshold order quantity
qR(w) =
2aH   aL   2w + c 
p
(aH   aL)(3aH   aL + 2c  4w)
2
:
Then, given the specication of the supplier's belief system, one can verify
that
qR(w; ai) =

aH 2w+c
2
if i = H,
q^R(w) o/w
where q^R(w) = min
n 
aL 2w+c
2
+
; qR(w)
o
and
qS(w; ai) =
ai   qR(w; ai)  c
2
constitute a separating equilibrium. The result that this equilibrium uniquely sur-
vives the intuitive criterion is provided later).
Proof of Lemma 4. When w  w < aL+c
2
, qR(w; aL) =
aL 2w+c
2
and thusdqR(w;aL)dw  = 1. When w < w, qR(w; aL) = qR(w). Take the rst derivative of
qR(w):
dqR(w)
dw
=  1 + (aH   aL)p
(aH   aL)(3aH   aL + 2c  4w)
>  1:
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Hence,
dqR(w;aL)dw  = 1 when w  w < aL+c2 and dqR(w;aL)dw  < 1 when w < w.
Proof of Proposition 5. Note that the supplier's expected prot follows
S(w) = [qR(w; aH) + (1  ) qR(w; aL)]w
+ 

aH   qR(w; aH)  c
2
2
+ (1  )

aL   qR(w; aL)  c
2
2
:
We rst show parts ii) and iii) where both parties' selling quantities are
positive. When w  w, the reseller does not distort his order quantity and thus
qR(w; ai) =
ai 2w+c
2
. The supplier's expected prot in this natural separating equi-
librium is (NS denotes natural separating, i.e., with no distortion):
NSS (w) =



aH   2w + c
2

+ (1  )

aL   2w + c
2

w (A.1)
+

aH + 2w   3c
4
2
+ (1  )

aL + 2w   3c
4
2
=
 12w2 + w(12  4c) + 9c2   6c+ a2H + (1  )a2L
16
:
When w < w, the reseller distorts his order quantity when the market size is small
and thus qR(w; aL) = qR(w). The supplier's expected prot is (SD denotes separating
with distortion):
SDS (w) =



aH   2w + c
2

+ (1  ) qR(w)

w
+ 

aH + 2w   3c
4
2
+ (1  )

aL   qR(w)  c
2
2
:
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The supplier selects the best wholesale price according to the above two types of
separating equilibrium; that is, the supplier can solve two constrained optimization
problems: maxw E[
NS
S (w)] s.t. w  w, and maxw E[SDS (w)] s.t. w < w, and
choose the better outcome.
The rst order condition of NSS (w) yields the unconstrained optimal solution w
NS =
3 c
6
. The rst order condition of SDS (w) follows
dSDS (w)
dw
=
1
4

(3aH   c  6w) + (1  )(aH + 2aL   c  6w)

1 
r
aH   aL
3aH   aL + 2c  4w

= 0:
(A.2)
Notice that when w < w = 3aL aH+2c
4
,
q
aH aL
3aH aL+2c 4w <
1
2
, which implies 0 <
1  
q
aH aL
3aH aL+2c 4w < 1. Thus, for
dSDS (wf )
dw
= 0 to hold for wf < w, we must have
3aH c 6wf > 0 and aH+2aL c 6wf < 0 (given 3aH c 6wf > aH+2aL c 6wf ).
Then, we can derive
dSDS (wf )
dw
>
1
4
[(3aH   c  6wf ) + (1  )(aH + 2aL   c  6wf )]
>
3  c  6wf
4
;
which asserts that if
dSDS (w)
dw
= 0 has a solution wf 2 (0; w), then wf must be larger
than the unconstrained maximizer, 3 c
6
, of NSS (w). Note that we can derive the
second and third derivatives of SDS (w). In particular, the third derivative
d3SDS (w)
dw3
is always positive when w  w and thus the second derivative d2SDS (w)
dw2
is increasing
when w  w. We can also verify that d2SDS (w)
dw2
can be positive at w = w only
if c > (29+19)(aH aL)
8(1 ) , and the rst derivative
dSDS (w)
dw
is positive at w = w only if
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c < (5+13)(aH aL)
8(1+)
, which cannot hold simultaneously. Therefore, there at most exists
one solution of
dSDS (w)
dw
= 0 in (0; w).
Note that NSS (w) and 
SD
S (w) coincide at w = w because the reseller's order
quantity in the equilibrium without distortion coincides with that with distortion
at w = w. Therefore, if w  wNS = 3 c
6
, or identically, c  3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
,
then wNS induces a natural separating equilibrium; moreover, SDS (w) must be
increasing at w = w given that SDS (w) is increasing at w = 0 and any solution
of the rst order condition of SDS (w) is larger than w
NS or w. Hence, if c 
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
, w = wNS = 3 c
6
is the supplier's optimal wholesale price. In
contrast, if w > wNS = 3 c
6
, or identically, c > 3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
, then wNS does
not induce a natural separating equilibrium and the corner solution w would be
the supplier's best choice achieving a natural separating equilibrium. Note that if
dSDS (w)
dw
= 0 has a solution wf 2 (0; w), then wf induces the distorted separating
equilibrium which is the optimal solution. If
dSDS (w)
dw
= 0 does not have a solution
in (0; w), then SDS (w) must be increasing in (0; w)and the corner solution w will
be the supplier's optimal wholesale price. Given the optimal wholesale price, we
can directly obtain the reseller's order quantity and then the supplier's direct selling
quantity.
Notice that given the optimal wholesale price w = 3 c
6
in the separating
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equilibrium without distortion, the supplier's expected prot can be derived as:
S =



aH   2w + c
2

+ (1  )

aL   2w + c
2

w (A.3)
+

aH + 2w
   3c
4
2
+ (1  )

aL + 2w
   3c
4
2
=
 12(3 c
6
)2 + (12  4c)  3 c
6

+ 9c2   6c+ a2H + (1  )a2L
16
=
42   8c+ (9 + 1=3)c2 + 2
16
where 2 =  (aH   )2+(1 ) (aL   )2, the variance of a. The supplier's expected
prot in the separating equilibrium with distortion cannot be explicitly expressed.
The last step is to characterize the boundary conditions such that the sup-
plier's and the reseller's selling quantities are strictly positive. If the supplier's selling
cost is low, the reseller's selling quantity under a small market size will rst go to zero.
This always happens in a natural separating equilibrium, i.e., when c  3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
(when the reseller's order quantity goes to zero under a small market size, the reseller
would never mimic such an ordering decision when the market size is large; thus, it
must be a separating equilibrium without distortion). It can be easily shown that
when c > 3(aH aL)
4
, the reseller's order quantity is positive. On the contrary, as
the supplier's selling cost increases, the supplier's direct selling quantity may go to
zero. Given aH and aL, we dene the smallest threshold c() that can be implicitly
determined at which the supplier's direct selling quantity goes to zero under at least
one market size.
Proof of Part i). The supplier can also choose a wholesale price such that the
reseller does not order with a small market size. The supplier's prot function in
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this case is
S(w) = 
"
aH   2w + c
2

w +

aH + 2w   3c
4
2#
+ (1  )

aL   c
2
2
:
There exists a unique maximizer w = 3aH c
6
and the subgame equilibrium follows
directly:qR(w
; aH) = 2c3 , qS(qR(w
; aH)) = 3aH 5c6 , qR(w
; aL) = 0, and qS(qR(w; aL)) =
aL c
2
. The expected prot of the reseller is R = 
2c2
9
and the expected prot of the
supplier is
S = 
3a2H   6aHc+ 7c2
12
+ (1  )(aL   c)
2
4
(A.4)
=
32   6c+ 3c2 + 32 + 4c2
12
:
Comparing the supplier's expected prots in (A.3) and (A.4), we can nd a
threshold 3
p
(aH aL)
4
such that when c  3
p
(aH aL)
4
, setting w = 3aH c
6
is more
benecial for the supplier, under which the reseller does not sell when the market
size is small, and when c > 3
p
(aH aL)
4
, the supplier shall induce the reseller to order
a positive quantity in both market scenarios.
Proof of Proposition 6. We rst show that when 3
p
(aH aL)
4
< c  min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
,
the supplier benets from encroachment. In this region, with encroachment, the nat-
ural separating equilibrium arises and the supplier's expected prot is as expressed
in (A.3). From section 2.4.1, we know that without encroachment, the supplier's
prot is S =
2
8
= [aH+(1 )aL]
2
8
with our presumption that aL >

2
(or identi-
cally  < aL
aH aL ; the reseller is induced to order a positive quantity in both market
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scenarios). Thus, we derive:
S   S = 4
2   8c+ (9 + 1=3)c2 + 2
16
  
2
8
=
2(  2c)2 + (1 + 1=3)c2 + 2
16
> 0:
Second, we investigate the region where c  3
p
(aH aL)
4
. The supplier's ex-
pected prot with encroachment follows (A.4). Thus, we derive:
S   S =
32
2
  6c+ 3c2 + 32 + 4c2
12
;
which decreases in c when c < 3
3+4
. Given our presumption  < aL
aH aL , we can
verify that 3
3+4
= 3(aL+(aH aL))
3+4
> 3((aH aL)+(aH aL))
3+4
> 3(aH aL)
4
.
Notice that when 3(aH aL)
4
 c  3
p
(aH aL)
4
, if the supplier followed the
natural separating equilibrium, then the reseller would sell a positive quantity for
each market size and thus the supplier's prot would be 4
2 8c+(9+1=3)c2+2
16
which
is larger than 
2
8
, as we have veried in the above. When the supplier optimizes
her wholesale price, for c  3
p
(aH aL)
4
, she chooses the strategy to sell only to
the reseller when the market size is large, which implies that her prot under this
strategy is larger than that under the natural separating equilibrium and thus larger
than S =
2
8
. In other words, S   S > 0 when 3(aH aL)4  c  3
p
(aH aL)
4
.
Given S   S is decreasing in c when c < 33+4 , we assert that S   S > 0 when
c < 3(aH aL)
4
.
Proof of Proposition 7. Notice that with supplier encroachment, the reseller's
expected prot is
R = 
2c2
9
(A.5)
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when c 2

0; 3
p
(aH aL)
4
i
and
R = 
(aH + c  2w)2
8
+ (1  )(aL + c  2w
)2
8
(A.6)
= 

(1  ) (aH   aL) + 43c
2
8
+ (1  )

 (aH   aL)  43c
2
8
when c 2

3
p
(aH aL)
4
;min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
oi
. We can verify that R increases
in c and has an upward jump at c = 3
p
(aH aL)
4
.
On the other hand, the reseller's expected prot without supplier encroach-
ment is
R = 
(2aH   )2
16
+ (1  )(2aL   )
2
16
(A.7)
which is independent of c.
Comparing (A.5) with (A.7) yields a threshold c^lR() =
3
p
2(2aH )2+2( 1 1)(2aL )2
8
where the two prots are equal; similarly, comparing (A.6) with (A.7) yields another
threshold c^hR() =
3
p
(42 4)aHaL+(4 22)a2H+(2 22)a2L
8
. Given the fact that R in-
creases in c while R is independent of c, it can be seen that if c^
l
R()  3
p
(aH aL)
4
,
then the reseller is worse o in expectation by supplier encroachment when c 2 
0; c^lR()

and better o when
c 2

c^lR();min

3(1 + 2)(aH   aL)
8
; c()

;
otherwise, if c^hR() < min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
, then the reseller is worse o when
c 2

0;max
n
c^hR();
3
p
(aH aL)
4
oi
and better o when
c 2
 
max
(
c^hR();
3
p
(aH   aL)
4
)
;min

3(1 + 2)(aH   aL)
8
; c()
#
;
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otherwise, the reseller is always worse o by supplier encroachment when
c 2

0;min

3(1 + 2)(aH   aL)
8
; c()

:
Combining these scenarios, we can identify a threshold c^R() that is either c^
l
R(),
max
n
c^hR();
3
p
(aH aL)
4
o
, or min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
. Notice that when (1+
p
2)aL <
aH <
13
5
aL, there always exists a  such that for  2 [0; ), c^R() < min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
;
also, c^R() =
3
p
2aL
8
when  ! 0 and c^R() = 3
p
2aH
8
when  ! 1. Therefore, there
exist cases where the reseller is better o by supplier encroachment.
Proof of Remark 1. When c 2

min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
; c()

, the supplier
might be worse o in an equilibrium where the reseller downward distorts his order
quantity. Since there is no closed-form solution for the supplier's optimal wholesale
price when the market size is small, deriving the necessary and sucient condition
under which the supplier is worse o is technically challenging. Thus, we analyze the
limiting case with ! 0.
Without supplier encroachment, as  ! 0, the supplier's expected prot is
S =
a2L
8
and the reseller's expected prot is R =
aL
2
16
. On the other hand, with
supplier encroachment and when the separating with distortion arises, as ! 0, the
supplier's optimal wholesale price is:
w =
(
aH+2aL c
6
if 5(aH aL)
8
 c < c();
w if 3(aH aL)
8
< c < 5(aH aL)
8
:
(A.8)
The supplier's expected prot is S = qR(w
)w +

aL qR(w) c
2
2
and the reseller's
expected prot is R =

aL qR(w)+c 2w
2

qR(w
). We can show that there exist aH ,
aL and c >
5(aH aL)
8
such that
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S   S = 1
72

33(aH   aL)2 + 9(aL   2c)2 + 60c(aH   aL) + 6c2
 (7aH   7aL + 8c)
p
3(aH   aL)(7aH   7aL + 8c)
i
< 0;
R   R = 1
72

 9a
2
L
2
+ (5aH   5aL + 4c 
p
3(aH   aL)(7aH   7aL + 8c))


 7aH + 7aL + 4c+
p
3(aH   aL)(7aH   7aL + 8c)
i
< 0:
For example, when aH = 1:35aL, both S   S< 0 and R   R< 0 when c 2
[0:40aL; 0:65aL]. Given the two parties' prot functions are continuous in , we can
nd such aH , aL,  > 0 and c 2

min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
; c()

, under which
both parties are worse o by supplier encroachment.
Proof of Proposition 8. First, when c 2

0; 3
p
(aH aL)
4
i
, in the resulting equilib-
rium with information acquisition, the supplier's expected prot follows (A.4). Thus,
the supplier gains from reseller information acquisition by:
S   NIS =
32   6c+ 3c2 + 32 + 4c2
12
  3
2   6c+ 7c2
12
=
32   4(1  )c2
12
= (1  )3(aH   aL)
2   4c2
12
which is larger than zero for any c 2

0; 3
p
(aH aL)
4
i
.
Second, when c 2

3
p
(aH aL)
4
;min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
, with information
acquisition, the supplier's expected prot follows (A.3). Thus, the supplier gains
from reseller information acquisition by:
S   NIS =
42   8c+ (9 + 1=3)c2 + 2
16
  3
2   6c+ 7c2
12
=
2
16
> 0:
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Note that c 2

0;min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
serves as a sucient condition.
Proof of Proposition 21. First, when c 2

3
p
(aH aL)
4
;min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
,
the resulting equilibrium with the reseller having private information is the natural
separating equilibrium without distortion. The reseller's expected prot follows (A.6)
and thus the reseller gains by
R   NIR = 

(1  ) (aH   aL) + 43c
2
8
+ (1  )

 (aH   aL)  43c
2
8
  2c
2
9
=
(1  )(aH   aL)2
8
> 0:
Second, when c 2

0; 3
p
(aH aL)
4
i
, with private information, the reseller will
not sell when the market size is small and his expected prot is R =
2c2
9
, which is
always smaller than NIR =
2c2
9
.
Third, as shown in Proposition 3, the equilibrium wholesale price with the
reseller having private information when c 2

min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
; c()

sat-
ises w > 3 c
6
. Moreover, it can be shown that the reseller's prot always decreases
in w. Thus, by setting w = 3 c
6
, we can obtain the following upper-bound on the
reseller's prot for this range of c, which we denote by EBR :
EBR = 
(aH   2w + c)2
8
+ (1  )

aL   qR(w) + c  2w
2

qR(w
)
Recall that NIR =
2c2
9
. With some algebra, we can show that EBR <> 
NI
R is
equivalent to:
4
p
3
p
(aH   aL)[(9  6)(aH   aL) + 8c]  8c  (21  9)(aH   aL) <> 0:
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It can further be shown that if c > 3(1+3+4
p
)(aH aL)
8
, then EBR < 
NI
R and thus
R < 
NI
R .
Proof of Proposition 10. i) With information sharing, we can express the sup-
plier's problem as:
SIS = max
wH ;wL



aH   2wH + c
2

wH + (1  )

aL   2wL + c
2

wL

+

aH + 2wH   3c
4
2
+ (1  )

aL + 2wL   3c
4
2
:
Without information sharing, when c 2

0; 3
p
(aH aL)
4
i
, the supplier's prot follows:
S = max
w

"
aH   2w + c
2

w +

aH + 2w   3c
4
2#
+ (1  )

aL   c
2
2
;
which is clearly inferior to the one under information sharing.
When c 2

3
p
(aH aL)
4
;min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
, the supplier's prot fol-
lows:
S = max
w



aH   2w + c
2

w + (1  )

aL   2w + c
2

w

+

aH + 2w   3c
4
2
+ (1  )

aL + 2w   3c
4
2
;
which is also inferior to the one under information sharing.
When c 2

min
n
3(1+2)(aH aL)
8
; c()
o
; c()

, without information sharing, the dis-
torted separating equilibrium will arise. We can rewrite the supplier's prot under
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information sharing as
SIS =
"
aH   2wH + c
2

wH +

aH + 2w

H   3c
4
2#
+ (1  )
"
qR(w

L; aL)w

L +

aL   qR(wL; aL)  c
2
2#
where wH and w

L are the optimal wholesale prices tailored to the two market sizes.
We write the supplier's prot without information sharing as
S =
"
aH   2w + c
2

w +

aH + 2w
   3c
4
2#
+ (1  )
"
qR(w
)w +

aL   qR(w)  c
2
2#
where w is the optimal wholesale price under the distorted separating equilibrium.
Clearly,
SIS   S > (1  )
"
qR(w
; aL)w +

aL   qR(w; aL)  c
2
2
 qR(w)w  

aL   qR(w)  c
2
2#
=
(1  ) [qR(w; aL)  qR(w)] [qR(w; aL) + qR(w) + 2c+ 4w   2aL]
4
=
(1  ) [qR(w; aL)  qR(w)]

aL 2w+c
2
+ qR(w
) + 2c+ 4w   2aL

4
=
(1  ) [qR(w; aL)  qR(w)]

qR(w
) + 5c 3aL
2
+ 3w

4
> 0
given qR(w
; aL) > qR(w) and w >
3 c
6
> 3aL c
6
.
ii) Notice that ISR = 
NI
R . Thus, the result with respect to the reseller's
expected prot follows directly from Propositions 8 and 21.
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A.2 Derivation of Prot Functions in Section 2.5
Recall that, in our analysis of encroachment in section 2.4.2, we assumed that
the reseller knows the true market size while the supplier knows only the distribution
of market size. Let us now extend that analysis to the case in which neither rm
knows the true market size, i.e., no information. Subsequently, we will consider the
case where they both know the true market size.
When neither rm knows the true market size, the supplier responds to the
reseller's order quantity qR, by choosing her own quantity as the solution to:
max
qS
[  qR   qS   c]qS;
which yields the optimal direct selling quantity: qS(qR) =
 qR c
2
. In anticipation of
the supplier's reaction, the reseller solves:
max
qR
[  qR   qS(qR)  w]qR;
and his optimal order quantity is: qNIR (w) =
 2w+c
2
. The supplier's direct selling
quantity is thus:
qNIS (q
NI
R (w)) =
+ 2w   3c
4
:
We can express the supplier decision on the wholesale price as the solution to:
max
w
qNIR (w)w +

  qNIR (w)  qNIS (qNIR (w))  c

qNIS (q
NI
R (w))
= max
w
  2w + c
2
w +

+ 2w   3c
4
2
:
The equilibrium wholesale price, the reseller's order quantity, and the supplier's
direct selling quantity are:
wNI =

2
  c
6
, qNIR =
2c
3
, and qNIS =

2
  5c
6
;
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and the reseller's and the supplier's expected prots without information acquisition
are:
NIR =
2c2
9
and NIS =
32   6c+ 7c2
12
:
Let us now consider the case in which the two rms have shared information
so that they both know the true market size. For each market size ai, i 2 fH;Lg, the
supplier responds to the reseller's order quantity qR, by choosing her own quantity
as the solution to:
max
qS
[ai   qR   qS   c]qS;
which yields the optimal direct selling quantity: qS(qR) =
ai qR c
2
. In anticipation of
the supplier's reaction, the reseller solves:
max
qR
[ai   qR   qS(qR)  w]qR;
and his optimal order quantity is: qSIR (w; ai) =
ai 2w+c
2
. The supplier's direct selling
quantity is:
qSIS (q
SI
R (w; ai)) =
ai + 2w   3c
4
;
and her decision on the wholesale price is the solution to:
max
w
qSIR (w; ai)w +

ai   qSIR (w; ai)  qSIS (qSIR (w; ai))  c

qSIS (q
SI
R (w; ai))
= max
w
ai   2w + c
2
w +

ai + 2w   3c
4
2
:
We can obtain the equilibrium wholesale price, the reseller's order quantity, and the
supplier's direct selling quantity, corresponding to each market size:
wSI(ai) =
ai
2
  c
6
, qSIR (ai) =
2c
3
, and qSIS (ai) =
ai
2
  5c
6
:
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Finally, the reseller's and the supplier's expected prots are:
SIR =
2c2
9
and SIS = 
3a2H   6aHc+ 7c2
12
+ (1  ) 3a
2
L   6aLc+ 7c2
12
:
A.3 Extensions and Proofs
Extensions
In this section, we study several extensions to our base model. First, we allow
for the possibility that the reseller cannot credibly commit that he will sell all of
the units that he obtains from the supplier. Then, we allow for the possibility that
the development of encroachment capability will provide the supplier with her own
independent source of demand information. Finally, we consider the possibility of
the supplier oering a two-part tari.
Free Disposal by the Reseller
In the main text, we have implicitly assumed that the reseller will always sell
all the units he orders from the supplier. We now relax this assumption by allowing
the reseller to withhold some units for free disposal. The timeline of the game
will be changed as follows: rst, the supplier sets the wholesale price; second, the
reseller observes the market size and places his order; third, the supplier produces the
quantity ordered by the reseller and an additional quantity for her own use; nally
the reseller and the supplier simultaneously determine the quantities that they will
sell to the market. Of course, the quantities that are chosen in stage four cannot
exceed the quantities produced in stage three.
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Dene a threshold by
qR(w) =
1
6
(6aH   3aL   6w + 3c
 
q
28a2H   36aHaL + 20aHc  48aHw + 9a2L   18aLc+ c2   12cw + 36aLw + 36w2

;
and the following proposition holds (which is parallel to Proposition 3).
Proposition 22. Given any wholesale price oered by the supplier, there exists a
unique perfect Bayesian separating equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion,
in which neither the supplier nor the reseller withholds any unit for free disposal.
Furthermore, when w  aH+c
6
, the reseller's and the supplier's order quantities are
the same as those in Proposition 3; when w < aH+c
6
, the reseller's order quantity
satises qR(w; aH) =
aH+c
3
and qR(w; aL) = min
n 
aL 2w+c
2
+
; aL+c
3
; qR(w)
o
, and the
supplier's direct selling quantity is qS(qR(w; ai)) =
ai qR(w;ai) c
2
, 8i 2 fH;Lg:
Proposition 22 rst asserts that the true market size will always be learned
by the supplier, and that, in equilibrium, neither rm will withhold from the market
any units that are ordered/prepared. However, although the free disposal option can
alter the quantities that are ordered, the proposition also establishes that it plays a
role only when the equilibrium wholesale price is below aH+c
6
. When this is the case,
the free disposal option undermines the reseller's ability to commit to a quantity
he wants to sell. As a result, the reseller will order less than what he would order
without the option of free disposal even under a large market size.
Of course, when the supplier determines the wholesale price, she does so
in anticipation of the above subgame equilibrium. To derive the optimal wholesale
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price analytically would be extremely tedious because it would involve comparing the
supplier's prots in several dierent scenarios. To avoid this, we conduct a numerical
analysis. Recall from Proposition 22 that, the free disposal option plays a role only
when the equilibrium wholesale price exceeds aH+c
6
. As shown in Figure A.1, this
occurs only when the prior probability of the large market size () is small and
the ratio of the two market sizes (aH
aL
) is large. For these parameters, having the
option of free disposal will clearly be a disadvantage for the reseller since he will
lose the advantages of Stackelberg leadership for the large market size and may
also need to distort more for the small market size. Hence, we can obtain largely
similar managerial insights related to supplier encroachment as those without the free
disposal option. Note that for the entire supply chain, the option of free disposal may
have two opposing eects. On one hand, it restricts the reseller's and the supplier's
selling quantities and thus avoids a very low market price. On the other hand, it
may indirectly lower the reselling order quantity when the market size is small. The
reseller who observes low demand may need to downward distort even further from
aL 2w+c
2
.
Encroachment Provides Supplier with a Noisy Signal about Demand
In addition to the way in which the development of encroachment capability
aects a supplier's strategic interactions with a reseller, which have been the focus
of our analysis up until now, the development of her own direct channel may also
provide a supplier with access to information about demand that is independent from
what she learns from the reseller's order. Previously, we have ignored this possibility
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Figure A.1: Demonstration of the scenarios where free disposal by the reseller either
has or does not have an impact. In this example, aH = 1:35 and aL = 1.
in order to focus exclusively on the strategic interactions with the reseller.
However, our model can easily be adapted to allow for the possibility that a
supplier who develops encroachment capability will also receive an independent signal
about market demand. To do this, we assume that the supplier receives a signal,
denoted by s 2 faL; aHg, after her decision to develop encroachment capability but
before she announces her wholesale price to the reseller. In addition, we assume that
the signal is accurate with probability  2 [0:5; 1]. Specically, when the true market
size is a = ai, i = H;L, the probability that the supplier receives a signal s = ai is:
Prob(s = aija = ai) =  and Prob(s = ajja = ai) = 1 ; i = H;L and j 2 fH;Lgni:
where the signal provides no information when  = 0:5, and is perfectly accurate
when  = 1.
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After the supplier receives the demand signal, she updates her prior on the
probability that the demand parameter is aH . Using Bayes' rule, it is easy to show
that her updated prior that the market size is large will depend upon the signal that
she receives in the following way:
0H (s) =
(

+(1 )(1 ) if s = aH
(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) if s = aL
and 0L (s) = 1   0H (s) is her updated prior that the market size is small. Denote
by 0 (s) the vector consisting of 0H (s) and 
0
L (s). With a slight abuse of notation,
the expected optimal prots obtained by the supplier and by the reseller after when
the supplier has encroachment capability can now be expressed as follows:
Es [S (; s)] = [+ (1  )(1  )] S (0 (aH)) + [(1  )+ (1  )] S (0 (aL))
Es [R (; s)] = [+ (1  )(1  )] R (0 (aH)) + [(1  )+ (1  )] R (0 (aL))
where S (
0 (aH)), S (
0 (aL)), R (
0 (aH)), and R (
0 (aL)) each have the same
structure that we have characterized with the supplier not receiving any signal.
The independent source of information allows the supplier to tailor her whole-
sale price according to the signal that she receives. However, it may have two op-
posing eects. When the supplier obtains a high demand signal (e.g., s = aH), the
equilibrium wholesale price w(s = aH) is higher than that in Proposition 5. Hence,
as Lemma 2 and Proposition 3 suggest, the reseller is less likely to downward distort
his order quantity. Whereas, when the supplier observes a low demand signal, the
equilibrium wholesale price w(s = aH) is weakly lower than that in Proposition 5
and the reseller is more likely to downward distort his order quantity. Note that
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the signaling game between the reseller and the supplier will always arise, unless the
supplier's own signal is also perfect, i.e., when  = 1.
From our numerical analysis, we observe that the positive eect overall dom-
inates, but the supplier benets just slightly from obtaining the demand signal. In
particular, Figure B.2 shows that the region in which the supplier is worse o shrinks,
but very slightly, as the accuracy level of the supplier's signal, , increases. The re-
gion where the reseller benets from supplier encroachment also expands slightly
when  increases.
Two-part Tari
Previously, we have restricted our attention to contracts that involve only
a per-unit wholesale price. We now extend our analysis to the case in which the
supplier uses a single two-part tari contract (T;w), where T is the xed fee and w
is the unit wholesale price.
Without Encroachment
When the supplier lacks the capability to encroach, she sets T and w to
maximize the following:
E
 
T + wqNR (w; a)

I
 
(a  w   qNR (w; a))qNR (w; a)  T

;
where qNR (w; a) =
a w
2
as in section 2.4.1 and I(x) is the indicator function such that
I(x) = 1 if x  0 and I(x) = 0 otherwise. Note that the indicator function captures
the fact that the reseller orders a positive quantity and pays the xed fee only if he
does not make negative prot from doing so.
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Figure A.2: Demonstration of the impact of the supplier obtaining a noisy signal.
The other parameters are: aH = 1:35 and aL = 1:00.
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There are two possible solutions to this problem. The rst is for the supplier
to set T just low enough to induce the reseller who observes a small market size to
order a positive quantity. If the supplier pursues this approach, then the conditionally
optimal wholesale price and xed fee are:
w =   aL and T  = (2aL   )
2
4
,
and the prots for the supplier and the reseller are:
T1S =
a2L + (  aL)2
4
and T1R = 
a2H   a2L
4
;
where we use the superscript T to indicate that the prot is achieved under a two-part
tari contract.
Alternatively, the supplier can oer a two-part tari contract to exclude the
reseller when he observes the small market size. In this case, the supplier sells nothing
when the market size is small, but extracts the entire surplus from the reseller when
the market size is large. Specically, the conditionally optimal wholesale price and
xed fee are:
w = 0 and T  =
a2H
4
,
and the prots for the supplier and the reseller are:
T2S = 
a2H
4
and T2R = 0.
By comparing T1S with 
T2
S , it is easy to conrm that the supplier will choose
the rst approach if and only if:
  a
2
H  
p
a4H   4a2Ha2L + 8aHa3L   4a4L
2(aH   aL)2 .
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With Encroachment
When the supplier has encroachment capability, she can similarly set T and
w to either induce a positive order quantity when the market size is small or extract
the entire surplus when the market size is large. In order to induce the reseller to
order when the market size is small, the xed fee cannot exceed:
TE1(w) = (aL   qR(w; aL)  qS(qR(w; aL))  w) qR(w; aL),
and the optimal wholesale price solves:
T1S = max
w
TE1(w) + E [wqR(w; a) + (a  qR(w; a)  qS(qR(w; a))  c) qS(qR(w; a))]
where qR(w; a) and qS(qR(w; a)) follow Proposition 3. If the supplier sets T and w
in this fashion and wE1 is the optimal wholesale price, then the reseller's prot is:
T1R = 
 T (wE1) +  aH   qR(wE1; aH)  qS(qR(wE1; aH))  w qR(wE1; aH) :
Alternatively, if the supplier does not induce a positive order quantity when
the market size is small, then the xed fee extracts the entire surplus from the reseller
when the market size is large and is equal to:
TE2(w) = (aH   qR(w; aH)  qS(qR(w; aH))  w) qR(w; aH),
and the optimal wholesale price solves:
T2S = max
w

 
TE2(w) + wqR(w; aH) + (aH   qR(w; aH)  qS(qR(w; aH))  c) qS(qR(w; aH))

:
The supplier's optimal prot from using a two-part tari when she has en-
croachment capability is the maximum of T1S and 
T2
S . Unfortunately, although
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the results of Proposition 3 continue to hold, obtaining an analytical characteriza-
tion of the optimal two-part tari is non-trivial. Therefore, we have performed a
numerical study of how the supplier's ability to use a two-part tari aects the ex-
tent to which the supplier and the reseller can benet from the supplier's ability to
develop encroachment capability. Figure A.3 shows the regions of parameters for
which the supplier and the reseller benet from the supplier's ability to encroach
when the supplier uses a two-part tari. By comparing it to Figure 2.4, we can see
that the supplier's ability to use a two-part tari dramatically alters the regions in
which either the supplier or the reseller benets. In particular, under a two-part
tari, there is a much smaller region of parameters for which the supplier benets
from the development of encroachment capability, and the region in which both the
supplier and the reseller benet becomes almost non-existent. To understand why
the development of encroachment capability now only benets the supplier when her
direct selling cost, c, is suciently small, note that her ability to charge a xed fee
will generally cause her to set the per-unit price w to a lower value than if she relied
entirely upon the per-unit price for income. When c is small, the supplier is willing
to rely entirely upon her own direct channel for the small market size in return for
setting a high xed fee that captures the reseller's entire surplus when the market
size is large, and thus, the reseller's ordering distortion is not a concern. However,
when c is relatively large, as Proposition 3 suggests, the downward distortion eect
is more serious when the wholesale price w is smaller. Such downward distortion
adversely aects the supplier, both directly and indirectly. The direct negative ef-
fect is that downward distortion lowers the total supply chain surplus (and thus the
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supplier's prot) when the market size is small (notice that the supplier can extract
the total supply chain surplus when the market size is small). The indirect negative
eect is that the supplier needs to charge a lower xed fee to induce the reseller
who observes a small market size to sell. Therefore, the benet of encroachment
signicantly shrinks.
With the above analysis by migrating from the system with a simple wholesale
price only contract to a slightly more complex two-part tari contract, a natural
question surfaces: What if the supplier can use even more complex contracts, such
as, a non-linear pricing scheme. In a separate manuscript, Li et al. (2015), we
consider a general non-linear pricing policy and show how a supplier's development of
encroachment capability is a double-edged sword that can either enhance or impede
her ability to extract rents from a reseller. Note that the analysis there diers
structurally from what we have done here because a screening problem arises under
a non-linear pricing scheme, instead of a signaling problem as explored in this study.
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 22. Let qstockR denote the quantity the reseller orders from
the supplier and qsellR the quantity he sells to the market in the end. It is obvious
that the supplier will not produce more than what she will sell. So we keep using the
notation qS to denote her selling quantity. With that, we can formulate the supplier's
direct selling decision by:
S = max
qS
wqstockR + (ai   qsellR   qS   c)qS;
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Figure A.3: Demonstration of the impact of supplier encroachment on the supplier's
and the reseller's protability when the supplier can use a two-part tari contract.
In this example, aH = 1:35 and aL = 1.
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which yields her optimal decision:
qS(q
sell
R ) =
ai   qsellR   c
2
:
For the reseller, to determine his selling quantity, he solves:
R = max
qsellR
 wqstockR + (ai   qsellR   qS)qsellR ;
which yields
qsellR (qS) =
ai   qS
2
:
Substituting qsellR (qS) into qS(q
sell
R ), we obtain the equilibrium selling quantities:
qsellR = min

ai + c
3
; qstockR

and qS = qS(q
sell
R ).
Clearly, the reseller will never order more than ai+c
3
. Hence, we rst have:
qstockR (aH) =
(
aH+c
3
if w < aH+c
6
;
aH 2w+c
2
if w  aH+c
6
:
Note that to have a separating equilibrium, the reseller may need to downward
distort his ordering quantity when the market size is small, to deter himself from
mimicking when he observes a large market size. Given qstockR (aH) =
aH 2w+c
2
when
w  aH+c
6
, we know the threshold ordering quantity under the small market size is
qR(w) according to Proposition 3. When w <
aH+c
6
, qstockR (aH) =
aH+c
3
, and thus,
we need to characterize another threshold order quantity in order for a separating
equilibrium to hold. In particular, we have the following indierence condition:
aH   aH + c
3
  aH   2c
3
  w

aH + c
3
=

aH   qR   aL   qR   c
2
  w

qR,
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from which we can derive the threshold
qR(w) =
1
6
(6aH   3aL   6w + 3c
 
q
28a2H   36aHaL + 20aHc  48aHw + 9a2L   18aLc+ c2   12cw + 36aLw + 36w2

:
Hence, the reseller's order quantity when the market size is small follows:
qstockR (aL) =
8<:min
n
qR(w);
aL+c
3
;
 
aL 2w+c
2
+o
if w < aH+c
6
;
min
n
qR(w);
 
aL 2w+c
2
+o
if w  aH+c
6
:
A.4 Intuitive Criterion and Elimination of Pooling Equilib-
ria
In this appendix, we prove that the separating equilibrium characterized in
Proposition 3 uniquely survives the intuitive criterion renement developed by Cho
and Kreps (1987).
The Intuitive Criterion
The intuitive criterion uses two steps to examine an equilibrium of a signaling
game between a signal sender and a signal receiver.
(i) The rst step of the intuitive criterion derives a set  of the types of the
sender, with which the highest utility that the sender can obtain by taking a specic
o-equilibrium strategy is lower than that by keeping the equilibrium strategy. That
is, under those types, the o-equilibrium strategy is dominated by the equilibrium
strategy for the sender.
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Specically, in our model, suppose we have an equilibrium in which the reseller
orders qe(w; aH) when observing the large market size and orders q
e(w; aL) when
observing the small market size. If qe(w; aH) = q
e(w; aL), then the equilibrium is
pooling; otherwise, the equilibrium is separating. In the rst step of the intuitive
criterion renement, for any o-equilibrium order quantity q, we derive a set of the
market sizes:
(q) = fai2fH;Lg : V (qe(w; ai); ai) > V^ (q; ai)g
where V (qe(w; ai); ai) denotes the reseller's equilibrium prot while V^ (q; ai) denotes
the highest prot that the reseller can obtain by ordering the o-equilibrium quantity
q. Note that the highest prot for a given order quantity q is achieved if the supplier
believes that the reseller has observed the small market size; that is,
V^ (q; ai) =

ai   q   max f0; aL   q   cg
2
  w

q.
Therefore, (q) contains those market sizes under which the o-equilibrium strategy
q is dominated by the equilibrium strategy qe(w; ai) for the reseller.
If the set C , the complement of , is an empty set, the second step becomes
unnecessary since for both market sizes the o-equilibrium strategy is always dom-
inated by the equilibrium strategy and the reseller will not deviate at all. In this
case, the intuitive criterion imposes no constraint on the solution space. If C is
nonempty (having one market size or both market sizes in the set in our model),
then we need to carry out the second step.
(ii) The second step of the intuitive criterion checks if there exists a specic
type in C such that the equilibrium utility of the sender with this type is lower
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than the lowest utility that the sender can obtain by taking a specic o-equilibrium
strategy given that the receiver restricts his belief to C after observing such a
deviation. If there does exist such a type, the equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion
test; otherwise, the intuitive criterion imposes no constraint on the solution space.
Specically, in our model, the second step of the intuitive criterion checks, for
any order quantity q, if there exists a market size ai 2 C(q), the complement of
(q), such that with this market size the reseller's equilibrium prot V (qe(w; ai); ai)
is lower than the lowest prot that the reseller can obtain by deviating to the order
quantity q when the supplier's belief is restricted to C(q) for such a deviation. Let
V (q; ai) denote this lowest prot, and it follows
V (q; ai) =
8<:

ai   q   maxf0;aH q cg2   w

q if aH 2 C(q),
ai   q   maxf0;aL q cg2   w

q o/w.
That is, if the large market size aH is contained in 
C(q) (i.e., the strategy to
deviate to q is not dominated by the equilibrium strategy for the reseller observing
the large market size), then the lowest prot the reseller would obtain to deviate to
q is achieved under the supplier belief that the reseller has observed the large market
size for such a deviation. If the large market size aH is not contained 
C(q), then
C(q) contains only the small market size and thus the lowest prot the reseller
would obtain to deviate to q is achieved under the supplier belief that the reseller
has observed the small market size. If there exists such a market size ai 2 C(q)
that V (qe(w; ai); ai) < V (q; ai), then the equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion in
our model; otherwise, the intuitive criterion imposes no constraint on the solution
space.
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Renement over Other Equilibria
Now we use the above procedure of the intuitive criterion to rene the equi-
libria in our model. We rst show that any pooling equilibrium cannot survive the
intuitive criterion. Dene the reseller's pooling prot
ViP (q) =

ai   q   max f0; aH + (1  ) aL   q   cg
2
  w

q; 8i 2 fH;Lg
where ai is the true market size the reseller observes while the supplier obtains
no information from the reseller's order quantity. Notice that all of those prot
functions, Vij(q) and ViP (q), are concave. Moreover, V
0
iL(q) > V
0
iP (q), 8i 2 fH;Lg.
Now, suppose that given a wholesale price w, there is a pooling equilibrium in
which the reseller orders qP for each market size. Then, we can always nd qF < qP
such that VLL(qF ) = VLP (qP ). Notice that
VLL(qF ) =

aL   qF   max f0; aL   qF   cg
2
  w

qF ;
VLP (qP ) =

aL   qP   max f0; aH + (1  ) aL   qP   cg
2
  w

qP :
Substituting qF into VHL(q), we obtain
VHL(qF ) =

aH   qF   max f0; aL   qF   cg
2
  w

qF .
Also,
VHP (qP ) =

aH   qP   max f0; aH + (1  ) aL   qP   cg
2
  w

qP :
Therefore,
VHL(qF )  VLL(qF ) = (aH   aL) qF ,
VHP (qP )  VLP (qP ) = (aH   aL) qP .
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Given qF < qP and VLL(qF ) = VLP (qP ), it is obvious that
VHP (qP )  VLP (qP ) > VHL(qF )  VLL(qF )
and thus,
VHP (qP ) > VHL(qF ).
As a result, we can nd a qD = qF +  such that the reseller when observing
the small market size has an incentive to deviate from the pooling equilibrium qP
to qD while he has no incentive to deviate from qP to qD when observing the large
market size, assuming a deviation to qD always leads the supplier to believe that the
true market size is small; i.e., there is a qD such that
VLP (qP ) < VLL(qD)
VHP (qP ) > VHL(qD):
Hence, the pooling equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion (see Figure A.4 for a
demonstration).
Besides pooling equilibria, there may exist other separating equilibria dierent
from the one characterized Proposition 3. Notice that in order for a separating
equilibrium to hold, the reseller's order quantity qe(w; aL) when the market size is
small must be smaller than q^R(w)(= min
n 
aL 2w+c
2
+
; qR(w)
o
). It is obvious that
given such a separating equilibrium, the reseller when observing the small market size
would have an incentive to deviate from qe(w; aL) to q^R(w) if the supplier holds the
same belief that the market size is small for both quantities, while the reseller when
observing the large market size would have no incentive to deviate from
 
aH 2w+c
2
+
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Figure A.4: Demonstration of the renement over pooling equilibria by the intuitive
criterion. The parameters are: aH = 1:2, aL = 1, c = 0:2,  = 0:3, and w = 0:2.
to q^R(w) based on the denition of q^R(w). Hence, any separating equilibrium dierent
from that in Proposition 3 will fail the intuitive criterion.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Main Results
Proof of Proposition 11. For each market size ai, the reseller's participation con-
straint follows: w(ai) = ai qR(ai) qS(ai). We rst assume qS(ai) = ai qR(ai) c2 > 0.
Plugging w(ai) and qS(ai) =
ai qR(ai) c
2
into (3.2), we have the supplier's optimiza-
tion problem as: maxqR(ai) qR(ai)
ai qR(ai)+c
2
+

ai qR(ai) c
2
2
. The rst-order condition
yields the optimal unbounded reselling quantity qPIR (ai) = 2c: Notice that in order for
qS(ai) > 0, we need c < ai  qPIR (ai), i.e., the condition c < ai3 . When this inequality
does not hold, we have qPIS (ai) = 0, and the supplier's optimization problem is simply
maxqR(ai) (ai   qR(ai)) qR(ai), which yields qPIR (ai) = ai2 . Clearly, given qPIR (ai) = ai2 ,
in order for the supplier's direct selling quantity to be zero, we need c  ai  qPIR (ai),
i.e., the condition c > ai
2
. For the rest of the parameter space ai
3
< c  ai
2
, the op-
timal reselling quantity follows the corner solution: qPIR (ai) = ai   c. With qPIR (ai),
the optimal wholesale price and equilibrium direct selling quantity can easily be
obtained.
Proof of Proposition 12. This result follows directly from Proposition 11. One
can easily verify that when 0 < c < ai
2
, the total output (qPIR (ai) + q
PI
S (ai)) with
supplier encroachment is larger than the ecient total output ai
2
. Hence, the total
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supply chain surplus with encroachment is lower than that without encroachment.
The supplier's prot always equals the supply chain surplus as she can use nonlinear
pricing to capture the entire supply chain surplus with perfect information.
Proof of Proposition 13. The classical mechanism design principle asserts that:
there exists an optimal solution in which the two binding constraints are the reseller's
individual rationality constraint for the small market size and his downward incentive
comparability constraint. From these two binding constraints we can obtain:
w(aL) = aL   qR(aL);
w(aH) = aH   qR(aH)  (aH   aL) qR(aL)
qR(aH)
:
Substituting these expressions for w(aL) and w(aH) into the objective function
of (3.3), we are left with an unconstrained objective function with only two variables,
qR(aL) and qR(aH), and it is separable and concave. The result in Proposition 13
follows from applying the rst-order conditions.
Proof of Proposition 15. In this proof, we solve the optimal separating menu of
contracts. The comparison between the optimal separating menu of contracts and
the optimal pooling contract is provided later.
To solve the optimal separating menu of contracts, notice that once we incor-
porate the functional form of the supplier's ex-post optimal direct selling quantity
response into the reseller's utility function, which forms the basis for the IR and IC
constraints, we continue to have the single crossing property in which a reseller's
preference for a larger quantity is increasing in the size of market that he observes.
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In addition, the supplier's objective function is separable and concave in the quan-
tities oered. Therefore, this problem is a classical mechanism design problem. At
optimum, the reseller's IR constraint for the small market size must be binding, i.e.,
w(aL) = aL   qR(aL)  qS(aL). The reseller's IC constraint for the large market size
must satisfy:
(aH   qR(aH)  qS(aH)  w(aH))qR(aH)
 [aH   (qR(aL) + qS(aL))  (aL   qR(aL)  qS(aL))]qR(aL)
= (aH   aL)qR(aL):
Thus, the optimal wholesale price for the large market size satises:
w(aH) = aH   qR(aH)  qS(aH)  (aH   aL)qR(aL)
qR(aH)
:
We can now substitute the above expressions into the supplier's objective of
choosing fqR(ai)gi2fH;Lg to obtain:
max 
24 aH   qR(aH)  aH   qR(aH)  c
2
+
  (aH   aL)qR(aL)
qR(aH)
!
qR(aH) +
 
aH   qR(aH)  c
2
+!235
+(1  )
24 aL   qR(aL)  aL   qR(aL)  c
2
+!
qR(aL) +
 
aL   qR(aL)  c
2
+!235
= 
24 aH   qR(aH)  aH   qR(aH)  c
2
+!
qR(aH)  (aH   aL)qR(aL) +
 
aH   qR(aH)  c
2
+!235
+(1  )
24 aL   qR(aL)  aL   qR(aL)  c
2
+!
qR(aL) +
 
aL   qR(aL)  c
2
+!235 :
Notice that the objective is separable and we can derive the optimal qR(aL) and
qR(aH) separately.
i) We rst optimize qR(aH). Suppose

aH qR(aH) c
2
+
is positive (i.e., when
175
qR(aH) < aH   c). We can maximize the term:

"
aH   qR(aH) 

aH   qR(aH)  c
2

qR(aH) +

aH   qR(aH)  c
2
2#
= 
"
aH   qR(aH) + c
2

qR(aH) +

aH   qR(aH)  c
2
2#
;
which has the rst-order condition as:
 qR(aH)
2
+

aH   qR(aH) + c
2

 

aH   qR(aH)  c
2

= 0:
Therefore, the unbounded optimal quantity is:
q<1>R (aH) = 2c:
Notice that when c < aH
3
,
aH q<1>R (aH) c
2
> 0.
Now, suppose

aH qR(aH) c
2
+
is zero (i.e., when qR(aH)  aH   c). We can
maximize the term:
 [(aH   qR(aH)) qR(aH)] :
The rst-order condition yields the optimal quantity
q<2>R (aH) =
aH
2
:
It is clear that when c  aH
2
;
aH q<2>R (aH) c
2
 0.
Therefore, when c  aH
2
, the optimal quantity is qER(aH) = q
<2>
R (aH) =
aH
2
;
when aH
3
 c < aH
2
, qER(aH) = aH   c; and when c < aH3 , qER(aH) = q<1>R (aH) = 2c.
ii) We use a similar procedure to optimize qR(aL). Suppose

aL qR(aL) c
2
+
is
positive (i.e., when qR(aL) < aL   c). We can maximize the term:
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(1  )
"
aL   qR(aL) 

aL   qR(aL)  c
2

qR(aL) +

aL   qR(aL)  c
2
2#
  (aH   aL)qR(aL)
= (1  )
"
aL   qR(aL) + c
2

qR(aL) +

aL   qR(aL)  c
2
2#
  (aH   aL)qR(aL):
The rst-order condition is
(1  )

 qR(aL)
2
+

aL   qR(aL) + c
2

 

aL   qR(aL)  c
2

  (aH   aL) = 0;
which yields the optimal quantity
q<1>R (aL) =

2c  2(aH   aL)
1  
+
:
Notice that when c <
aL+
2(aH aL)
1 
3
,
aL q<1>R (aL) c
2
> 0.
Now, suppose

aL qR(aL) c
2
+
is zero (i.e., when qR(aL)  aL   c). We can
maximize the term:
(1  ) (aL   qR(aL)) qR(aL)  (aH   aL)qR(aL):
The rst-order condition yields the optimal quantity
q<2>R (aL) =

aL
2
  (aH   aL)
2 (1  )
+
:
It is clear that when c  aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ;
aL q<2>R (aL) c
2
 0.
Therefore, if aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) >
aL+
2(aH aL)
1 
3
(i.e., aL > aH), then, when c 
aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , the optimal quantity is q
E
R(aL) = q
<2>
R (aL) =
aL
2
  (aH aL)
2(1 ) ; when
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aL+
2(aH aL)
1 
3
 c < aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , q
E
R(aL) = aL   c; and when c <
aL+
2(aH aL)
1 
3
,
qER(aL) = q
<1>
R (aL) =

2c  2(aH aL)
1 
+
.
In contrast, if aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) <
aL+
2(aH aL)
1 
3
(i.e., aL  aH), then q<2>R (aL) =
0. Therefore, when c  aL, both the optimal directing selling and the optimal
reselling quantities equal zero for the small market size. When c < aL, we can notice
that q<1>R (aL) = 0. Therefore, the optimal reselling quantity is zero. The other
results follow immediately.
Proof of Proposition 17. Without encroachment, the optimal contract follows
Proposition 13, based on which we can derive the supplier's expected prot as:
NS =
X
i2fH;Lg
iw
N (ai)q
N
R (ai)
= 
aH
2
2   (aH   aL)qNR (aL)+ (1  )  aL   qNR (aL) qNR (aL)
= 
aH
2
2   IfaL>aHg(aH   aL)aL2   (aH   aL)2 (1  )

+(1  )IfaL>aHg
"aL
2
2   (aH   aL)
2 (1  )
2#
:
When aL  aH , the prot reduces to NS = 
 
aH
2
2
. With encroachment, the
optimal solution of the supplier's problem follows Proposition 15 and the supplier's
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expected prot follows:
ES =
X
i2fH;Lg
i[w
E(ai)q
E
R(ai) +
 
ai   qER(ai)  qES (ai)  c

qES (ai)] (B.1)
= 
h 
aH   qER(aH)  qES (aH)

qER(aH)  (aH   aL)qER(aL) +
 
qES (aH)
2i
+(1  )
h 
aL   qER(aL)  qES (aL)

qER(aL) +
 
qES (aL)
2i
:
When aL  aH , the above prot can be written as:
ES =
8>>>><>>>>:

 
aH
2
2
+ (1  )
 
aL c
2
+2
if c  aH
2
,
 [c (aH   c)] + (1  )
 
aL c
2
+2
if aH
3
 c < aH
2
,

h
c (aH   c) +
 
aH 3c
2
2i
+ (1  )
 
aL c
2
+2
if c < aH
3
.
(B.2)
When aL > c, we have the rst derivative as:
dES
dc
=
8<:
 (1  )aL c
2
if c  aH
2
,
aH   (1  )aL2   5 12 c if aH3  c < aH2 ,
4+1
2
c  aH+(1 )aL
2
if c < aH
3
.
(B.3)
When aL  c, we have the rst derivative as:
dES
dc
=
8<:
0 if c  aH
2
,
(aH   2c) if aH3  c < aH2 ,

 
5
2
c  aH
2

if c < aH
3
.
(B.4)
From the upper branch of (B.2), we can observe that when c  aH
2
, if aL  c,
then ES = 
 
aH
2
2
= NS , while if aL > c, then 
E
S > 
N
S and is decreasing in c.
This observation implies that if aL  aH2 , then we always have ES = NS for any
c  aH
2
. However, if aL >
aH
2
, then there exists an interval c 2 [aH
2
; aL) in which
ES is larger than 
N
S but decreases to 
N
S as c approaches aL. Hence, we divide the
analysis into two cases with (i) aL
aH
 1
2
and (ii) aL
aH
> 1
2
, respectively.
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(i) For the case in which aL
aH
 1
2
, we must show that ES > 
N
S = 
 
aH
2
2
when c ! 0, that ES is rst decreasing, and then increasing in c, and that ES =
NS = 
 
aH
2
2
at c = aH
2
.
From the expression for ES shown in (B.2), we can see that, when c! 0, we
have ES = 
 
aH
2
2
+ (1   )  aL
2
2
> NS = 
 
aH
2
2
. In addition, we can see from
(B.4) that
dES
dc
= (aH   2c) > 0 when c 2 [maxfaL; aH3 g; aH2 ). Therefore, ES is
increasing in c for c 2 [maxfaL; aH3 g; aH2 ) and ES = NS = 
 
aH
2
2
when c = aH
2
.
It remains to be shown that
dES
dc
is decreasing and then increasing over the
range c 2 [0;maxfaL; aH3 g]. From (B.3), we can see that for c suciently small,
dES
dc
= 4+1
2
c   aH+(1 )aL
2
< 0. In addition, we can observe from both (B.4) and
(B.3) that
dES
dc
is increasing in c for all c < aH
3
.
For the range, c 2 [aH
3
; aH
2
), we need to consider two possibilities: First, if
aL <
aH
3
, then we have that
dES
dc
= (aH  2c)  0 and ES < NS for all c 2 [aH3 ; aH2 ).
Alternatively, if aL  aH3 , then we have
dES
dc
= aH   (1  )aL2   5 12 c in the range
of c 2 [aH
3
; aL], while we have
dES
dc
= (aH   2c) > 0 for all c 2 [aL; aH2 ).
If 5  1, then dES
dc
is non-decreasing in c for c 2 [aH
3
; aL]. By assumption,
we have aL  aH , which implies that d
E
S
dc
> 0 at the point c = aH
3
. It follows that
dES
dc
> 0 for all c 2 [aH
3
; aH
2
).
If 5 > 1, then
dES
dc
= aH (1 )aL2   5 12 c is decreasing in c for c 2 [aH3 ; aL].
However, because
dES
dc
is continuous at c = aL for aL  aH3 , and
dES
dc
= (aH 2c) > 0
for c 2 [aL; aH2 ), it follows that we must have
dES
dc
> 0 for c 2 [aH
3
; aL] as well.
Combining the analysis for the above two situations, we can conclude that
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there exists one threshold c0S such that 
E
S > 
N
S when 0 < c < c
0
S, 
E
S  NS when
c0S  c < aH2 , and ES = NS when c  aH2 .
(ii) The analysis for the case with aL >
aH
2
is similar to the above, except
that now we can have another threshold c00S such that 
E
S > 
N
S when c
00
S < c < aL.
Proof of Proposition 18. First, it is clear from Proposition 15 that when c 
max
n
aH
2
; aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 )
o
, the supplier never sells directly even if she has the option
to encroach, which suggests ES = 
N
S .
Second, we can show that the supplier's expected prot with encroachment
is increasing in c when max
n
min
n
aH
2
; aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 )
o
; aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ;
aH
3
o
< c <
max
n
aH
2
; aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 )
o
. There can be two cases:
i) If aH
2
< aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) (i.e.,  >
1
2
), then when max
n
aH
2
; aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 )
o
<
c < aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , the supplier's expected prot (according to Equation (B.1)) is:
ES = 
aH
2
2
  (aH   aL) (aL   c)

+ (1  )c (aL   c) :
Taking the rst derivative:
dES
dc
= (aH   aL) + (1   ) (aL   2c) > 0 when c <
aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) . Hence, 
E
S increases in c when
aH
2
< c < aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) .
ii) If aH
2
> aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) (i.e.,  <
1
2
), then when max
n
aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ;
aH
3
o
<
c < aH
2
, the supplier's expected prot is:
ES = 

c (aH   c)  (aH   aL)

aL
2
  (aH   aL)
2 (1  )

+(1 )
 aL
2
2   (aH   aL)
2 (1  )
2!
;
which is obviously increasing in c when c < aH
2
.
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Hence, ES < 
N
S when max
n
min
n
aH
2
; aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 )
o
; aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ;
aH
3
o
<
c < max
n
aH
2
; aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 )
o
and ES ! NS as c increases to max
n
aH
2
; aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 )
o
.
Third, when c < min
n
(aH aL)
1  ;
aH+(1 )aL
1+4
; aH
3
o
, we can easily show that the
supplier's expected prot ES under encroachment is decreasing in c. Notice from
Proposition 15 that qER(aL) =

2c  2(aH aL)
1 
+
= 0 under encroachment when
c < min
n
(aH aL)
1  ;
aH+(1 )aL
1+4
; aH
3
o
. Thus,
ES = 
"
c (aH   c) +

aH   3c
2
2#
+ (1  )

aL   c
2
2
;
when c < min
n
(aH aL)
1  ;
aH+(1 )aL
1+4
; aH
3
o
. By taking the rst derivative of ES , it
can be conrmed that that ES decreases in c when c <
aH+(1 )aL
1+4
. Further, notice
that when c goes to zero, ES goes to 
a2H
4
+ (1  )a2L
4
which is larger than NS .
Combining the above results, we assert that there must exist a threshold c0S
such that when c < c0S, 
E
S > 
N
S , and a threshold c
000
S such that when c
000
S  c <
max
n
aH
2
; aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 )
o
, ES  NS . Furthermore, we can assert by comparing ES
and NS according to the equilibrium solutions of Propositions 13 and 15 that there
exists at most one more threshold c00S 2 [c0S; c000S ] at which ES = NS , and these three
thresholds may coincide with each other (the detailed comparison is long but mainly
algebraic, which is thus omitted). Hence, the full comparison can be characterized
by three thresholds: when 0 < c < c0S, 
E
S > 
N
S ; when c
0
S  c  c00S, ES  NS ;
when c00S < c < c
000
S , 
E
S > 
N
S ; when c
000
S  c < max
n
aH
2
; aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 )
o
, ES  NS ;
and when c  max
n
aH
2
; aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 )
o
, ES = 
N
S .
Proof of Proposition 19. Without encroachment, the optimal contract follows
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Proposition 13, based on which we can derive the reseller's expected prot as:
NR = (aH   aL)qER(aL) = IfaL>aHg(aH   aL)

aL
2
  (aH   aL)
2 (1  )

:
With encroachment, the optimal solution of the supplier's problem follows Proposi-
tion 15 and we can formulate the reseller's expected prot as:
ER =
X
i2fH;Lg
i
 
ai   qER(ai)  qES (ai)  wE(ai)

qER(ai) = (aH   aL)qER(aL):
Proposition 15 reveals that if aL
aH
  < 1, qER(aL) = qNR (aL) = 0 for any c.
Thus, the reseller is always indierent with or without encroachment.
If  < aL
aH
, qER(aL) = q
N
R (aL) =
aL
2
  (aH aL)
2(1 ) when c  aL2 + (aH aL)2(1 ) ,
so the reseller is indierent with or without encroachment in this region. When
aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) < c <
aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , q
E
R(aL) > q
N
R (aL) =
aL
2
  (aH aL)
2(1 ) , which suggests
that the reseller gains a larger prot under encroachment. When c < aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ,
qER(aL) decreases and approaches zero as c decreases. Hence, there exists a threshold
c0R such that the resller is worse o when c  c0R, better o when c0R < c < aL2 +
(aH aL)
2(1 ) , and indierent when c  aL2 + (aH aL)2(1 ) with encroachment compared to
without.
Proof of Proposition 20. An analysis of a simultaneous move Cournot compe-
tition can reveal that without any constraint, the optimal selling quantities of the
reseller and the supplier should be ai+c
3
and ai 2c
3
, respectively, for each market size.
Certainly, in our context, the reseller cannot sell more than what he orders, i.e., his
selling quantity will be minfai+c
3
; qR(ai)g.
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As in the proof of Proposition 15, the reseller's individual rationality con-
straint for the small market size must be binding at optimum and thus we have
w(aL) = aL   qR(aL)   qS(aL). The reseller's incentive compatibility constraint for
the large market size must also bind at optimum and thus satisfy:
(aH   qR(aH)  qS(aH)  w(aH))qR(aH)
= [aH   (qR(aL) + qS(aL))  (aL   qR(aL)  qS(aL))]qR(aL)
= (aH   aL)qR(aL):
Thus, the optimal wholesale price for the large market size satises:
w(aH) = aH   qR(aH)  qS(aH)  (aH   aL)qR(aL)
qR(aH)
:
We can now substitute the above expressions into the supplier's objective of
choosing fqR(ai)gi2fH;Lg to obtain:
max 
24 aH   qR(aH)  aH   qR(aH)  c
2
+
  (aH   aL)qR(aL)
qR(aH)
!
qR(aH) +
 
aH   qR(aH)  c
2
+!235
+(1  )
24 aL   qR(aL)  aL   qR(aL)  c
2
+!
qR(aL) +
 
aL   qR(aL)  c
2
+!235
= 
24 aH   qR(aH)  aH   qR(aH)  c
2
+!
qR(aH)  (aH   aL)qR(aL) +
 
aH   qR(aH)  c
2
+!235
+(1  )
24 aL   qR(aL)  aL   qR(aL)  c
2
+!
qR(aL) +
 
aL   qR(aL)  c
2
+!235
s:t: qR(ai)  ai + c
3
; i = H;L
Notice that in the proof of Proposition 15, without the constraint qR(ai)  ai+c3 ,
the optimal quantity qER(ai) is an interior solution to an optimization with a concave
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objective function. Therefore, with the constraint qR(ai)  ai+c3 , the optimal quantity
is minfai+c
3
; qER(ai)g; i 2 fH;Lg. In summary, the option of free disposal will lower
the optimal quantity to aH+c
3
for the large market size when aH
5
< c < aH
2
. For the
small market size, the option of free disposal will lower the optimal reselling quantity
to aL+c
3
when minfaL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ;
aL
5
+ 6(aH aL)
5(1 ) g < c < maxfaL3 + 2(aH aL)3(1 ) ; aL2 g.
Proof of Proposition 21. (i) For the reseller, it is obvious that when  2 [ aL
aH
; 1),
his prot is always zero either with or without information acquisition, and thus
he is indierent. When  2 (0; aL
aH
), without information acquisition, the reseller
obtains zero prot; with information acquisition, he can obtain a positive prot when
c is larger than (aH aL)
(1 ) and zero otherwise. Therefore, there exists a threshold
cIR =
(aH aL)
(1 ) such that the reseller is better o by information acquisition when
c > cIR and indierent when c < c
I
R.
(ii) For the supplier, we rst derive her prot in the case of no information
acquisition. When c 2 (0; 
3
], we have:
ENIS =
X
i2fH;Lg
i

2c
  c
2
+
  3c
2
(ai   2c    3c
2
  c)

=
2   6c+ 9c2 + 4c  4c2
4
=
2   2c+ 5c2
4
;
when c 2 (
3
; 
2
], we have: ENIS = c(   c); and when c 2 (2 ;+1), we have:
ENIS =
2
4
.
(ii-a) We show that there exists cIS such that 
E
S > 
ENI
S when c < c
I
S. Notice
that when c  minf(aH aL)
1  ;

3
g (which implies that c  aH
3
and c < aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ),
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we can derive:
ES  ENIS = 
"
c (aH   c) +

aH   3c
2
2#
+ (1  )

aL   c
2
2
  
2   2c+ 5c2
4
=
2
4
  (1  ) c2:
Clearly, ES > 
ENI
S if c <

2
p
1  . Hence, there exists a threshold c
I
S = minf(aH aL)1  ; 3 ; 2p1 g
such that ES > 
ENI
S when c < c
I
S.
(ii-b) We show that there exist cIS and  such that 
E
S > 
ENI
S when c > c
I
S
and  > . Notice that when c > maxfaH
2
; aLg (which implies c > 2 ), the supplier
never sells through her direct channel either with or without downstream information
acquisition. we compare ES and 
ENI
S for  2 [ aLaH ; 1) and  2 (0;
aL
aH
), respectively.
1) When  2 [ aL
aH
; 1), we have
ES   ENIS = 
a2H
4
  
2
4
;
which is positive when  >
a2L
(aH aL)2 .
2) When  2 (0; aL
aH
), we have
ES   ENIS = 
aH
2
2
  (aH   aL)

aL
2
  (aH   aL)
2 (1  )

+(1  )
 aL
2
2
 

(aH   aL)
2 (1  )
2!
  
2
4
=
[(1  + 2)a2H   2(2  2+ 2)aHaL + (3  3+ 2)a2L]
4(1  ) :
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Let U  (1  + 2)a2H   2(2  2+ 2)aHaL + (3  3+ 2)a2L. We have
dU
d
= ( 1 + 2)a2H   2( 2 + 2)aHaL + ( 3 + 2)a2L;
d2U
d2
= 2a2H   4aHaL + 4a2L = 2(aH   aL)2 > 0:
As a result, U is convex, and U > 0 when  >
aH 3aL+
p
 3a2H+10aHaL 3a2L
2(aH aL) .
Combining cases 1) and 2), we conrm that there exist cIS and  such that
ES > 
ENI
S when c > c
I
S and  > . It is worth noting that the above conditions
are all sucient conditions. To derive the sucient and necessary conditions is
technically challenging.
B.2 Dominance of Separating Equilibrium
In this section, we show that the optimal separating solution always dominates
the optimal pooling solution in our model.
B.2.1 Derivation of the Optimal Pooling Solution
We rst derive the pooling solution. Notice that after the reseller accepts the contract
(w; qR), the supplier solves
max
qS
[ (aH   qR   qS   c) + (1  ) (aL   qR   qS   c)] qS
for her direct selling quantity. The optimal solution is qS(qR) =

aH+(1 )aL qR c
2
+
.
Given the reseller anticipates the supplier's direct sale decision, when designing the
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contract (w; qR), the supplier solves
max
w;qR
wqR +
 
aH + (1  ) aL   qR   c
2
+!2
s:t:
 
aL   qR  

aH + (1  ) aL   qR   c
2
+!
qR   wqR  0; 
aH   qR  

aH + (1  ) aL   qR   c
2
+!
qR   wqR  0:
Clearly, the second constraint is redundant, and at optimum, the rst constraint
must bind. Therefore, w = aL   qR  

aH+(1 )aL qR c
2
+
. We rst solve the case
where qR > 0 and
aH+(1 )aL qR c
2
> 0 at optimum. Then, the above program can
be rewritten as:
max
qR

aL   qR  

aH + (1  ) aL   qR   c
2

qR+

aH + (1  ) aL   qR   c
2
2
:
From the rst-order condition
aL   qR  

aH + (1  ) aL   qR   c
2

  qR
2
  aH + (1  ) aL   qR   c
2
= 0;
we have qR = 2 (aL + c  (aH + (1  ) aL)), and thus, qS = 3(aH+(1 )aL c)2   aL.
Now, we discuss four subcases.
(1) Notice that qR > 0 and q

S > 0 if (aH + (1  ) aL)   aL < c <
(aH + (1  ) aL)  23aL. In this case, the supplier's prot is
EPS =((aH + (1  ) aL)  c) (aL + c  (aH + (1  ) aL))
+

3 (aH + (1  ) aL   c)
2
  aL
2
:
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(2) When c  (aH + (1  ) aL)   aL, qR = 0; that is, the supplier would
sell the product only through her direct channel. The initial assumption is violated.
Therefore, instead of the above optimization program, the supplier solves
max
qS
[ (aH   qS   c) + (1  ) (aL   qS   c)] qS:
In this case, the optimal quantity is qS =
aH+(1 )aL c
2
and the supplier's prot is
EPS =

aH+(1 )aL c
2
2
:
(3) When c  (aH + (1  ) aL)  23aL, qS = 0; that is, the supplier would sell
the product only through the reseller. The initial assumption is violated. Therefore,
instead of the above optimization program, the supplier solves
max
w;qR
wqR
s:t:
aH + (1  ) aL   qR   c
2
 0;
(aL   qR) qR   wqR  0;
(aH   qR) qR   wqR  0:
Clearly, the last constraint is redundant, and at optimum, the second constraint must
bind. Therefore, w = aL   qR.
(3i) When the rst constraint does not bind, we have qR =
aL
2
and the sup-
plier's prot EPS =
 
aL
2
2
. This case arises if c > (aH + (1  ) aL)  aL2 .
(3ii) When the rst constraint binds, we have qR = aH + (1  ) aL   c and
the supplier's prot
EPS = (aL + c  (aH + (1  ) aL)) (aH + (1  ) aL   c) :
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This case arises if (aH + (1  ) aL)  23aL  c < (aH + (1  ) aL)  aL2 .
We summarize the supplier's prot:
EPS =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:

aH+(1 )aL c
2
2
if c   (aH   aL) ,
((aH + (1  ) aL)  c) (aL + c  (aH + (1  ) aL))
+

3(aH+(1 )aL c)
2   aL
2 if  (aH   aL) < c
<  (aH   aL) + 13aL,
(aL + c  (aH + (1  ) aL)) (aH + (1  ) aL   c) if  (aH   aL) +
1
3aL  c
<  (aH   aL) + 12aL, 
aL
2
2
if c >  (aH   aL) + 12aL:
(B.5)
B.2.2 Prot Comparison
In the following, we compare the supplier's prots under the optimal sep-
arating and pooling solutions. Note that the separating solution (i.e., the menu
f(qER(aL); wE(aL)), (qER(aH); wE(aH))g and the direct selling quantities (qES (aL); qES (aH)))
is given in Proposition 4. We carry out the comparison for a list of cases depending
on the supplier's direct selling cost c.
When c   (aH   aL) :
In this case, the supplier does not sell through the reseller under the optimal
pooling solution. On the other hand, notice that the pair of qR(aL) = 0 and q
E
R(aH)
(as given in Proposition 4) is always a feasible solution for the supplier's problem of
the separating case. Under this pair, the supplier's prot is
 
aL c
2
2
after learning
the market size is small and her prot is always larger than
 
aH c
2
2
after learning
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the market size is large. Therefore, the supplier's prot under the optimal separating
solution must be larger than 
 
aH c
2
2
+ (1  )  aL c
2
2
which, by Jensen's inequal-
ity, is larger than the supplier's prot

aH+(1 )aL c
2
2
under the optimal pooling
solution. Hence, the pooling solution is dominated the separating solution.
When  (aH   aL) < c <  (aH   aL) + 13aL:
In this case, the supplier sells through both the direct and the reselling chan-
nels under the optimal pooling solution, and her corresponding prot is
EPS =((aH + (1  ) aL)  c) (aL + c  (aH + (1  ) aL))
+

3 (aH + (1  ) aL   c)
2
  aL
2
:
We discuss two subcases with  (aH   aL) < c  23 (aH   aL)+aL3 and 23 (aH   aL)+
aL
3
< c <  (aH   aL) + aL3 in sequence.
1) When  (aH   aL) < c  23 (aH   aL) + aL3 , we have qR  aL   c under
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the pooling solution. Thus, we can derive:
ESS = 
240@aH   qER(aH) 
 
aH   qER(aH)  c
2
!+1A qER(aH)  (aH   aL)qER(aL) +
0@ aH   qER(aH)  c
2
!+1A235
+(1  )
240@aL   qER(aL) 
 
aL   qER(aL)  c
2
!+1A qER(aL) +
0@ aL   qER(aL)  c
2
!+1A235
> 
"
aH   qR  

aH   qR   c
2

qR   (aH   aL)qR +

aH   qR   c
2
2#
+(1  )
"
aL   qR  

aL   qR   c
2

qR +

aL   qR   c
2
2#
=

aH + (1  ) aL   qR   

aH   qR   c
2

  (1  )

aL   qR   c
2

qR
+

aH   qR   c
2
2
+ (1  )

aL   qR   c
2
2
   (aH   aL) qR


aH + (1  ) aL   qR  
aH + (1  ) aL   qR   c
2

qR +

aH + (1  ) aL   qR   c
2
2
   (aH   aL) qR
=

aL   qR  
aH + (1  ) aL   qR   c
2

qR +

aH + (1  ) aL   qR   c
2
2
= EPS
The last inequality holds by Jensen's inequality. Hence, the pooling solution is
dominated the separating solution.
2) When 2
3
 (aH   aL) + aL3 < c <  (aH   aL) + aL3 , we construct a feasible
solution of the supplier's problem of the separating case: (qR(aL); qR(aH)) = (aL  
c; aH   c) with the corresponding optimal wholesale prices determined from the IC
and IR constraints (the direct selling quantity is always zero). Under this solution,
the supplier's prot is: 0S =  [(aH   c) c  (aH   aL) (aL   c)] + (1  ) (aL   c) c.
We can obtain
0S   EPS =
(5aH   5aL + aL   3c) ( aH + aL   aL + 3c)
4
We can verify that 5aH   5aL+ aL  3c  0 and  aH + aL  aL+3c  0 when
2
3
 (aH   aL) + aL3 < c <  (aH   aL) + aL3 . Therefore, 0S  EPS . The supplier's
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prot ESS under the optimal separating solution must be larger than 
0
S. Hence,
the pooling solution is dominated the separating solution.
When  (aH   aL) + 13aL  c <  (aH   aL) + 12aL:
In this case, the supplier does not sell through her direct channel under the
optimal pooling solution. Her prot is
EPS = [aL + c  (aH + (1  ) aL)] [aH + (1  ) aL   c] :
We apply the same feasible solution (qR(aL); qR(aH)) = (aL   c; aH   c) as
discussed in the above for the separating case, under which the supplier's prot is:
0S =  [(aH   c) c  (aH   aL) (aL   c)] + (1  ) (aL   c) c. We can obtain
0S   EPS =  [(aH   c) c  (aH   aL) (aL   c)] + (1  ) (aL   c) c
  [c  (aH   aL)] [(aH   aL) + (aL   c)]
=  (aH   c) c  (aH   aL) (aL   c) + (1  ) (aL   c) c
 (aH   aL)c+ 2(aH   aL)2   (aL   c) c+ (aH   aL) (aL   c)
=  (aH   c) c   (aL   c) c  (aH   aL)c+ 2(aH   aL)2
= 2(aH   aL)2 > 0:
The supplier's prot ESS under the optimal separating solution must be larger than
0S. Hence, the pooling solution is dominated the separating solution.
When c   (aH   aL) + 12aL:
Now, we consider Case (3i) of the pooling solution under which the supplier's
prot EPS =
 
aL
2
2
. We present the comparison according to   aL
aH
and  > aL
aH
in
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sequence.
(Case A)   aL
aH
1) We rst consider the separating solution (qER(aL); q
E
R(aH)) = (
aL
2
 (aH aL)
2(1 ) ;
aH
2
).
We can obtain:
ESS  EPS = 
"aH
2
2
  (aH   aL) aL
2
+
 (aH   aL)2
2(1  )
#
+(1  )
 aL
2
2
 

 (aH   aL)
2(1  )
2!
 
aL
2
2
= 
aH
2
2
   (aH   aL) aL
2
+
2 (aH   aL)2
2(1  )
+(1  )
aL
2
2
  
2 (aH   aL)2
4(1  )  
aL
2
2
= 
aH
2
2
   (aH   aL) aL
2
+
2 (aH   aL)2
4(1  )   
aL
2
2
= 
aH
2
2
  aHaL
2
+
 (aL)
2
2
+
2 (aH   aL)2
4(1  )   
aL
2
2
= 
aH
2
2
  aHaL
2
+ 
aL
2
2
+
2 (aH   aL)2
4(1  )
> 0:
2) We compare EPS =
 
aL
2
2
with the supplier's prot ESS under the sepa-
rating solution (qER(aL); q
E
R(aH)) = (
aL
2
  (aH aL)
2(1 ) ; aH   c). Notice that this solution
(qER(aL); q
E
R(aH)) will arise only when c 2

aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ;1

and c 2  aH
3
; aH
2

which
implies aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) <
aH
2
. We can obtain
ESS   EPS =  (aH   c) c 
aHaL
2
+ 
aL
2
2
+
2 (aH   aL)2
4(1  ) : (B.6)
This dierence is the smallest when c is at the lower support, i.e., either c = aH
3
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or aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , whichever larger. We rst assume
aH
3
> aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) (i.e., aL <
2aH
3
  (aH aL)
(1 ) ). So the smallest dierence is achieved at c =
aH
3
and we can obtain:
ESS   EPS =
 (aH   aL)2
4
   1
36
(aH)
2 +
2 (aH   aL)2
4(1  )
=
 (aH   aL)2
4(1  )   
1
36
(aH)
2
> 
264

aH
3
+ (aH aL)
(1 )
2
4(1  )  
1
36
(aH)
2
375 > 0:
Now, we assume aH
3
< aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) <
aH
2
, which implies 
1  < 1. So the
smallest dierence is achieved at c = aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) and we can obtain:
ESS  EPS = 

aH  

aL
2
+
 (aH   aL)
2(1  )

aL
2
+
 (aH   aL)
2(1  )

 aHaL
2
+ 
aL
2
2
+
2 (aH   aL)2
4(1  )
= aH
aL
2
+
2aH (aH   aL)
2(1  )  
aHaL
2
+ 
aL
2
2
+
2 (aH   aL)2
4(1  )
 
 aL
2
2
+

 (aH   aL)
2(1  )
2
+
 (aH   aL) aL
2(1  )
!
=
2 (aH   aL)2
2(1  ) +
2 (aH   aL)2
4(1  )

1  
1  

> 0:
3) Now, consider the scenario: c 2

aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ;1

and c 2  0; aH
3

un-
der which the optimal separating solution is (qER(aL); q
E
R(aH)) = (
aL
2
  (aH aL)
2(1 ) ; 2c).
Clearly, this scenario will arise only if aH
3
> aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) . To compare the sup-
plier's prots under the optimal separating and pooling solutions, we rely on the
feasible solution of the supplier's problem of the separating case: (qR(aL); qR(aH)) =
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(aL
2
  (aH aL)
2(1 ) ; aH   c) with the optimal wholesale prices determined from the IC
and IR constraints. We compare the supplier's prot EPS =
 
aL
2
2
under the pool-
ing solution with her prot ESS under this feasible solution of the separating case.
Notice from scenario 2) that (B.6) is increasing in c. So the smallest dierence of
ESS   EPS is achieved at the smallest c; i.e., at c = aL2 + (aH aL)2(1 ) . In scenario
2), we have shown that EPS is smaller than 
ES
S when c =
aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) under the
condition aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) <
aH
2
. Clearly, this condition holds in scenario 3). Therefore,
the optimal pooling solution is dominated by the optimal separating solution.
4) We compare EPS =
 
aL
2
2
with the supplier's prot ESS under the separat-
ing solution (qER(aL); q
E
R(aH)) = (aL c; aH2 ). Notice that this solution (qER(aL); qER(aH))
will arise only when c 2 (aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ;
aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ] and c 2 (aH2 ;1). We can
obtain
ESS  EPS = 
aH
2
2   (aH   aL) (aL   c) (B.7)
+(1  ) (aL   c) c 
aL
2
2
= 
aH
2
2
+ (1  ) (aL   c)

c  
1   (aH   aL)

 
aL
2
2
:
Taking the derivative of the dierence with respect to c, we obtain
d(ESS  EPS )
dc
=
2(1  )

aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 )   c

> 0 given the range of c which we focus on. Therefore,
the smallest of the dierence is achieved either at c = aH
2
or c = aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 )
whichever larger. Suppose aH
2
> aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) . We obtain the smallest dierence
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by plugging c = aH
2
into the above equation:
ESS  EPS = 
aH
2
2
+ (1  )

aL   aH
2
aH
2
  
1   (aH   aL)

 
aL
2
2
= 
aH
2
2
+ (1  )

aL
aH
2
 
aH
2
2   
1   (aH   aL) aL +
aH
2

1   (aH   aL)

 
aL
2
2
= 
aH
2
2
+ (1  )aL aH
2
  (1  )
aH
2
2    (aH   aL) aL + aH
2
 (aH   aL) 
aL
2
2
= 
aH
2
2
+ (1  )aL aH
2
  (1  )
aH
2
2   aHaL + a2L + a2H2   aHaL2   aL2 2
=
4  1
4
a2H  
4  1
2
aHaL +
4  1
4
a2L
=
4  1
4
(aH   aL)2 :
Given aH
2
< aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , we know  >
1
2
. Therefore, ESS   EPS > 0.
Suppose aH
2
 aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) . We obtain the smallest dierence by plugging
c = aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) into the above equation:
ESS  EPS = 
aH
2
2
+ (1  )

aL  

aL
3
+
2 (aH   aL)
3(1  )

aL
3
+
2 (aH   aL)
3(1  )

  
1   (aH   aL)

 
aL
2
2
= 
aH
2
2
+ (1  )

2aL
3
  2 (aH   aL)
3(1  )
 
aL
3
   (aH   aL)
3(1  )

 
aL
2
2
= 
aH
2
2
+ (1  ) 2
9
"
a2L +
2 (aH   aL)2
(1  )2   2
 (aH   aL) aL
(1  )
#
 
aL
2
2
= 
aH
2
2
+
2
9
(1  )a2L +
2
9
2 (aH   aL)2
(1  )  
4
9
 (aH   aL) aL  
aL
2
2
= 
a2H
4
+
2
9
(1  )a2L +
2
9
2 (aH   aL)2
(1  )  
4
9
 (aH   aL) aL  
aL
2
2
=
1
(1  )
"
(1  )a
2
H
4
+
2
9
(1  )2a2L +
2
9
2 (aH   aL)2   4
9
(1  ) (aH   aL) aL   (1  )
aL
2
2#
:
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Taking the derivative of the term in the bracket with respect to , we can obtain
d

(1  )  ESS   EPS 
d
= (1  2)a
2
H
4
  4
9
(1  )a2L +
4
9
 (aH   aL)2
 4
9
(1  2) (aH   aL) aL +
aL
2
2
;
d2

(1  )  ESS   EPS 
d2
=  a
2
H
2
+
4
9
a2L +
4
9
(aH   aL)2 + 8
9
(aH   aL) aL
=  a
2
H
2
+
4
9
a2L +
4
9
 
a2H + a
2
L   2aHaL

+
8
9
 
aHaL   a2L

=  a
2
H
36
< 0:
Therefore,
d[(1 )(ESS  EPS )]
d
is decreasing in . Notice that in this region we have
 < aL
aH
. Plugging  = aL
aH
into
d[(1 )(ESS  EPS )]
d
, we derive
d

(1  )  ESS   EPS 
d
=
aH
2
  aL
2
2
> 0:
We assess the sign of ESS  EPS at the smallest possible . Given the condition aH2 
aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) , the smallest possible  is the one under which
aH
2
= aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) .
Note that when aH
2
= aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) , c =
aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) =
aH
2
. In the above, we have
already shown that when c = aH
2
, ESS   EPS > 0. Thus, we know ESS   EPS > 0
when aH
2
< aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) .
5) Now, we consider the scenario c 2 (0; aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ] and c 2 (aH2 ;1) under
which the optimal separating solution is
(qER(aL); q
E
R(aH)) =
 
2c  2 (aH   aL)
1  
+
;
aH
2
!
:
Clearly, this scenario will arise only if aH
2
< aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) . To compare the supplier's
prots under the optimal separating and pooling solutions, we rely on the feasible
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solution of the supplier's problem of the separating case: (qR(aL); qR(aH)) = (aL  
c; aH
2
) with the optimal wholesale prices determined from the IC and IR constraints.
We compare the supplier's prot under this feasible solution of the separating case
with her prot EPS =
 
aL
2
2
under the optimal pooling solution (i.e., equation (B.7)).
In scenario 4), we have shown that (B.7) is increasing in c. Thus, the smallest
dierence is achieved at c = aH
2
. Notice that given aH
2
< aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) , we have
aH
2
< aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) . In scenario 4), we have shown (B.7) is positive at c =
aH
2
. Hence,
the optimal pooling solution must be dominated by the optimal separating solution.
6) We compare EPS =
 
aL
2
2
with the supplier's prot ESS under (q
E
R(aL); q
E
R(aH)) =
(aL c; aH c) under the separating equilibrium. Notice that this solution (qER(aL); qER(aH))
will arise only when c 2 (aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ;
aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ] and c 2 (aH3 ; aH2 ). We can
obtain
ESS  EPS =  [(aH   c) c  (aH   aL) (aL   c)] + (1  ) (aL   c) c 
aL
2
2
(B.8)
=  (aH   aL) [2c  aL] + (aL   c) c 
aL
2
2
:
We can derive
d(ESS  EPS )
dc
= 2
 
aL
2
+  (aH   aL)  c

< 0 given the condition of
the optimal pooling solution (c >  (aH   aL) + aL2 ). Therefore, the smallest of the
dierence is achieved either at c = aH
2
or c = aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) whichever smaller.
Suppose aH
2
< aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) . We obtain the smallest dierence by plugging
c = aH
2
into the above equation:
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ESS  EPS = 
h
aH   aH
2
 aH
2
  (aH   aL)

aL   aH
2
i
+ (1  )

aL   aH
2
 aH
2
 
aL
2
2
= 

a2H
4
  aHaL + a2L +
a2H
2
  aHaL
2

+ (1  )

aHaL
2
  a
2
H
4

 
aL
2
2
=
4  1
4
(aH   aL)2 :
Given aH
2
< aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , we know  >
1
2
. Therefore, ESS   EPS > 0.
Suppose aH
2
 aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) . We obtain the smallest dierence by plugging
c = aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) into the above equation:
ESS  EPS =  (aH   aL)
 (aH   aL)
(1  )
+

aL
2
   (aH   aL)
2(1  )

aL
2
+
 (aH   aL)
2(1  )

 
aL
2
2
=
2 (aH   aL)2
(1  )  
2 (aH   aL)2
4(1  )2
=
2 (aH   aL)2
(1  )
3  4
4(1  ) :
Given aH
2
 aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , we know   12 . Therefore, ESS   EPS > 0.
7) Now, consider the scenario c 2 (aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ;
aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ] and c 2
(0; aH
3
) under which the optimal separating solution (qER(aL); q
E
R(aH)) = (aL   c; 2c).
Clearly, this scenario will arise either if aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) <
aH
3
< aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) or if
aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) <
aH
3
. To compare the supplier's prots under the optimal separating
and pooling solutions, we rely on the feasible solution of the supplier's problem of the
separating case: (qR(aL); qR(aH)) = (aL c; aH c) with the optimal wholesale prices
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determined from the IC and IR constraints. We compare the supplier's prot under
this feasible solution of the separating case with her prot EPS =
 
aL
2
2
under the
optimal pooling solution (i.e., equation (B.8)). In scenario 6), we have shown that
(B.8) is decreasing in c. So the smallest dierence for this scenario 7) is achieved
at c = aH
3
if aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) <
aH
3
< aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) and at c =
aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) if
aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) <
aH
3
. We rst consider aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) <
aH
3
< aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) . Notice
that if aH
2
< aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , then we have shown in scenario 6) that (B.8) is positive
at c = aH
2
, which implies (B.8) is positive at c = aH
3
given (B.8) is decreasing in c
and aH
2
> aH
3
. Similarly, if aH
2
> aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , then we have shown in scenario 6)
that (B.8) is positive at c = aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , which implies (B.8) is positive at c =
aH
3
given (B.8) is decreasing in c and aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) >
aH
3
. Second, if aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) <
aH
3
,
then aH
2
> aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) and we have shown in scenario 6) that (B.8) is positive at
c = aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) . Consequently, the optimal pooling solution must be dominated
by the optimal separating solution.
8) Now, consider the scenario c 2 (0; aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) ] and c 2 (aH3 ; aH2 ) under
which the optimal separating solution is
(qER(aL); q
E
R(aH)) =
 
2c  2 (aH   aL)
1  
+
; aH   c
!
:
This scenario will arise either if aH
3
< aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) <
aH
2
or if aH
2
< aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) .
Again, we rely on the feasible solution of the supplier's problem of the separating
case: (qR(aL); qR(aH)) = (aL c; aH c) with the optimal wholesale prices determined
from the IC and IR constraints. We compare the supplier's prot under this feasible
solution of the separating case with her prot EPS =
 
aL
2
2
under the optimal
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pooling solution (i.e., equation (B.8)). In scenario 6), we have shown that (B.8)
is decreasing in c. So the smallest dierence is achieved at c = aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) if
aH
3
< aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) <
aH
2
and at c = aH
2
if aH
2
< aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) . We rst consider
aH
3
< aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) <
aH
2
. Notice that if aH
2
< aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , then we have shown
in scenario 6) that (B.8) is positive at c = aH
2
, which implies (B.8) is positive at
c = aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) given (B.8) is decreasing in c. Similarly, if
aH
2
> aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) ,
then we have shown in scenario 6) that (B.8) is positive at c = aL
2
+ (aH aL)
2(1 ) , which
implies (B.8) is positive at c = aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) given (B.8) is decreasing in c and
aL
3
+2(aH aL)
3(1 ) <
aL
2
+(aH aL)
2(1 ) . Second, if
aH
2
< aL
3
+2(aH aL)
3(1 ) , then
aH
2
< aL
2
+(aH aL)
2(1 )
and we have shown in scenario 6) that (B.8) is positive at c = aH
2
. Consequently, the
optimal pooling solution must be dominated by the optimal separating solution.
9) We compare EPS =
 
aL
2
2
with the supplier's prot ESS under the separat-
ing solution (qER(aL); q
E
R(aH)) = (

2c  2(aH aL)
1 
+
; 2c). Notice that this solution
(qER(aL); q
E
R(aH)) will arise only when c 2 (0; aL3 + 2(aH aL)3(1 ) ] and c 2 (0; aH3 ). More-
over, the condition for the optimal pooling solution is c >  (aH   aL)+ 12aL. There-
fore, we must have aH
3
>  (aH   aL) + 12aL and aL3 + 2(aH aL)3(1 ) >  (aH   aL) + 12aL.
From aH
3
>  (aH   aL)+ 12aL, we know  < 2aH 3aL6(aH aL) . From
aL
3
+ 2(aH aL)
3(1 ) >
 (aH   aL)+12aL, we know  <
2aH 3aL 
p
4a2H+12aHaL 15a2L
12(aH aL) or  >
2aH 3aL+
p
4a2H+12aHaL 15a2L
12(aH aL) .
Notice that
2aH 3aL 
p
4a2H+12aHaL 15a2L
12(aH aL) < 0 and
2aH 3aL+
p
4a2H+12aHaL 15a2L
12(aH aL) >
2aH 3aL
6(aH aL) .
Hence, this case never arises.
(Case B)  > aL
aH
We now consider the scenario with  > aL
aH
under which qER(aL) in the optimal
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separating solution is always zero.
1) We compare EPS =
 
aL
2
2
with the supplier's prot ESS under the separat-
ing solution (qER(aL); q
E
R(aH)) = (0;
aH
2
). Notice that this solution (qER(aL); q
E
R(aH))
will arise only when c 2 (aH
2
;1). It is straightforward to notice that
ESS = 
aH
2
2
+ (1  )
 
aL   c
2
+!2
 
aH
2
2
 aHaL
4
>
aL
2
2
:
2) We compare EPS =
 
aL
2
2
with the supplier's prot ESS under the separat-
ing solution (qER(aL); q
E
R(aH)) = (0; aH c). Notice that this solution (qER(aL); qER(aH))
will arise only when c 2 (aH
3
; aH
2
). Recall the condition for the optimal pooling equi-
librium is c >  (aH   aL) + 12aL. Thus, we must have aH2 >  (aH   aL) + 12aL; i.e.,
 < 1
2
. Since  > aL
aH
, we have aH > 2aL.
The dierence in prots is
ESS   EPS =  (aH   c) c+ (1  )
 
aL   c
2
+!2
 
aL
2
2
: (B.9)
We rst assume aL c
2
> 0. Then, taking derivative of the prot dierence with
respect to c, we obtain
d
 
ESS  EPS

dc
=  (aH   2c)  (1  )

aL   c
2

=
2aH   (1  )aL
2
  5  1
2
c:
Plugging c = aH
2
, we have
d
 
ESS   EPS

dc
=
(1  )(aH   2aL)
4
> 0:
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Plugging c = aH
3
, we have
d
 
ESS   EPS

dc
=
(1 + )aH + 3aL   3aL
6
> 0
given (1 + )aH > aH + aL > 3aL. Therefore,
d(ESS  EPS )
dc
> 0 for any c 2 (aH
3
; aH
2
).
Plugging c = aH
3
into ESS   EPS , we have
ESS   EPS =
(1 + 7)a2H   6(1  )aHaL   9a2L
36
:
Notice that the above dierence is increasing in . Thus, the smallest dierence is
achieved at  = aL
aH
. Plugging  = aL
aH
, we have ESS   EPS = a
2
H+aHaL+6a
2
L
36
  a3L
4aH
>
0 given aH > 2aL. Therefore, 
ES
S > 
EP
S for any c 2 (aH3 ; aH2 ) if aL c2 > 0.
Furthermore, we can notice that given c, (B.9) is decreasing in aL. Hence, we must
have ESS > 
EP
S for any c 2 (aH3 ; aH2 ).
3) We compare EPS =
 
aL
2
2
with the supplier's prot ESS under the sepa-
rating solution (qER(aL); q
E
R(aH)) = (0; 2c). Notice that this solution (q
E
R(aL); q
E
R(aH))
will arise only when c 2 (0; aH
3
). Recall the condition for the optimal pooling equi-
librium is c >  (aH   aL) + 12aL. Thus, we must have aH3 >  (aH   aL) + 12aL; i.e.,
aL
aH
<  < 2aH 3aL
6(aH aL) =
1
3
  aL
6(aH aL) <
1
3
. From 2aH 3aL
6(aH aL) >
aL
aH
, we have aH >
9+
p
33
4
aL.
The dierence in prots is
ESS  EPS = 
"
(aH   c) c+

aH   3c
2
2#
+ (1  )
 
aL   c
2
+!2
 
aL
2
2
: (B.10)
We rst assume aL c
2
> 0, i.e., c < aL. Then, taking derivative of the prot
dierence with respect to c, we obtain
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d
 
ESS  EPS

dc
=  (aH   2c)  3(aH   3c)
2
  (1  )

aL   c
2

=  aH + (1  )aL
2
+
4+ 1
2
c:
Solving
d(ESS  EPS )
dc
= 0, we have c = aH+(1 )aL
4+1
. The smallest ESS   EPS is
achieved at this c. Denote U = (32 + )a2H + (2
2   2)aHaL   (52    + 1)a2L.
We have
ESS   EPS jc=aH+(1 )aL
4+1
=
U
4(4+ 1)
where U > 0 if and only if aH >
 2++
p
164+32+
(3+1)
aL. This condition always holds
because it is implied by aH >
1

aL (i.e.,
1

>
 2++
p
164+32+
(3+1)
for any  < 1
3
).
Thus, ESS > 
EP
S .
We now assume aL c
2
 0, i.e., c  aL. Then, taking derivative of the prot
dierence with respect to c, we obtain
d
 
ESS   EPS

dc
=  (aH   2c)  3(aH   3c)
2
=  aH
2
+
5
2
c:
The smallest ESS  EPS is achieved at c = aH5 . Plugging this c into (B.10), we have
ESS   EPS =
a2H
5
  a
2
L
4
 4aLaH   5a
2
L
20
 (4 +
p
33)a2L
20
> 0
where the rst inequality holds because aH > aL and the second one holds because
aH >
9+
p
33
4
aL.
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B.3 Extensions of the Base Model
In this section, we present two extensions of our base model. In B.3.1, we
extend our model to a setting with a continuously distributed market size. We
allow for the possibility that the development of encroachment capability allows the
supplier to receive demand information through her direct channel in B.3.2.
B.3.1 Robustness with Uniform Distribution
In the base model, we have used a two-state distribution to model the market
size. Here, we extend our model to a setting where the market size a follows a
continuous, uniform distribution U[a; a] (it is technically cumbersome to compare
the expected prots under more general continuous distributions; see B.3.3 for the
detailed derivations). Under such a setting, the supplier designs a continuum of
contracts, (w(a); qR(a)), corresponding to each market size a 2 [a; a], to maximize
her prot. In the following, we rst characterize the optimal separating contracts
for the two cases without and with supplier encroachment (we focus only on the
separating cases in this analysis).
When the supplier does not have the option to encroach, the reseller that
observes the true market size a will choose the contract by solving:
max
a^2[a;a]
[a  qR(a^)  w(a^)]qR(a^):
By the revelation principle, we can focus on the truth-telling solution; that is, at
optimum, the reseller always chooses the contract that corresponds to the true market
206
size he observes. Therefore, the supplier's problem can be formulated as
max
f(w(a);qR(a))ga2[a;a]
E [w(a)qR(a)]
s:t: a = arg max
a^2[a;a]
[a  qR(a^)  w(a^)]qR(a^); 8a 2 [a; a];
(a  qR(a)  w(a)) qR(a)  0;8a 2 [a; a]:
Applying the classical mechanism design technique, we derive the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 23. Without the option of encroachment, the optimal order quantity
and the corresponding wholesale price for the reselling channel follow:
qNR (a) =

a  a
2
+
and wN(a) = a  qNR (a) 
R a
a
qNR (~a)d~a
qNR (a)
:
In contrast, when there is a direct channel, the supplier may sell directly
after she learns the market size from the reseller's contract choice. In particular, if
the reseller takes a contract corresponding to a^, the supplier's optimal direct selling
quantity follows: qS(a^) =

a^ qR(a^) c
2
+
. Anticipating the supplier's response, the
reseller that observes the true market size a will choose the contract by solving:
max
a^2[a;a]
[a  qR(a^)  qS(a^)  w(a^)]qR(a^):
Thus, we can formulate the supplier's problem with the option of encroachment as:
max
f(w(a);qR(a))ga2[a;a]
E [w(a)qR(a) + (a  qR(a)  qS(a)  c)qS(a)]
s:t: a = arg max
a^2[a;a]
[a  qR(a^)  qS(a^)  w(a^)]qR(a^);8a 2 [a; a];
a  qR(a)  qS(a)  w(a)  0;8a 2 [a; a];
which yields the following proposition.
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Figure B.1: The eects of supplier encroachment and asymmetry information on the
supply chain parties' prots when the market size a is uniformly distributed in the
support [1:00; 1:40].
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Proposition 24. With the option of encroachment, the optimal order quantity in the
reselling channel is in Table B.1, with the corresponding wholesale price satisfying:
wE(a) = a  qER(a) 

a qER(a) c
2
+
 
R a
a q
E
R(~a)d~a
qER(a)
, and the supplier's equilibrium direct
selling quantity is qES (a) =

a qER(a) c
2
+
.
Scenarios c 2 (0; a
3
] c 2 ( a
3
; 2a a
3
] c 2 (2a a
3
; a
2
] c 2 ( a
2
;+1)
a 2 [a; a] a 2 [a; 2a  3c) a 2 [2a  3c; a] a 2 [a; a] a 2 [a; a]
qER(a) 2(c+ a  a)+ 2(c+ a  a)+ (a  c)+ (a  c)+
 
a  a
2
+
Table B.1: Optimal separating menu of contracts under uniform demand distribution
Comparing the supplier's and the reseller's prots with and without supplier
encroachment, we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 25. Under certain parameters of the market size distribution and the
direct selling cost, the supplier as well as the reseller can be either better o or worse
o by the development of the option of supplier encroachment.
Hence, supplier encroachment can still either benet or hurt the supplier and
the reseller when the market size is continuously distributed, which is numerically
illustrated in Figure B.1. Note that the results revealed under a two-state distri-
bution may have a richer pattern than that under a uniform distribution because
the market size is evenly distributed under the uniform distribution, while under a
two-state distribution it can be skewed to either end. Nevertheless, the managerial
insight remains largely the same (even for more general distributions) that supplier
encroachment can help reduce the information rents but it can also induce the sup-
plier to behave opportunistically and hurt herself.
209
B.3.2 Encroachment Provides Supplier with a Noisy Demand Signal
In addition to the way in which the development of encroachment capability
aects a supplier's strategic interactions with a reseller, which have been the focus
of our analysis up until now, the development of her own direct channel may also
provide a supplier with access to information about demand that is independent from
what she learns from the reseller's order. Previously, we have ignored this possibility
in order to focus exclusively on the strategic interactions with the reseller.
However, our model can easily be adapted to allow for the possibility that a
supplier who develops encroachment capability will also receive an independent signal
about market demand. To do this, we assume that the supplier receives a signal,
denoted by s 2 faL; aHg, after her decision to develop encroachment capability but
before she announces her menu of quantity-price pairs for the reseller. In addition,
we assume that the signal is accurate with probability  2 [0:5; 1]. Specically, when
the true market size is a = ai, i = H;L the probability that the supplier receives a
signal s = ai is
Prob(s = aija = ai) =  and Prob(s = ajja = ai) = 1 ; i = H;L and j 2 fH;Lgni:
Note that when  = 0:5, the signal provides no information, and when  =1, the
signal is perfectly accurate.
After the supplier receives the demand signal, she will update her prior on the
probability that the demand parameter is aH . Using Bayes' rule, it is easy to show
that her updated prior will depend upon the signal that she receives in the following
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way:
0H (s) =
(

+(1 )(1 ) if s = aH
(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) if s = aL
and 0L (s) = 1   0H (s) is her updated prior for the probability that the demand
parameter will be aL. Denote by 
0 (s) the vector consisting of 0H (s) and 
0
L (s).
The expected optimal prots obtained by the supplier and by the reseller after when
the supplier has encroachment capability can now be expressed as follows:
Es

ES (; s)

= [+ (1  )(1  )] ES (0 (aH)) + [(1  )+ (1  )] ES (0 (aL))
Es

ER (; s)

= [+ (1  )(1  )] ER (0 (aH)) + [(1  )+ (1  )] ER (0 (aL))
where ES (
0 (aH)), ES (
0 (aL)), ER (
0 (aH)), and ER (
0 (aL)) each have the same
structure that we have characterized previously.
The independent source of information has both a direct eect and an indirect
eect. The direct eect is that the supplier can tailor her pricing menu according to
the signal that she receives, and this helps to reduce information rents. In the extreme
case where the signal is perfectly accurate, the information rents are eliminated. The
indirect eect arises from the fact that, because the signal aects the price-quantity
pairs that are oered to the reseller, it indirectly inuences the supplier's direct selling
quantity. Thus, the accuracy of the demand signal indirectly aects the supplier's
direct selling quantity in spite of the fact that she is fully informed of the market
size (via the reseller's order) at the time that she determines the quantity to sell
directly. Figure B.2 illustrates the eects of the supplier's independent source of
market information with dierent accuracy levels. Figure B.2(a)-B.2(c) show that
the regions where the supplier is better o expand as  increases for the reasons
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described above. By comparing these results to those in Figure 3.4(a), where  = 0:5
implicitly, even a relatively inaccurate signal,  = 0:55, dramatically expands the
region in which the supplier benets from encroachment.
In Figure B.2(d)-B.2(f) we show how the reseller is aected by encroachment
when the supplier receives an independent demand signal of varying levels of ac-
curacy. Note that the region depicted in Figure 3.4(b) corresponds to the case for
 = 0:5, i.e., the demand signal that the supplier receives carries no information.
We can see that, as the accuracy level of the supplier's signal increases, the original
region in which the reseller is better o shrinks. However, a new region (around
 = aL
aH
) where the reseller is better o emerges. Note that the reseller makes zero
prot for  > aL
aH
when the signal contains no information, i.e., when  = 0:5, be-
cause the optimal menu of quantity-price pairs does not induce the reseller to order
when demand is low. However, when the supplier observes even a noisy signal of low
demand before she announces the quantity-price pairs, she becomes more willing to
induce the reseller to order a positive quantity when demand is low. Consequently,
both the supplier and the reseller are better o under encroachment in this region.
This last observation is intriguing because it implies that for certain parame-
ters (relatively high values of both c and ), the reseller benets from the supplier's
development of encroachment capability only if it results in the supplier obtaining
an independent source of demand information.
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Figure B.2: Illustration of the regions where supplier obtaining a noisy signal benets
or hurts the supplier and the reseller in the presence of supplier encroachment. The
supplier/reseller is better o in the orange regions, worse o in the blue regions, and
indierent in the blank regions. The other parameters are: aL = 1:00 and aH = 1:40.
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 23. Dene the reseller's prot function:
R(a^ja) = [a  qR(a^)  w(a^)]qR(a^)
where a is the observed market size while a^ is the index of the contract the reseller
chooses. By the revelation principle, we focus on the truth-telling equilibrium where
the reseller truthfully reports the observed market size and thus his prot follows:
R(aja) = [a  qR(a)  w(a)]qR(a): (B.11)
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To ensure the truth-telling equilibrium, we must have @R(a^ja)
@a^
ja^=a = 0. The
implicit function theorem implies that
dR(aja)
da
=

@R(a^ja)
@a
+
@R(a^ja)
@a^
@a^
@a

ja^=a = @R(a^ja)
@a
ja^=a = qR(a):
Integrating the above equation, we have the local IC constraint (where R(aja) = 0):
R(aja) = R(aja) +
Z a
a
dR(~aj~a)
d~a
d~a =
Z a
a
qR(~a)d~a: (B.12)
(B.12) suggests that for all a 2 [a; a], R(aja)  0. Hence, we do not have to
explicitly consider the IR constraint. Given the uniform distribution U[a; a], the
reseller's expected prot is
R =
Z a
a
1
a  a
Z a
a
qR(~a)d~a

da =
Z a
a
a  a
a  aqR(a)da:
The last equality holds because of integration by parts. By comparing (B.11)
and (B.12), we can derive the supplier's optimal wholesale price:
w(a) = a  qR(a) 
R a
a
qR(~a)d~a
qR(a)
: (B.13)
Hence, the supplier's optimization problem can be formulated as:
S = max
qR(a)
Z a
a
1
a  aw(a)qR(a)da
=
Z a
a
1
a  a
 
a  qR(a) 
R a
a
qR(~a)d~a
qR(a)
!
qR(a)da
=
Z a
a
1
a  a [2a  a  qR(a)] qR(a)da:
The last equality holds because of integration by parts. DenoteH(a) = [2a  a  qR(a)] qR(a).
We have:
dH
dqR
(a) = 2a  a  2qR(a):
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Solving dH
dqR
(a) = 0, we have the optimal reselling quantity: qER(a) =
 
a  a
2
+
.
Plugging qER(a) into (B.13), we have the optimal wholesale price: w
E(a) = a  
qER(a) 
R a
a q
E
R(~a)d~a
qER(a)
.
Proof of Proposition 24. With encroachment, after observing the reseller's or-
der quantity qR(a^), the supplier will set her direct selling quantity at q

S(a^) =
a^ qR(a^) c
2
+
. Thus, the reseller's prot function can be written as:
R(a^ja) = [a  qR(a^) 

a^  qR(a^)  c
2
+
  w(a^)]qR(a^)
where a is the observed market size while a^ is the index of the contract the reseller
chooses. Under the truth-telling equilibrium, we have:
R(aja) = [a  qR(a) 

a  qR(a)  c
2
+
  w(a)]qR(a):
As a result, we can derive the supplier's optimal wholesale price:
w(a) = a  qR(a) 

a  qR(a)  c
2
+
 
R a
a
qR(~a)d~a
qR(a)
: (B.14)
Further, we can formulate the supplier's optimization problem under the uniform
distribution as:
ES = max
qR(a)
Z a
a
1
a  a
(
w(a)qR(a) + [a  qR(a) 

a  qR(a)  c
2
+
  c]

a  qR(a)  c
2
+)
=
Z a
a
1
a  a
(
(a  c)2   [qR(a)]2 + 4cqR(a)
4
  (a  a)qR(a)
)
da:
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Denote H(a) = (a c)
2 [qR(a)]2+4cqR(a)
4
  (a  a)qR(a), and we have
dH
dqR
(a) =
2c  qR(a)
2
  (a  a):
Solving dH
dqR
(a) = 0, we derive the optimal reselling quantity:
qER(a) = 2(c+ a  a)+;
under which the supplier's equilibrium direct selling quantity is
qES (a) =

a  qR(a)  c
2
+
=

2a  a  3c
2
+
:
Note that the above derivation assumes the reselling quantity is positive. In
case the reselling quantity is zero at a demand realization a, the supplier's equilibrium
direct selling quantity will be qES (a) =
 
a c
2
+
. On the other hand, the direct selling
quantity can also be zero in equilibrium.
The regions with respect to c and a that correspond to the above cases with
specic pairs of qER(a) and q
E
S (a) can be easily obtained as presented in the propo-
sition. Finally, plugging qR(a) into (B.14), we have the optimal wholesale price:
wE(a) = a  qER(a) 

a qER(a) c
2
+
 
R a
a q
E
R(~a)d~a
qER(a)
.
Proof of Proposition 25. Below, we examine the eect of supplier encroachment
on the reseller and the supplier, respectively. We restrict the proof to the case where
a  2a
3
.
Reseller Prot
We can derive, based on Propositions 23 and 24, the reseller's expected gain
from supplier encroachment:
ER   NR =
Z a
a
a  a
a  a

qER(a)  qNR (a)

da:
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In particular, we can have four cases:
i) When c  a
2
, qER(a) = q
N
R (a) for any a 2 [a; a]. Hence, ER = NR .
ii) When c 2 (2a a
3
; a
2
), qER(a) qNR (a) = (a c)+ (a  a2)+. It is straightforward
to see that qER(a)  qNR (a)  0 for any a, and qER(a)  qNR (a) > 0 for any a > c. Hence,
ER > 
N
R . We also know that 
E
R is decreasing in c when c 2 (2a a3 ; a2) given qER(a)
is decreasing in c.
iii) When c 2 ( a
3
; 2a a
3
], we have
ER =
Z a
a
a  a
a  aq
E
R(a)da
=
Z 2a 3c
a
a  a
a  a [2(c+ a  a)] da+
Z a
2a 3c
a  a
a  a(a  c)da
=
 3a3   3ca2 + 27c2a  27c3 + 4a3   12aa2 + 6ca2   12caa+ 12a2a
6(a  a) :
Taking the rst derivative, we obtain
dER
dc
=  3a
2   54ac+ 81c2   6a2 + 12aa
6(a  a) :
We can observe that ER is increasing when
3a p6(a a)
9
< c < 3a+
p
6(a a)
9
and de-
creasing otherwise. Notice that 3a 
p
6(a a)
9
< a
3
and 3a+
p
6(a a)
9
< 2a a
3
. Hence,
ER is increasing in c when c 2

a
3
; 3a+
p
6(a a)
9

and decreasing in c when c 2
3a+
p
6(a a)
9
; 2a a
3

.
iv) When c 2 (0; a
3
), ER is increasing in c. Moreover, 
E
R ! 0 when c! 0.
Summarizing from the above analysis for cases i) to iv), we can conclude
that as c increases, ER is rst increasing (from 0 to a value greater than 
N
R ),
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then decreasing, and nally stabilizes at NR . Therefore, there exists a threshold c
0
R
such that the reseller is worse o with encroachment when c < c0R, better o when
c0R < c <
a
2
, and indierent when c  a
2
.
Supplier Prot
We can derive, based on Propositions 23 and 24, the supplier's expected gain
from supplier encroachment. In particular, we can have the following ve cases:
i) When c  a
2
, qER(a) = q
N
R (a) and q
E
S (a) = 0 for any a 2 [a; a]. Hence,
ES = 
N
S .
ii) When c 2 (2a a
3
; a
2
), the supplier's expected prot with encroachment is
ES =
Z a
a
1
a  a
(
(a  c)2   qER(a)2 + 4cqER(a)
4
  (a  a)qER(a)
)
da:
=
Z a
a
1
a  a fc(a  c)  (a  a)(a  c)g da
=
 a2 + 6ca  aa+ 2a2   6c2
6
:
Taking the rst derivative, we have
dES
dc
= a 2c, which implies that ES is increasing
in c when c 2 (2a a
3
; a
2
). Hence, given ES approaches 
N
S at c =
a
2
, we know the
supplier is worse o by encroachment when c 2 (2a a
3
; a
2
).
iii) When c 2 ( a
3
; 2a a
3
], the supplier's prot with encroachment is
ES =
Z 2a 3c
a
1
a  a
(
(a  c)2   [2(c+ a  a)]2 + 8c(c+ a  a)
4
  2(a  a)(c+ a  a)
)
da
+
Z a
2a 3c
1
a  a fc(a  c)  (a  a)(a  c)gda
=
24aac  24ca2   9ca2 + 12aa2 + 42ac2   15ac2   12aa2 + 6a3   5a3   27c3
12(a  a)
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Taking the rst derivative, we have
dES
dc
=
 24a2 + 84ac  9a2   30ac  81c2 + 24aa
12(a  a) :
It can be shown that ES is increasing when
14a 5a 2
p
(a a)(14a 5a)
27
< c <
14a 5a+2
p
(a a)(14a 5a)
27
and decreasing otherwise. It is also easy to check that
14a 5a+2
p
(a a)(14a 5a)
27
> 2a a
3
and
14a 5a+2
p
(a a)(14a 5a)
27
< a
3
for any a  2a
3
. Therefore, ES is increasing in c and
ES < 
N
S when c 2 ( a3 ; 2a a3 ].
iv) When c 2 (a  a; a
3
], the supplier's expected prot with encroachment is:
ES =
Z a
a
1
a  a
(
(a  c)2   [2(c+ a  a)]2 + 8c(c+ a  a)
4
  2(a  a)(c+ a  a)
)
da
=
5a2 + 5a2 + 9ca  7aa+ 15c2   15ca
12
:
Taking the rst derivative, we have
dES
dc
= 5c
2
  5a 3a
4
. Hence, ES can be rst
decreasing and then increasing in this region.
v) When c 2 (0; a  a], the supplier's prot with encroachment is:
ES =
Z a a
a
1
a  a

(a  c)2
4

da
+
Z a
a a
1
a  a
(
(a  c)2   [2(c+ a  a)]2 + 8c(c+ a  a)
4
  2(a  c)(c+ a  a)
)
da
=
a3   3a2c+ 3ac2   3(a3   3a2c+ 3ac2)
12(a  a)
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The rst derivative is:
dES
dc
=  3a
2+6ac+( 3a2+6ac)
12(a a) . It can be shown that 
E
S is de-
creasing when c < a
2+3a2
2(a+3a)
. Notice that a
2+3a2
2(a+3a)
> a   a when a  2a
3
. Thus ES is
decreasing in the whole region (0; a   a]. Combining the analysis for cases iv) and
v), we assert that the supplier's expected prot with encroachment is rst decreasing
and then increasing in c when c 2 (0; a
3
]. The maximum is achieved when c ! 0,
and ES goes to
2+2
4
which is larger than NS .
Summarizing the analysis for the cases i) to v), we conclude that as c increases
in the interval (0; a
2
], ES is rst decreasing, then increasing, and nally stabilizes at
NS . Therefore, there exists a threshold c
0
S such that the supplier is better o with
encroachment when c < c0S, worse o when c
0
S < c <
a
2
, and indierent when c  a
2
.
B.3.3 Analysis with General Continuous Demand Distribution
In this supplement, we extend the analysis for a special case with uniform
distribution of demand realization to the general case with a general continuous dis-
tribution G(a) and density g(a). We briey discuss why it is technically challenging
to come up with analytical results for a general distribution, especially when the
supplier holds the option of encroachment.
Without the Option of Encroachment
When the reseller observes a realization a but chooses the contract for real-
ization a^, the reseller's prot is
R(a^ja) = [a  qR(a^)  w(a^)]qR(a^):
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Due to the revelation principle, we, without loss of generality, focus on truth-
telling equilibrium where the reseller truthfully reports her observed demand. If
the reseller selects the truth-telling contract (the incentive compatibility constraints
hold), we have
R(aja) = [a  qR(a)  w(a)]qR(a) (B.15)
To ensure that the reseller chooses the truth-telling contract, we must have
@R(a^ja)
@a^
ja^=a = 0, i.e., truth-telling is the reseller's best strategy. The implicit function
theorem implies that
dR(aja)
da
=

@R(a^ja)
@a
+
@R(a^ja)
@a^
@a^
@a

ja^=a = @R(a^ja)
@a
ja^=a = qR(a):
Integrating the above equation, we have the local incentive-compatability con-
straint
R(aja) = R(aja) +
Z a
a
dR(~aj~a)
d~a
d~a =
Z a
a
qR(~a)d~a; (B.16)
because R(aja) = 0. Equation (B.16) suggests that for all a 2 [a; a], R(aja)  0.
Hence, we do not have to explicitly consider the individual rationality constraint in
this mechanism design problem. The reseller's expected prot is
R =
Z a
a
g(a)
Z a
a
qR(~a)d~a

da
=
Z a
a
[1 G(a)] qR(a)da:
Comparing Equations (B.15) and (B.16), we have supplier's the optimal
wholesale price as
w(a) = a  qR(a) 
R a
a
qR(~a)d~a
qR(a)
: (B.17)
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Denote the supplier's prot when demand realization is a by S(aja) =
w(a)qR(a). Plugging Equation (B.17) into the supplier's prot function, we obtain
the supplier's maximization problem as
S = max
qR(a)
Z a
a
g(a)w(a)qR(a)da:
=
Z a
a
g(a)
 
a  qR(a) 
R a
a
qR(~a)d~a
qR(a)
!
qR(a)da
=
Z a
a
g(a) (a  qR(a)) qR(a)da 
Z a
a
g(a)
Z a
a
qR(~a)d~a

da
=
Z a
a
g(a)

[a  qR(a)] qR(a)  [1 G(a)] qR(a)
g(a)

da
The last equality holds because by using integration by parts, we have
R =
Z a
a
g(a)
Z a
a
qR(~a)d~a

da =

G(a)
Z a
a
qR(~a)d~a

jaa  
Z a
a
G(a)qR(a)da
=
Z a
a
qR(a)da 
Z a
a
G(a)qR(a)da
=
Z a
a
[1 G(a)] qR(a)da
Denote H(a) = [a  qR(a)] qR(a)  [1 G(a)]qR(a)g(a) , we have
dH
dqR
(a) = a  2qR(a)  1 G(a)
g(a)
:
We assume that the inverse hazard rate 1 G(a)
g(a)
is monotone non-increasing in
a (notice that it is a standard assumption in the mechanism design literature that
the hazard rate g(a)
1 G(a) is monotone non-decreasing). In this case,
dH
dqR
(a) is monotone.
Solving dH
dqR
(a) = 0, we have the optimal wholesale quantity
qNR (a) =
a
2
  1 G(a)
2g(a)
:
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Notice that qNR (a) is increasing in a. Plugging this wholesale quantity into
Equation (B.17), we have the optimal wholesale price as
wN(a) = a  qNR (a) 
R a
a
qNR (~a)d~a
qNR (a)
:
With the Option of Encroachment
When the supplier holds the option of encroachment, the analysis of the con-
tract design problem is similar. We only need to add the supplier's direct selling
quantity into relevant equations. After observing the reseller's order quantity qR(a^),
the supplier's direct selling quantity follows Equation(3.1). The reseller's prot is
R(a^ja) = [a  qR(a^) 

a^  qR(a^)  c
2
+
  w(a^)]qR(a^):
If the reseller chooses the truth-telling contract (IC constraints hold), we have
R(aja) = [a  qR(a) 

a  qR(a)  c
2
+
  w(a)]qR(a):
Similar to the derivation of Equation (B.13), the supplier's optimal wholesale
price follows
w(a) = a  qR(a) 

a  qR(a)  c
2
+
 
R a
a
qR(~a)d~a
qR(a)
: (B.18)
When demand realization is a, the supplier's prot function under truth-
telling is
S(aja) = w(a)qR(a) + [a  qR(a) 

a  qR(a)  c
2
+
  c]

a  qR(a)  c
2
+
:
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Assume both rms sell positive quantities in any demand realization. The
supplier's optimization problem is
ES = max
qR(a)
Z a
a
g(a)
(
w(a)qR(a) + [a  qR(a) 

a  qR(a)  c
2
+
  c]

a  qR(a)  c
2
+)
=
Z a
a
g(a)

a  qR(a)  c
2
 a+ qR(a)  c
2
+ cqR(a)  [1 G(a)] qR(a)
g(a)

da
=
Z a
a
g(a)
(
(a  c)2   [qR(a)]2 + 4cqR(a)
4
  [1 G(a)] qR(a)
g(a)
)
da:
Denote H(a) = (a c)
2 [qR(a)]2+4cqR(a)
4
  [1 G(a)]qR(a)
g(a)
, and we have
dH
dqR
(a) =
2c  qR(a)
2
  [1 G(a)]
g(a)
:
Solving dH
dqR
(a) = 0, we have the optimal wholesale quantity
qER(a) =

2c  2 [1 G(a)]
g(a)
+
:
For qER(a) to be positive, we need c >
1 G(a)
g(a)
. The supplier's direct selling
quantity is
qES (a) =

a  qER(a)  c
2
+
:
From Equation (B.18), we have wE(a) = a qER(a) 

a qER(a) c
2
+
 
R a
a q
E
R(~a)d~a
qER(a)
.
For qES (a) > 0, i.e., q
E
R(a) < a   c, we need c < c(a) = a3 + 2[1 G(a)]3g(a) . Notice
that c(a) may not be monotone even we assume that the inverse hazard rate 1 G(a)
g(a)
is
monotone non-increasing in a. Hence, the supplier's direct selling quantity may go to
zero either when the market size is small or when the market size is large. This non-
monotonicity causes technical diculties in characterizing the wholesale quantity and
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the supplier's direct selling quantity when either of them goes to zero. Moreover, it
is technically challenging to analytically derive the supplier and the reseller's prots
for a general distribution function. There do not exist simple expressions for the
integrals under a general continuous distribution G(a).
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 4
C.1 Estimation of the Random Coecients Model
C.1.1 Calculation of Market Shares
Consumers are assumed to purchase one unit of the product that gives the
highest utility. Since in this model an individual is dened as a vector of individual,
time, and product-specic shocks, (vi; "1t; : : : ; "Jt; i0t; : : : ; iJt), this implicitly denes
the set of individual attributes that lead to the choice of product j. Formally, let
Ajt denes the individuals who choose product j in period t, then
Ajt(:t;) = f(i; "1t; : : : ; "Jt; i0t; : : : ; iJt)jUijt  Uikt; 8k = 0; 1; : : : ; Jg (C.1)
where :t = (1t; : : : ; Jt)
0 are mean utilities of all products, respectively. Assuming
ties occur with zero probability, the probability of the jth product is just an integral
over the mass of consumers in the region Ajt. Hence, we can calculate the market
share for product j as the probability of this product being chosen. Formally, it is
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given by
sjt(:t; v) =
Z
Ajt
dP (v; )
=
Z
Ajt
dP (v)dP ()
=
Z
exp(jt + yj(t 1)vvi)
1 +
PJ
k=1 exp(kt + yk(t 1)vvi)
dP (v) (C.2)
where P () is the distribution function. The second-last equality holds as we assume
individual-specic coecients v and time-individual-product specic idiosyncratic
shocks  are independent, while the last equality holds from the assumption that 
follow a Type I extreme value distribution. Market shares given in Equation (C.2) do
not have a closed-form expression. We use a Monte Carlo simulation to approximate
it. Recall that vi follows a multivariate normal distribution vi  N(0; IK), we can
obtain an unbiased estimator of this integral by taking n random draws of vi (each vi
corresponds to an individual consumer) and compute the average choice probability
from these n consumers as
sjt(:t; v) =
nX
i=1
sijt =
nX
i=1
exp(jt + yj(t 1)vvi)
1 +
PJ
k=1 exp(kt + yk(t 1)vvi)
(C.3)
C.1.2 Estimation Procedure
The estimation involves two nested loops. In the outer loop, the parameters
corresponding to the individual heterogeneity distribution are heuristically learned,
whereas the inner loop involves computing the unknown parameters embedded in
the mean utility. More specically, we ran the estimation algorithm as follows.
1. Generate 1000 i.i.d. draws of vi from the standard normal distribution.
227
2. Assign starting values to 0v. Also, initiate values for 
0.
3. Compute market share for product j according to Equation (C.3) using
Monte Carlo simulation.
4. The inner loop computation takes place based on a contraction-mapping
procedure. Fixing the nonlinear parameters  at their current values, iterate over
the values of the mean utility  to minimize the distance between the predicted
market share and the observed market share.
5. Given the  obtained from last step, extract the time-product specic
unobserved characteristic " from the linear equation as
" =    y + I +  +  : (C.4)
If instrument variables are not used,  in the equation above is the least squares
estimator. If instruments are used,  is the GMM estimator.
6. Form an objective function. If instrument variables are not used, the
objective function is the sum of squared errors, i.e., f = "0". If instruments are used,
we form a GMM-type objective function by interacting the unobserved characteristic
" with the set of instruments Z, i.e.,
f = "0ZW 1Z 0"; (C.5)
where W = E[Z 0Z] is the GMM weighting matrix.
7. The inner loop computation takes place again. Use quasi-Newton algorithm
to update the parameter values for v. Iterate from Step 3 until the algorithm nds
the optimal combination of v and  that minimizes the objective function.
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C.2 Instrument Variables and GMM Estimation
We address the endogeneity issue related to integration timing by using Face-
book's stock price as an instrument variable. Correlation of the endogeneity issue
related to application user bases using valid instruments is detailed below. All in-
struments are applied in Step 5 of the estimation procedure in Appendix C.1.2. We
turn to the GMM style estimators of dynamic panel data models that exploit the
lags and lagged dierences of explanatory variables as instruments. Although these
GMM estimators are often used in linear models, we show that it is straightforward
to apply them to our nonlinear model as well. We apply the instruments to the mean
utility function, in Step 4 of the estimation procedure detailed in Appendix C.1.2.
Essentially, the dependent variable is the mean utility  and the error terms are
time-product specic unobserved characteristic ". Denoting the interaction terms by
Xjt, we can rewrite Equation (C.4) as a standard panel model as follows
jt = yj(t 1)) +Xjt + j + "jt: (C.6)
The dynamic panel model literature has documented how to estimate panel
model with xed eects. We follow Nickell (1981) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
and come up with two types of instruments below. As description in Appendix C.1,
there are only minor changes to Step 5 and Step 6 of the estimation algorithm when
instrument variables are used. Basically, we form a GMM objective function based
on dierent moment conditions.
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C.2.1 Moment Conditions for First-Dierenced Equations
The rst set of moment conditions apply instruments to rst-dierences of
Equation (C.6). Denote the rst-dierence operator by , the rst-dierenced equa-
tion is
jt = yj(t 1) +Xjt +"jt; (C.7)
where jt = jt   j(t 1), yj(t 1) = yj(t 1)   yj(t 1), Xjt = Xjt   Xj(t 1),
and "jt = "jt  "j(t 1). Notice that rst dierencing has eliminated xed eect and
thus the correlation between the explanatory variables and j is no longer an issue.
However, by rst dierencing we have introduced another kind of bias. Now the
error term "jt is correlated with the explanatory variable yj(t 1). However, we
can show that yjp, 8p  t   2 are valid instruments as they are not correlated with
"jt, but correlated with yj(t 1). We therefore formulate the rst set of moment
conditions as follows
E[yjp"jt] = 0; 8p  t  2: (C.8)
C.2.2 Moment Conditions for Level Equations
Consider the level equation (C.6), the xed eect j is correlated with yj(t 1)
because the xed eect inuences consumer utility and aggregate demand in each
period. Notice that E[yjt"js] = 0 if s > t and E[yjt"js] 6= 0 if s  t. Thus, we have
that yjp is uncorrelated with "jt for all p  t   1. By extension, this implies that
yjp is uncorrelated with "jt for all p  t  1. As yjp is linearly correlated with j,
yjp is uncorrelated with j.Therefore, yjp is uncorrelated with both j and "jt,
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for all p  t  1. Therefore, we have the second set of moment conditions as follows
E[yjp"jt] = 0; 8p  t  1:
C.3 Estimation with Switching Costs
C.3.1 Calculation of Market Shares
With switching costs, an individual's choices also depend on her choice in last
period. An individual i is dened as a vector of individual, time, product-specic
shocks, and her last period usage di(t 1) = d. A full vector of consumer characteristics
consists of (di(t 1); 'i; i; "1t; : : : ; "Jt; i0t; : : : ; iJt), which implicitly denes the set of
individual attributes that lead to the choice of product j. Formally, let Ajt denes
the individuals who choose product j in period t, then
Ajt(d; :t;) =

(di(t 1); 'i; i; "1t; : : : ; "Jt; i0t; : : : ; iJt)jUijt  Uikt; 8k = 0; 1; : : : ; J
	
(C.9)
where :t = (1t; : : : ; Jt)
0 are mean utilities of all products. Assuming ties occur with
zero probability, the average probability of the jth product being chosen by those
consumers who chose d in last period is just an integral over the mass of consumers
in the region Ajt. Hence, we can calculate this average probability as
sjt(d; :t;v; c) =
Z
Ajt
dP ('; v; )
=
Z
Ajt
dP (')dP (v)dP () (C.10)
=
ZZ
exp
 
jt + yj(t 1)vvi   (c+ 'i)1

di(t 1) =2 f0; jg
	
1 +
PJ
k=1 exp
 
kt + yk(t 1)vvi   (c+ 'i)1

di(t 1) =2 f0; kg
	dP (')dP (v)
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where P () is the distribution function of consumer heterogeneity. The second-
last equality holds as we assume individual-specic coecients and time-individual-
product specic idiosyncratic shocks are independent, while the last equality holds
from the assumption that  follow a Type I extreme value distribution. Market
shares given in Equation (C.10) do not have a closed-form expression. We use a
Monte Carlo simulation to approximate it. We can obtain an unbiased estimator of
this integral by taking n independent draws of vi and 'i and compute the average
choice probability from these n consumers as
sjt(d; :t;v; c) =
nX
i=1
exp
 
jt + yj(t 1)vvi   (c+ 'i)1

di(t 1) =2 f0; jg
	
1 +
PJ
k=1 exp
 
kt + yk(t 1)vvi   (c+ 'i)1

di(t 1) =2 f0; kg
	
(C.11)
Let Mt denote the market size, i.e., the total number of consumers (including
outside good users) in period t. Let Nt denote the number of new consumers arriving
in the market in period t. The market size in period t is
Mt =Mt 1 +Nt: (C.12)
For expositional simplify, denote sjt(d) = sjt(d; :t;  ; c). Denote by Qjt the
total number of consumers who chose j in period t, then
Qjt =
JX
k=0
Qk(t 1)sjt(d = k) +Ntsjt(d = 0); (C.13)
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where Qk(t 1) is the number of consumers who chose option k in the previous period
t  1. The unconditional market share for product choose j in period t is simply
sjt =
Qjt
Mt
(C.14)
Estimation Procedure
The estimation procedure is similar to the estimation of the base mode in
Appendix C.1.2, with some very minor modications. More specically, we ran the
estimation algorithm as follows.
1. Generate 1000 i.i.d. draws of vi and 1000 i.i.d. draws of 'i from a standard
normal distribution.
2. Assign starting values to (0v; c
0). Also, initiate values for 0.
3. Compute market share for product j according to Equation (C.14) using
Monte Carlo simulation.
4. The inner loop computation takes place based on a contraction-mapping
procedure. Fixing the nonlinear parameters (v; c) at their current values, iterate
over the values of the mean utility  to minimize the distance between the predicted
market share and the observed market share.
5. The same as in Appendix C.1
6. The same as in Appendix C.1
7. The inner loop computation takes place again. Use quasi-Newton algorithm
to update the parameter values for (v; c). Iterate from Step 3 until the algorithm
nds the optimal combination of v, c, and  that minimizes the objective function.
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